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“Science, like all creative activity, is exploration, gambling,  
and adventure. It does not lend itself very well to neat blueprints, 
detailed road maps, and central planning. Perhaps that’s why it’s fun” 
Herbert A. Simon, 1964. 
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Abstract 
Government reforms have led nonprofit organisations (NPOs) to become more 
involved in the provision of mainstream public services in the UK and consequently 
they have been subject to an increasingly demanding regime of performance 
measurement and inspection if they wish to provide services on behalf of the state. 
The creation of a contract culture has put nonprofit providers in a position where 
they have to bid against each other to deliver pre-determined services, resulting in a 
very competitive operating environment. NPOs have become more professionalised 
and performance-driven and this new climate encourages a business-like attitude to 
the management of their services. Pay-for-performance schemes have become a 
recognised phenomenon in NPOs, despite having generated controversial discussion 
in the literature. The literature on incentive theories has been applied almost 
exclusively to private sector organisations and limited attention has been devoted to 
the nonprofit sector. It is argued here that one cannot simply transfer across for-profit 
sector ideas; one must try to establish a framework that is more suited to the logic of 
the NPO. The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, it investigates the use of 
performance-related pay (PRP) in nonprofit housing associations in England and 
looks at whether PRP acts as a motivator encouraging nonprofit employees to 
improve their work performance. Second, it inquires whether the new competitive 
and performance-driven environment influences the reward decisions of NPOs. This 
thesis examines influences on the choice of reward practices in housing associations 
in order to provide an alternative to agency explanations for the use of PRP in the 
nonprofit sector. The results not only point to the ineffectiveness of PRP schemes in 
housing associations but also identify the strength of institutional pressures on NPOs 
to conform with best practice in pay decisions.   
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Introduction 
Nonprofit organisations (NPOs) have become increasingly important 
in the provision of health, social services and housing in the UK, and the 
government, at both the local and national levels, has become an important source of 
funding for the work of many voluntary organisations. As a result, funding bodies are 
more demanding with regard to good management practice, and greater attention is 
paid to staff management so as to ensure the provision of high-quality services (Billis 
and Harris 1992). Changes in the nature of funding have contributed to the creation 
of a contract culture, where grants are made based on a specific service provision 
instead of the general purpose of a charity. The contract culture implies tighter 
controls and performance standards for staff delivering front-line services in 
community care, health, social services and homelessness (Cunningham 1999:20). 
Nonprofit providers are put in a position where they have to bid against each other to 
deliver pre-determined services, resulting in a very competitive operating 
environment. This ongoing pressure on NPOs to become more efficient and effective 
at competing for funding has led to a reliance on managerial concepts originally 
developed in private for-profit organisations (Theuvsen 2004). In particular, pay-for-
performance systems have become a widely recognised phenomenon in NPOs 
(Baber, Daniel et al. 2002; Barragato 2002). 
My thesis investigates the use of performance-related pay (PRP) in nonprofit housing 
associations (HAs) in England. HAs, according to Mullins (2010), are regarded as 
the ‘distant uncle’ of the voluntary sector in England because they have their own set 
of trade bodies, regulators, funders and consultancy organisations. Nonetheless, they 
remain true nonprofits, occupying a unique space outside of both the market and the 
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state (Salamon and Anheier 1997). As HA’s become more involved in the provision 
of mainstream public services, they also become more professionalised and 
performance-driven and that may well impact on their choice and use of reward 
practices. This is what makes them a very interesting case to study within the 
voluntary sector.  
The aim of this research work is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to address whether PRP 
acts as a motivator for nonprofit employees to improve their work and whether a new 
competitive and performance-driven environment could change the reward 
preferences of nonprofit employees whereby PRP becomes an incentive system 
suited to the needs of NPOs to increase organisational performance. The applicability 
of pay-for-performance systems in NPOs is something of a contradiction. Agency 
theory characterises compensation as a mechanism for aligning the behaviour of the 
agent with the interests of the principal. Making pay contingent on results obtained 
by agents implies that, the higher the salary received by an agent, the better will be 
the performance of the organisation (Fernandez-Alles, Cuevas-Rodriguez et al. 
2006). However, nonprofit sector theorists argue that nonprofit workers seem to 
accept lower monetary compensation, and that they may agree to donate labour 
because they believe in the social relevance of the organisational output. Previous 
studies (Weisbrod 1977; Hansmann 1987; Rose-Ackerman 1996; Handy and Katz 
1998) have been consistent with the assumption that NPOs have unique 
characteristics that can explain why they behave differently from for-profit 
organisations. These characteristics are likely to reduce production costs. Principal 
and agents are motivated by the mission of the organisation and, consequently, 
agency problems are not likely to arise as they do in the case of for-profit firms. The 
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NPO literature strongly emphasises the inadequacy of high-powered incentives in 
NPOs. The main rationale behind this is a lack of competition and the use of highly 
intrinsically motivated employees (Brandl and Guttel 2007). However, one could 
question whether the changing environmental conditions of the voluntary sector hold 
these assumptions true. The changing funding regime and market competition have 
led HAs to an increasing conformity with private sector management practices 
(Walker 1998) and the impact of such developments on the way PRP is implemented 
in these organisations remains to be seen.  
The paradox between the popularity of PRP in NPOs and its apparent ineffectiveness 
as a tool for increasing employee motivation leads to the second aim of this research. 
Why have housing associations introduced PRP for their employees? Research on 
institutional theory suggests that organisations are pressurised to change as a direct 
response to other organisations upon which they depend. Changes in pay systems 
could result from informal pressures exerted on HAs by funding bodies (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). Voluntary organisations drawn into the contract culture and 
encouraged to use the performance measures established by public funders may 
introduce PRP to evidence purposeful and proper management, sustain legitimacy 
and ensure continued access to resources (Meyer and Scott 1983). PRP may be more 
symbolic than instrumental, used to accommodate environmental expectations and 
signal to funding bodies a more business-like attitude. Institutional pressures 
influencing reward decisions provide an important dimension to the study of PRP in 
NPOs because it argues that the adoption of PRP reflects conformity with ‘best 
practice’ in pay decisions led by institutional isomorphism, rather than the strategic 
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and commercial considerations that would make PRP a suitable reward system for 
nonprofits. 
The rapid growth of the voluntary sector’s paid workforce has primarily been driven 
by the growth of public service delivery. The workforce is growing at a faster rate 
than the public sector itself, and estimates suggest that over half a million people are 
now in paid employment in the UK’s voluntary sector (NCVO 2007). Yet, relatively 
little is known about the way in which employees are managed in this sector, since it 
has been subject to little empirical investigation. My research will contribute to 
knowledge in a number of ways. First, it takes forward previous work examining 
performance in NPOs (Gray 1999; Brown 2002; Chou 2002; Ballou 2005) and 
addresses the issue at the employee level. Most studies concentrate on organisational 
performance in the healthcare system in the US or, at the employee level, on 
executive pay (Baber, Daniel et al. 2002; Gray and Benson 2003), resulting in a lack 
of empirical research on pay systems for the average nonprofit worker. Second, it 
aims to contribute to a programme of research into reward determination and 
uncover the underlying reasons for designing and implementing reward systems in 
NPOs. The analysis of why and how reward strategies are arrived at, and their 
efficacy in the social and economic context in which NPOs operate, are paramount to 
developing further research in reward management. Practically, my research findings 
may prompt practitioners in the sector to think more consciously and strategically 
about what drives their organisations’ choice of reward system.  
The first chapter will provide a discussion of incentives and motivation in the 
nonprofit sector in the interest of investigating whether pay systems such as PRP are 
suited to NPOs. The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 continues 
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the discussion of rewards in NPOs and an institutional theory perspective assists in 
explaining the reasons why nonprofits make reward decisions to implement PRP. 
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology. Chapter 4 discusses in detail the 
performance management and pay systems implemented in the four case studies. The 
objective here is to identify whether the performance management and PRP systems 
follow the advice of good practice in the sector. Chapter 5 addresses why NPOs, and 
HAs in particular, seek to introduce PRP. The results of interviews with senior 
management in PRP organisations as well as interviews with reward consultants in 
the field are presented. Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the data collected in the 
four case studies in the housing sector. It compares the organisations using PRP to 
those using seniority pay and investigates whether PRP motivates nonprofit 
employees to perform well at work. Chapter 7 uses the Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS) to investigate the use of PRP in nonprofit organisations 
and its effect on attitudinal outcomes such as job satisfaction, pay satisfaction and 
organisational commitment across the sector. The main objective of this chapter is to 
provide a broader view, beyond the case study analysis, of the use of PRP for 
nonprofit employees in the UK. Extending the analysis to a broader and larger 
sample such as the WERS helps to assess how far the findings of this thesis extend 
beyond the cases discussed here. Chapter 8 summarises the key conclusions, 
implications for research and practice, limitations of the study and directions for 
future research. 
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Chapter 1  Incentives and Motivation in Nonprofit Organisations 
In this chapter I present a discussion of the theory of incentives and 
how its theoretical framework fits into the nonprofit context. The discussion moves 
on to an overview of the theory of NPOs, focusing on the distinctive characteristics 
of these organisations. The main argument here is that the non-distribution 
constraint, inherent in nonprofit and public sector organisations, allows these 
organisations to drop the income maximisation purpose and produce socially 
desirable outcomes for society. Incentive theories may have a different impact in the 
nonprofit context since employees’ compatibility with the goals and values of the 
NPO may vary from the corresponding compatibility in for-profit organisations. The 
use of PRP is also discussed here and lessons learned from the public sector case are 
presented with the aim of shedding some light on how PRP may work in NPOs.  
1.1 Incentive Theories and their Application Beyond the For-Profit Firm 
Traditionally, the issue of incentives in organisations has been studied within 
the framework of agency theory. Agency theory provides an explanation of how the 
separation of organisational activities from ownership presents the problem of 
ensuring that the owner’s interests are aligned with the interests of the employees 
responsible for operating the business (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Because workers 
and employers may have divergent objectives within the organisation (Prendergast 
1999), the owners (the principal) will try to ensure that the employees (the agents) 
direct their work efforts in line with the owners’ interests. In order to achieve this, 
compensation systems are used to balance the provision of fixed and variable 
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rewards and ensure that appropriate incentives are in place for the employee to act in 
the owners’ interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The relationship between agent and principal can be classified into two aspects: The 
first one is referred to as moral hazard, which denotes a lack of effort on the part of 
the agent. In other words, the agent has an informational advantage over the principal 
and, after the contract has been agreed to, he or she does not meet the terms of the 
contract, knowing that the principal cannot directly observe his or her actions. The 
second aspect is known as adverse selection, often labelled information asymmetry. 
This is where the principal is not fully informed about the abilities of potential 
agents, and therefore may make an unwise agent choice (Eisenhardt 1989). The 
principal, aware of these potential problems, needs to guard against opportunistic 
agent behaviour by developing an effective contract. Three important factors will 
define the contracting process: the costs of obtaining information, both that needed to 
select the appropriate agent and that needed to effectively monitor and enforce the 
contract, the uncertainty associated with the production process, and the risk 
preferences of the actors (Ferris and Graddy 1996). The information costs related to 
agency problems will vary according to the nature of the activity being contracted. 
The costs of enforcing the contract depend on the measurability of the agent’s 
behaviour (effort), and the agent’s performance (the outcome of that effort). There is 
often considerable uncertainty associated with the translation of agent behaviour into 
outcomes. The more difficult it is to gather information on outcomes, the more likely 
it is that contracts will be based on behaviour. Thus, the ability to measure 
performance is a critical determinant of contract terms. The agent is unlikely to be 
indifferent about the nature of the contract, and a risk-adverse agent will not be 
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inclined to accept an outcome-based contract if there is a high degree of uncertainty 
associated with the behaviour-outcome process. The issue of risk arises because 
outcomes are only partly influenced by behaviour. Government policies, economic 
climate and competition can also have an impact on the outcomes. When outcome 
uncertainty is low, outcome-based contracts become more attractive (Eisenhardt 
1989). 
However, as Williamson (1985) has pointed out, contracts are not always effective at 
preventing opportunism. In his work on transaction costs, Williamson (1981:553) 
recognises two behavioural assumptions in his approach. The first is that agents are 
subject to bounded rationality and the second is that at least some agents are given to 
opportunism. Considering that rationality is limited by the amount of information 
one has, it becomes impossible to anticipate all contingencies and specify them in a 
contract. There are also high costs involved in trying to overly constrict agents’ 
opportunistic behaviour. If agents were not given to opportunistic behaviour, 
incomplete contracts would not be a problem. Williamson (1985) advances his work 
addressing opportunistic behaviour by making a distinction between high-powered 
and low-powered incentives. High-powered incentives are provided by market 
transactions in which gains go directly to the parties transacting. In organisations, 
which he calls hierarchies, incentives are low-powered and the employees involved 
in a transaction may get a pay rise or a promotion but will not make any direct gains 
from the transaction. However, firms have increasingly turned to high-powered 
incentives that base compensation on measures of employee output. These include 
stock options to compensate executives, pay by results and PRP using a diversity of 
compensation systems. High-powered incentives have clear advantages but 
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Williamson also warns of the disadvantages of such incentives. Incentives can be too 
powerful and may encourage people to behave more dishonestly since the rewards 
are higher.  
The key elements of incentive theories described above have largely been applied in 
(and developed for) for-profit organisations. High-powered incentives, for instance, 
may have beneficial effects in specific circumstances and for some principals but 
lead to very dysfunctional reactions in other circumstances and for a different type of 
principal (Dixit 2002). What must be taken into account here is the set of special 
characteristics some organisations may have that makes it difficult for them to 
successfully introduce outcome- or performance-based incentives. The theory of 
incentives argues that an agent gets utility only from the monetary income the 
principal pays him and disutility from the effort he exerts on behalf of the principal. 
Dixit (2002) points out that agents may also be motivated by some aspects of the job 
itself. If agents are motivate by working in the organisation and by the actions they 
perform in their jobs, then the principal can offer smaller marginal bonus payments 
and still guarantee the same level of effort. Several studies (Rainey 1979; Rainey 
1982; Ferris and Graddy 1994; Tirole 1994; Frant 1996; Dixit 2002) have suggested 
that different incentive structures and constraints embedded in public, private and 
nonprofit organisations can result in different behaviours and outcomes. Firms 
operate differently depending on their ownership structure and on the motivations of 
employees, managers and consumers (Rose-Ackerman 1996).  
The ownership structure of an organisation influences its objectives and its values. In 
for-profit organisations, the owner has control over the organisation and, therefore, 
not only the right to claim the residual income, but also to determine the goals of the 
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organisation, which will most likely be related to profit maximisation. Even when the 
organisation has a variety of stakeholders to answer to, the profit maximisation goal 
is usually shared by them all. Contrast this with government and nonprofit 
organisations. The heterogeneous stakeholders in these organisations are unlikely to 
share the same goals (Tirole 1994). Nonprofit organisations are accountable to a 
variety of constituencies and key stakeholders include financial donors, funders, 
service recipients and volunteers (Speckbacher 2003). Extending the line of 
reasoning applied to government organisations (Tirole 1994; Dixit 2002) to 
nonprofits, the profit maximisation objective in the latter is likely to be replaced, not 
by a single goal for the organisation, but by a multiplicity of potentially conflicting 
objectives, leading to vague and difficult-to-measure goals, to support these diverse 
groups (Stone and Brush 1996; Stone, Bigelow et al. 1999). The objectives are often 
very difficult to quantify because of their qualitative dimensions. Moreover, even 
when the objectives can be identified, their diversity raises the issue of how much 
weight should be given to each one in order to obtain a stable and well-defined 
purpose to maximise. Dixit (2002) stresses the multidimensionality of goals in 
government agencies and the difficulties in identifying what would constitute their 
fulfilment. As the profit motive does not figure importantly among the formal 
objectives of NPOs, their objectives are not as clear and well defined as they are in 
for-profits. While investors focus on the return on capital, owners of nonprofits 
promote other types of goals such as the return on the work accomplished, the quality 
of goods produced or the accessibility of the service provided (Laville and Nyssens 
2001). 
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Incentives are used as a mechanism to transmit the organisation’s values and shape 
attitudes and performance to conform to those values (Lawler 1983). NPOs, like 
government institutions, are highly complex; their goals and objectives are not 
always clearly codified but have usually developed from the history of the 
organisation and the shared values of its stakeholders (Bacchiega and Borzaga 2001). 
Consequently, incentive theories may work differently in relation to employees’ 
attitudes and performance, depending on the type and strength of an individual’s 
motives and their compatibility with the organisation’s goals and values (Puffer and 
Meindl 1992).  
Economic theories of the nonprofit sector can also help us to understand the 
distinctiveness of these organisations. Theoretical work started in the 1970s due to 
the growing number of organisations in the sector and, moreover, the large and 
growing public subsidies being given to them, which made understanding their 
economics relevant to public policy (Hansmann 1987). The economic theories of the 
NPO presented next help to explain the profit versus nonprofit distinction that has 
emerged from the theory of incentives in this section. 
1.2 Economic Theories of the Nonprofit Sector: Roles and Behaviour of 
Nonprofit Organisations  
A substantial body of work has been dedicated to the economics of the 
nonprofit sector (Weisbrod 1977; Hansmann 1980; Young 1983; Salamon 1987; 
Steinberg 1987; Rose-Ackerman 1996). Hansmann (1987) divides the literature into 
two groups: theories on the role of NPOs and theories on their behaviour. The first 
addresses issues concerned with the existence of NPOs and the economic functions 
they perform. The second relates to the objectives pursued by nonprofits and the 
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motivations of the managers and entrepreneurs who found and work for them. 
Questions of role and behaviour cannot be separated. In order to understand how 
these organisations behave, one needs first to understand how they developed and 
have survived in the market.    
The public goods theory is the first economic theory of the role of NPOs. Weisbrod 
(1977) proposes that NPOs serve as private producers of public goods. Public goods 
are characterised here as products that, once produced, are enjoyed by everyone, 
whether or not they have paid for them. A clean environment is an example of a 
public good. Such goods can be desirable within a society but not necessarily 
profitable and for this reason may not be supplied by for-profit firms. Governments 
provide public goods but only at the level that satisfies the median voter; they may 
not be able or willing to meet all of the demand for certain goods, creating a demand 
for services produced by voluntary organisations. Nonprofits may also provide more 
diverse services than is possible in the public sector and individuals who are 
dissatisfied with the low quality of public services and wish to supplement this 
provision may establish nonprofits (Weisbrod 1977). Weisbrod’s theory captures an 
important phenomenon in nonprofits: their role as providers of public goods. 
However, the problem with this theory is that many NPOs seem to provide private 
services rather than public ones. His theory does not explain the existence of 
commercial nonprofits, organisations whose income derives from the sale of goods 
or services, such as nonprofit hospitals, nursing homes, day-care centres or housing 
and support for the homeless. The theory also stops short of explaining why 
commercial nonprofits seem to spring up and survive in sectors where private firms 
cannot or are less likely to.  
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The contract failure theory (Hansmann 1980) expands the body of literature on the 
economic role of nonprofits and raises the issue of asymmetric information and 
transaction costs. Hansmann (1980) argues that NPOs arise in circumstances where 
consumers are not able to accurately evaluate the quantity and/or quality of the 
service a firm provides for them. For-profit firms thus have the financial incentive to 
take advantage of customers by providing less service or service of a lower quality 
than what was agreed. In contrast, NPOs, owing to the non-distribution constraint, 
have less incentive to take advantage of their customers. The central discussion of 
Hansmann’s theory evokes the issue of trust. Because nonprofits do not distribute 
profits to owners, and because altruistically oriented individuals are assumed to self-
select themselves into the sector, these organisations are seen as more trustworthy. 
NPOs are also efficient responses to high monitoring costs (Krashinsky 1986). 
Essentially, the contract failure theory views the nonprofit firm as a response to 
agency problems (Hansmann 1987). Since nonprofit employees tend to be 
altruistically oriented, nonprofits are motivated to act in accordance with consumer 
expectations, which implies that the costs of monitoring for potential exploitation, 
common in for-profit organisations, are avoided.  
Salamon (1987) suggests that Weisbrod’s and Hansmann’s theories explain the 
existence of the voluntary sector in terms of market failures and concentrate on 
comparing nonprofit and for-profit organisations. Instead, he developed a new theory 
of the voluntary sector based on the partnership between nonprofits and the 
government. The central argument of his theory signals that voluntary organisations 
are best equipped to solve collective and community problems although, if nonprofits 
fail to provide, government action becomes appropriate. The author suggests that, 
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instead of the voluntary sector being given a secondary role, it should be seen as the 
preferred mechanism for providing collective goods and services, with the 
government only assuming the residual role. Salamon’s (1987) voluntary failure 
theory suggests that the failures of voluntary organisations justify government 
involvement and support for the voluntary sector. This approach is certainly more 
consistent with the history of the government-nonprofit relationship in European 
countries, and in the UK most specifically but what exactly are the voluntary failures 
addressed in Salamon’s theory? There are four: ‘philanthropic insufficiency’ 
concerns the inability of the sector to generate sufficient income; ‘philanthropic 
particularism’ describes the tendency of NPOs to focus on specific groups, rather 
than favouring equality; ‘philanthropic paternalism’ refers to the fact that those in 
control of the charitable resources can determine what the sector does and whom it 
serves; lastly, ‘philanthropic amateurism’ explains the difficulties of attracting 
professional personnel.  
Salamon (1987) suggests that the voluntary sector’s weaknesses correspond well 
with the government’s strengths and vice versa. On the one hand, the failures 
described above can be diminished because the government is in a position to 
generate more resources, set priorities to guarantee access to all citizens and improve 
the quality of the services by establishing quality control standards. On the other 
hand, nonprofits, operating on a smaller scale, can avoid red tape, adjust to the needs 
of customers and allow for a degree of competition among service providers. The 
theoretical rationale for government-nonprofit cooperation is a strong one. However, 
there are several concerns for the voluntary organisations, such as loss of autonomy, 
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bureaucratisation, and distortion of their mission in the pursuit of public funding, to 
name a few.  
The second group of nonprofit theories relates to the behaviour of the NPOs. Most 
models of the behaviour of NPOs are optimising models (Hansmann 1987). These 
models explain the behaviour of the NPO according to the optimisation of an 
objective function under several restrictions. One example is the ‘constrained 
quality-quantity maximising model’ developed for the case of hospitals by 
Newhouse (1970). The main objective of the hospital is to maximise the quantity of 
services provided and at the same time maximise the quality of care; such objectives 
are constrained by a budget. Newhouse’s model shows that the nonprofit firm will 
exhibit productive inefficiency when compared with the for-profit firm. This model 
suggests that organisations in general minimise costs. However, due to the absence 
of ownership claims on residual earnings, the nonprofit firm will not have an 
incentive to minimise costs and therefore will inherently be subject to productive 
inefficiency. Hansmann (1981) and James and Neuberger (1981) found similar 
results for performing arts organisations and universities, respectively. Another 
common behaviour of nonprofit firms is their poor ability to respond quickly to 
increases in demand compared to their private counterparts. One explanation is that 
NPOs are constrained in their access to capital (Hansmann 1987). The lower levels 
of efficiency, presented as a distinctive behaviour of NPOs, integrate well with 
theories of the role of nonprofits, especially Salamon’s (1987) voluntary failure 
theory where government-nonprofit partnership becomes relevant. 
Entrepreneurial theories of NPOs also offer an explanation for the distinctive 
behaviour of these organisations. Unlike the neo-classical models described above, 
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their contribution focuses on the preferences of the individuals engaged in these 
organisations. Understanding the motivations of economic actors who take actions 
from which they derive no material advantage has always been a challenge for 
economic theory. However it has been recognised that individuals derive satisfaction 
not only from extrinsic motives but also from setting meaningful goals and achieving 
them (Ben-Ner and Gui 2003). Entrepreneurship theories propose that 
entrepreneurial behaviour explains why NPOs are founded and why they engage in 
the provision of services (Badelt 1997).  
Young (1983) points out in his work different entrepreneurial motivations in the 
nonprofit sector, which helps to explain why NPOs are established in the first place. 
Young finds that preferences such as pride in accomplishment, the search for 
personal identity, a need for autonomy and independence and a desire to preserve a 
cherished organisation are more prevalent within nonprofit entrepreneurs. The author 
suggests that entrepreneurs with different motivations and styles allocate themselves 
into industries and economic sectors according to their preferences for wealth, 
power, and intellectual and moral purposes. Once established in different parts of the 
economy, they will be responsible for introducing particular behaviour and 
characteristics in their sector and in their organisation. Badelt (2003) affirms that 
entrepreneurial theories are consistent with theories of the role of NPOs. The 
different motivations of individuals founding NPOs are far from profit maximisation 
and therefore efficiency levels may be lower in nonprofits. James’s (1987) work on 
religious organisations, for example, indicates that customers may prefer the services 
of NPOs for the same reasons that nonprofit entrepreneurs form them. 
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The literature on NPOs is abundant and research has shown that nonprofits are more 
than profit maximisers (Newhouse 1970; Hansmann 1981; James 1983). The non-
distribution constraint has been the most salient characteristic of NPOs presented in 
the literature so far but the question is whether the behaviour of for-profit and 
nonprofit organisations can be differentiated according to that constraint. Empirical 
studies comparing the economic behaviour of nonprofit, government and for-profit 
organisations exist for a number of industries, although most deal with health care. 
Attention has been directed mainly towards differences in four dimensions of 
behaviour: cost and use of resources, quality of service, access to care and user 
satisfaction (Weisbrod 1989).   
With respect to costs, a study of hospitals (Steinberg and Gray 1993:306) reviewed 
research comparing for-profit and nonprofit hospitals and concluded that ‘nonprofits 
had either similar or lower expenses than did for-profits, and all studies showed that 
the costs to third-party payers were substantially higher in for-profit hospitals than in 
nonprofits’. Hamilton (1994) found that NPOs served more patients than government 
and private hospitals, and characterises nonprofit hospitals as patient maximisers 
rather than profit maximisers.  
The effect of ownership type (for-profit, nonprofit or government agencies) on the 
quality of the service provided is also a subject of speculation. An important aspect is 
whether for-profit organisations cut quality more, especially in dimensions that are 
difficult for consumers or regulators to monitor (Weisbrod 1989). A study of day-
care centres found that the quality among nonprofits tended to be higher than in for-
profits (Mauser 1998). Gray (1986) also concludes that most studies on the quality of 
nursing home care favour NPOs in a wide range of measures, including the amount 
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of patient care staff, expenditure on food, complaints to state agencies and 
nonconformity with regulatory requirements. Grabowski and Hirth (2003) found 
support for asymmetric information theory, and confirm that an increase in nonprofit 
market share has improved for-profit and overall nursing home quality. Marmor, 
Schlesinger et al. (1987) found that for-profit organisations offered lower-quality 
care than nonprofits. Gray (1999) and Harrigan, Woolhandler et al. (2001) conclude 
that for-profit nursing homes provide worse and less nursing care than nonprofit and 
public homes. This shows that some studies are consistent with the assumption that 
the non-distribution constraint will soften the incentive to reduce quality of service in 
aspects that are hard to monitor (Chou 2002).  
When it comes to access to care, Mauser (1998) found that nonprofit day-care 
centres were more likely to serve children from low-income families than for-profits, 
even when price was controlled for. Another national study in the US also compared 
for-profit and nonprofit organisations in relation to patient selection (Brown 2002) 
and found that nonprofits were more likely to serve severely disabled people. Ballou 
(2005), meanwhile, confirms that ownership has an effect on consumers’ choices. He 
concludes that clients have a preference for nonprofit homes. Other studies have 
consistently found NPOs to be more positively associated with user satisfaction than 
for-profits (Dellana and Glascoff 2001; Landon, Zaslavsky et al. 2001; Sikorska-
Simmons 2005; Gillies, Chenok et al. 2006). Interpreting consumer satisfaction is not 
clear-cut, however, and should also be related to expectations (Carley 1988). On the 
one hand, a high level of satisfaction could simply be a result of low expectations; on 
the other hand, consumers may be dissatisfied with an adequate service because of 
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unmet needs that the service was not designed to meet in the first place (Carley 
1988). 
The four dimensions of behaviour discussed here – cost, quality, access to care and 
user satisfaction – are not, on their own, predictive of performance. They have 
deficiencies, and strong conclusions about the superior performance of NPOs are not 
warranted. However, what these studies demonstrate is a significant difference 
between the behaviour of nonprofit and for-profit organisations and, moreover, how 
the non-distribution constraint is effective in producing socially desirable outcomes 
(Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld 2001).  
The studies presented above show the profit-nonprofit distinction at the 
organisational level. However, the non-distribution constraint can also explain 
different behaviours at the employee level. Theoretical research on NPOs assumes 
that nonprofits attract intrinsically motivated agents (Hansmann 1980; Rose-
Ackerman 1996) and several empirical studies show that these nonprofit agents are 
willing to exchange extrinsic rewards for commitment to a social cause (Handy and 
Katz 1998). The next section will reveal the unique attributes of employees in the 
nonprofit sector in relation to their motivation, and how the non-distribution 
constraint plays an important role in that. Nonprofit employees appear to have 
different needs, motivations and reward preferences that culminate in a stronger 
nonmonetary motivational foundation (Ridder and McCandless 2010). 
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1.3 The Characteristics of the Nonprofit Employee: Different Needs and 
Motivation 
NPOs have distinctive structures of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives that 
serve to attract workers who are not predominantly driven by monetary remuneration 
(Bacchiega and Borzaga 2001). The rewards offered in organisations can take 
various forms: Firstly, intrinsic rewards consist of features of the work itself, such as 
worker self-fulfilment and fulfilment of the organisation’s social mission, 
opportunities for workers to accomplish moral and ideological aspirations, and doing 
work that is helpful to other people. Extrinsic rewards can be monetary, such as pay 
and benefits, or nonmonetary, such as job security, autonomy, future career 
advancements, and training and development (Borzaga and Tortia 2006). A mix of 
these incentives, with less emphasis on monetary rewards, serves as an organisational 
device to attract employees to the NPO.  
In many organisations the services provided are very difficult to measure in terms of 
output. Hence, linking workers’ remuneration to their performance does not help to 
solve agency problems because of the difficulties of monitoring effort. ‘Any 
economic system can reward only what it can monitor, and monitoring involves cost’ 
(Weisbrod 1989:542). One consequence of the difficulties of monitoring effort is the 
adoption of incentives only loosely related to performance. However, these types of 
incentive may trigger low commitment from workers and have limited influence in 
terms of encouraging agents to behave efficiently (Bacchiega and Borzaga 2001). In 
NPOs the services provided are often intangible, making outputs even harder to 
measure. Williamson (1975), for example, stresses that monitoring in NPOs can be 
even more complicated than in business enterprises as measuring the fulfilment of 
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organisational goals is more difficult. Another problem with measuring performance 
in NPOs is that, even if outcome measures can be identified, they may not be 
affected only by the employee’s effort. NPOs often face problems securing funds for 
their activities, attracting volunteers and securing reasonable levels of workforce to 
do the job. These factors could contribute to an incorrect perception of low employee 
performance. On the other hand, some important aspects of worker behaviour in 
NPOs may diminish the effort-monitoring problem.  
There is an ongoing debate on wage differentials between nonprofit, for-profit and 
government organisations. Empirical studies have shown that NPOs tend to pay their 
employees less than public and for-profit organisations (Mirvis and Hackett 1983; 
Preston 1990). The hypothesis of donative labour suggests that nonprofit workers 
seem to accept lower monetary compensation and agree to donate labour because 
they believe in the social relevance of the organisational output and share the mission 
of the organisation (Preston 1989). However, the differences in monetary 
compensation diminish or even disappear in industries such as health, social services 
and education, where nonprofits are heavily concentrated (Ruhm and Borkoski 
2000). Some other studies point out that NPOs pay their workers less than 
government agencies and more than for-profit organisations in certain industries but, 
when nonprofits have a larger number of volunteers with a high social aim, pay is 
lower than in for-profit organisations (Almond and Kendall 2000). Leete’s (2001) 
research indicates that there is no single economy-wide wage differential among 
sectors as the differences disappear when controlling for industry and occupational 
category. However, she finds that Preston’s (1989) donative hypothesis holds true for 
white-collar workers. She goes further and reveals that wages in nonprofits are less 
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dispersed than in for-profits, leading to perceptions of greater fairness in wage 
structures. Leete (2000) suggests that NPOs rely more on practices that strengthen 
intrinsic motivation than their for-profit counterparts and that wage equity may be 
important for developing and maintaining employee motivation in this sector. 
Empirical evidence also suggests that employees in the for-profit and nonprofit 
sectors differ in personality, values and behavioural dimensions (Rawls, Ullrich et al. 
1975). The authors point out that the students in their sample who expressed a 
preference for positions in NPOs had different needs from those who chose for-profit 
organisations. Previous studies (Hansmann 1987; Weisbrod 1989; Rose-Ackerman 
1996; Handy and Katz 1998) are consistent with the assumption that nonprofit 
employees are highly motivated by the social aim of the organisation and are 
attracted by the goals they are asked to pursue. However, personality and values are 
not the only differences found between for-profit and nonprofit workers. Nonprofit 
employees have stronger nonmonetary orientation and studies have shown the 
different reward preferences of these employees and their reasons for working in 
NPOs (Light 2002; Borzaga and Tortia 2006). Wittmer (1991) examined 
motivational factors among public, for-profit and nonprofit employees and identified 
that nonprofit employees were more interested in serving the public needs than in 
extrinsic rewards such as a large salary. The research also shows similar motivational 
factors between government and nonprofit employees. Another study compared 
nonprofit employees with government and for-profit employees (Mirvis and Hackett 
1983) and found that nonprofit employees were more likely than for-profit workers 
to state that ‘their work is more important to them than the money they earn’ and 
reported more ‘meaningfulness’ and autonomy in their work than for-profit 
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employees. The authors also suggest that government and nonprofit employees have 
some similar orientations towards work and intrinsic job gratification. 
Katz (1964) proposes that organisations need to elicit different types of behaviours to 
function effectively and increase performance. Experienced meaningfulness and 
autonomy in the workplace relate to what the author calls spontaneous behaviour. 
This type of behaviour is illustrated by one showing initiative and working beyond 
the requirements of his/her job. Reliable behaviours, on the other hand, are 
characterised by regular attendance, arriving at work on time and having to perform 
at the satisfactory level. Self-determination theory confirms this view and posits that 
there are two types of motivation, autonomous and controlled (Gagne and Deci 
2005). Autonomous motivation involves acting with a sense of discretion or choice, 
and controlled motivation involves acting with a sense of pressure, a sense of having 
to engage in the actions (2005:334). According to the authors, autonomous 
motivation is an example of intrinsic motivation and in the case of nonprofit 
employees, they tend to have more autonomy, greater task variety and greater 
influence over their job than for-profit employees and these characteristics have been 
identified as essential for strengthening intrinsic motivation.  
Research also confirms that nonprofit workers display higher job satisfaction than 
for-profit employees, even in the presence of lower wage levels (Mirvis 1992; Benz 
2005; Borzaga and Dependri 2005; Borzaga and Tortia 2006). Parsons and 
Broadbridge (2006) explore the role of job characteristics and communication in 
relation to job motivation and satisfaction amongst UK charity shop managers. The 
authors found that, although managers exhibited high levels of satisfaction when 
analysing job characteristics, they exhibited much lower levels of satisfaction with 
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factors such as pay, job status and working conditions. The study points out that the 
managers’ dissatisfaction with these extrinsic factors was overcome by the 
satisfaction they achieved from providing support to their volunteers and help to the 
charity’s beneficiaries. Hackman and Oldham (1980) explain the ‘task significance’ 
concept, in which a job that has an important impact on the lives of others becomes 
strongly meaningful to a worker, to the point that it is translated into worker 
satisfaction and performance. Thus, it seems clear that the monetary characteristic is 
not necessarily the highest priority for employees. Rather, NPOs seem to be able to 
motivate employees by using non-wage incentives and relying more than other types 
of organisations on intrinsic motivation.  
Another study (Devaro and Brookshire 2007) presents evidence that there is no 
difference in average performance between business workers and those from 
nonprofit firms. Yet, in their study, business firms appear to use different types of 
incentive mechanisms, such as promotions and other types of output-contingent 
incentive contracts, while the opposite scenario is found in NPOs. Considering that 
performance levels are the same, on average, in both types of firm, it seems that 
NPOs must have a different approach to creating incentives for their workers. The 
authors explain that a plausible answer is that workers in nonprofit firms are 
inherently more motivated than their for-profit counterparts because of their interest 
in the organisational mission of the NPO. Based on these studies, it seems clear that 
nonprofit and for-profit employees do not share the same characteristics defining 
their motivations (Alvarado 1996). Such differences may well lead to different 
approaches to reward systems. Theuvsen (2004) indicates that since nonprofit 
employees are not primarily motivated by financial rewards, the conditions of 
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nonprofit environments and employees’ preferences do not coincide with the 
motivational determinants of pay-for-performance systems.  
NPOs seem to be able to mobilise human and financial resources and to select 
workers who are willing to exert themselves for other reasons than in exchange for 
monetary compensation. Authors (Bacchiega and Borzaga 2001; Borzaga and Tortia 
2004) suggest that the efficiency of NPOs is tied to the sharing and fulfilment of 
social missions. The existence of an explicit social aim is an important signal of the 
organisation’s nature, and existing and potential workers should be attracted to the 
organisational goals they will be asked to pursue. The non-distribution constraint of 
NPOs makes it possible to attract workers who are motivated by reasons other than 
economic ones. The pursuit of collective benefits associated with the goods or 
services produced constitutes an incentive in itself and explains the commitment of 
the individuals who create and establish the goals of the NPO. Serving the 
community facilitates the integration of volunteers, users, workers and access to 
various donations. When the dimension of working for a common good is present, it 
facilitates social support from workers, volunteers and users, who share a concern for 
a problem that needs action (Laville and Nyssens 2001). The stakeholders involved, 
both internal and external, have incentives to find responses to any problems they 
identify in the organisation. This feature of NPOs is most likely to reduce production 
costs. Stakeholders, principal and agents, are motivated by the mission of the 
organisation and are interested in establishing fiduciary relationships; consequently, 
agency problems are not likely to arise as they do in the case of for-profit firms.  
Working in a NPO, setting meaningful goals and achieving such goals enables 
committed workers to realise their own visions. This also enables employees to 
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understand how a certain service should be provided and how an organisation should 
be conducted. Engaging in such valuable activities is an incentive for workers as they 
may gain gratitude from the public or a group of people being served (Rose-
Ackerman 1996). Rose-Ackerman (1996) argues that an organisation with committed 
founders and workers has two possible benefits. First is the quality control 
advantage, where founders will seek to hire employees who share their vision and 
thus little monitoring will be necessary. This means that the problem of effort control 
can be diminished or eliminated by selecting motivated managers and workers, or by 
auto-selection by these employees themselves, promoted by incentive structures that 
rely less on monetary rewards (Handy and Katz 1998). Secondly, NPOs have the 
product differentiation advantage. This means that they can attract a high level of 
professional employees, willing to accept a lower level of pay in return for achieving 
their altruistic goals of providing goods and services in a NPO. 
The social dimension of NPOs and their motivated workers are crucial to defining 
the incentives adopted within them. The existence of an explicit goal of contributing 
to the social good and the direct involvement of a group of stakeholders such as 
members, donors, volunteers, customers and workers sharing common values are 
some of the important characteristics that should be considered when applying the 
theory of incentives. The involvement of agents interested in the services provided 
by the organisation creates an environment of participation and democratic 
management, which increases the cohesiveness within the group carrying out the 
tasks, strengthening the achievement of goals (Bacchiega and Borzaga 2001). The 
studies presented here are consistent with the assumption that NPOs and the 
motivational characteristics of nonprofit employees are more likely to avoid the 
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problem of workers’ opportunistic behaviour than are for-profit enterprises. The 
characteristics of NPOs give rise to incentive systems that help to overcome agency 
problems. The distinctions between for-profit and nonprofit organisations argued for 
here explain why the incentive logic that applies within businesses cannot be forced 
into the nonprofit case without considering the specificities of these organisations. 
The fact is that incentive systems have always been a controversial issue and this is 
no different in the nonprofit sector. The challenge is to promote a framework of 
analysis suited to the logic of the NPO. The next section will discuss in detail the 
theoretical foundations of PRP and its use in the nonprofit sector. 
1.4 Theoretical Foundations of Performance-related Pay  
This thesis is concerned with individual PRP schemes as they appear to focus 
on the issue of motivation more acutely than other schemes such as team bonuses or 
other systems concentrating on organisational performance. Perhaps this is because 
the link between individuals, pay and their performance in individual PRP schemes 
more closely reflects the key elements of motivation theories than in other incentive 
schemes (Thomson 2004). This section identifies those theories of motivation that 
seem most likely to explain the motivational effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of PRP 
schemes. Looking at the literature, the three theories identified as most relevant to 
PRP are expectancy theory, goal-setting theory and equity theory (Marsden and 
French 1998).  
PRP is considered a powerful motivational tool and the main theoretical support for 
using pay as a motivational tool comes from expectancy theory (Vroom 1964). 
Expectancy theory points to three factors that play an interactive role in motivation. 
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The first is the effort-performance relationship, also called expectancy. This refers to 
how strongly effort is (positively) correlated to performance, from the individual’s 
viewpoint. The higher the effort-performance expectancy, the more motivated the 
individual will be to apply effort. The second factor, referred to as instrumentality, 
represents the performance-outcome relationship, which can be translated as the 
individual’s expectation that his reward will be closely linked to his level of 
performance. This factor also leads to an increase in the motivation to exert effort. 
The third factor, valence, represents the degree to which a person values a particular 
reward. The higher the valence factor, the higher will be the motivation of the 
individual. Interestingly, the second and third factors of expectancy theory can be 
translated into the agency theory framework discussed earlier. Instrumentality 
translates into incentive intensity and valence into the agent’s utility function. In both 
theories, remuneration is valued positively and effort negatively by the individual 
(Sloof and van Praang 2007). 
Clearly, there is a natural congruence between a pay system that links pay to 
performance and a theory that predicts an employee will be motivated to work harder 
to achieve goals that produce a valued reward for him (Thomson 2004). This is an 
obvious reason for Vroom’s theory frequently being used to justify the use of PRP, 
as it assumes that individuals make choices between alternative actions in order to 
maximise the benefits to themselves (Pearce and Perry 1983).  
The use of PRP represents the implicit acceptance of expectancy theory in the for-
profit sector. However, applying the theory in the nonprofit sector would assume that 
there is no significant difference between the motivations of nonprofit and for-profit 
employees and that both are seeking the personal financial rewards offered through 
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PRP (Alvarado 1996). The main focus of expectancy theory is on the individual, who 
is assumed to be a rational maximiser of personal utility. Moreover, applying PRP in 
the nonprofit sector assumes that the two organisational environments, for-profit and 
nonprofit, are similar. Expectancy theory is particularly useful in situations where 
goals can be clarified, where there is an abundance of rewards, and where rewards 
can be closely linked to performance (Shamir 1991). In many situations this is not 
the case, such as in the public and nonprofit sectors for instance, where rewards are 
less abundant, where there is a multiplicity of goals, and where there is a tendency 
not to differentiate individuals on the basis of their work performance (Perry and 
Porter 1982).  
One view is that it is simply a question of implementation, and that if PRP were 
implemented in the correct way, then it would be an effective motivator in any 
organisational environment. Kessler (1994) identifies three elements of PRP that 
present implementation problems: establishing performance criteria, assessing 
whether or not those criteria have been met, and the linkage between the criteria and 
the pay award. The alternative view, though, is that it may not simply be a matter of 
proper implementation, since NPOs to begin with already have limitations such as 
limited funds to invest in PRP, the weak link between objectives and performance, 
and an organisational culture that emphasises equality in the workplace. If PRP is 
properly implemented in NPOs but still fails to succeed, one should ask whether 
characteristics inherent in the organisational environment of these organisations may 
be what is limiting the success of the schemes. Limited funding, an egalitarian 
organisational culture and intrinsically motivated employees are all inherent in NPOs 
and their impact on the applicability of PRP should be assessed carefully. 
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Another theory commonly associated with PRP is goal-setting theory. Authors have 
pointed that the essential elements of goal-setting theory are also present in PRP, 
given that individual employees are set specific targets that they must achieve in 
order to get a performance reward (Cannell and Wood 1992). Moreover, the 
introduction of performance management practices in NPOs is likely to increase goal 
specificity and measurability in these organisations, making goal-setting theory even 
more relevant in this context. Goal-setting theory involves establishing SMART – 
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time-targeted – objectives. The theory 
claims that employees will be more highly motivated if they are set specific and 
challenging levels of performance to be achieved within a specific time frame, as 
long as they also have high goal commitment and as long as feedback on their 
progress towards goal achievement is provided on a regular basis. Goal-setting 
theory explains individual performance, based on the hypothesis that, if goals 
regulate performance, then more difficult goals will lead to a higher level of 
performance than easy goals (Locke 1968). The theory suggests that clear and 
specific goals are more motivating than generalised statements about expected 
performance. It also states that challenging but attainable goals are more motivating 
than easily attainable ones, particularly for employees with high achievement needs. 
The theory claims that feedback and participative goal setting can have a positive 
reinforcement effect on the employee’s effort. Participatively set goals may be more 
effective than assigned goals and there is evidence that the degree of transparency, 
ownership and objectivity associated with goal setting is particularly relevant for 
motivating public service workers (Latham and Locke 2006). Participation and 
democratic management are also important characteristics of NPOs, and are 
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consistent with the need for the constant involvement of workers and managers in 
affirming and defining the goals of the NPO (Bacchiega and Borzaga 2001). 
There appears to be a fundamental difference between goal-setting theory and 
expectancy theory. Goal-setting theory posits that goal difficulty is the driver that 
increases worker motivation, meaning that the increase in employee effort is directly 
related to an increase in the difficulty of specific, measurable and achievable goals. 
On the other hand, expectancy theory postulates that perceptions about the 
effort/reward relationship and the value of the reward drive employee motivation. 
The two theories depend upon different drivers but it is possible to utilise concepts 
from each of them in a single PRP scheme. Goal-setting theory indicates that 
financial incentives increase acceptance of difficult goals and, consequently, may 
enhance performance (Locke, Latham et al. 1988). The use of PRP in performance 
management systems can be viewed as a way of ensuring that performance 
appraisals are actually carried out, as Cannell and Wood (1992) found in their 
survey. PRP reinforces the organisational objectives for employees by tying those 
objectives into financial rewards, which may increase their commitment to 
appraisals. In contrast, one could argue that, if it is the goal setting rather than the 
financial incentive that explains the motivational effects of PRP, then it may be 
possible for an organisation to get the same motivational effects without the need for 
a financial incentive. If the performance management system in the PRP scheme is 
what affects motivation, then performance rewards may be unnecessary. An 
evaluation of the introduction of PRP in the British National Health Service (NHS) 
found that managers were very positive about the goal-setting component of the 
scheme, more so than the reward component of it. Managers spoke favourably about 
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role and goal clarity, good feedback and support from their superiors (Dowling and 
Richardson 1997). 
Performance management in many cases plays an important part in both the 
introduction and continued use of PRP in organisations. Through the use of 
performance appraisals, an overall rating can be used to decide the level of a pay 
increase. The payment can take the form of a bonus or an increase in base pay, 
substituting for seniority pay and increases based on the cost of living (Arrowsmith 
and Marginson 2011). However, PRP is not essential for performance management. 
Hendry et al. (2000) criticise the use of PRP, terming it the ‘dark side’ of 
performance management, because it emphasises the controlling rather than the 
developmental aspects of performance management. Nevertheless, the ability to 
cascade organisational objectives down through the hierarchy and reward their 
achievement, through PRP, means that, in practice, PRP is widely associated with 
performance management.  
In the literature, the expectancy and goal-setting theories help to explain the 
motivational effects of PRP. In this study, equity and organisational justice theories 
will be useful in complementing these first two approaches, and are introduced here 
to help explain the potentially demotivating effects of PRP in NPOs. Porter and 
Lawler (1968) expanded Vroom’s initial work and added some important 
enhancements related to the motivational effects predicted by expectancy theory. 
They suggest that the level of reward the employee can expect to receive in exchange 
for his/her performance has to be perceived as both equitable and consistent with the 
existing reward structure of the organisation. If the reward structure does not provide 
equitable rewards for a given level of performance, the employee will not have 
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sufficient motivation to apply effort (Harvey, Speier et al. 2001). Similarly, if high 
performance in the past failed to lead to a higher reward, future individual effort may 
suffer as a result of a loss of credibility of the organisation’s reward system (Steers, 
Mowday et al. 2004). Porter and Lawler (1968) address the relationship between 
expectancy theory and equity theory and argue that perceptions of equity affect the 
valence of outcomes. Perceptions of inequity could reduce the valence and therefore 
the motivation of the individual.  
Equity theory (Adams 1965) suggests that people are motivated to reduce inequity. 
The theory makes no claims about the relationship between financial incentives and 
performance, although, under certain conditions, deviations from fairness may 
diminish the association between financial incentives and performance (Kanfer 
1990). One of the arguments for PRP is that this system is a fairer system of pay 
since it looks at the ratio of individual inputs to outputs, rather than paying everyone 
the same rate for the job (Armstrong and Murlis 2004). However, equity theory is 
underpinned by the individual’s perceptions of fairness. In other words, employees 
will compare the ratio of their input to reward outcome with the ratios of their 
colleagues to assess the fairness of the system (Adams 1965). There is a danger that 
individual employees will simply have a different view than the organisation 
regarding fairness. PRP may bring unintended consequences for the organisation in 
terms of work motivation if it is believed to be unfair. Equity theory provides an 
explanation of how employees’ perceptions of the fairness of the PRP system affect 
work motivation. Linking it to expectancy theory, any doubts an employee has about 
the fairness of the PRP system are also likely to affect his or her belief in the effort-
reward relationship, and consequently, the motivational effectiveness of the reward. 
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PRP purposefully offers different levels of pay to employees doing the same work, if 
those employees’ performances are judged to be different. Researchers have 
suggested that PRP may, in fact, demotivate employees if they feel that their 
employer’s assessment of their performance is unfair (Marsden and Richardson 
1994; Brown and Benson 2003).  
Adams’ equity theory refers to what is termed distributive justice. Greenberg (1987) 
argues that, in addition to distributive justice, employees are also concerned with 
procedural justice. Individuals will assess the fairness of the procedures that the 
organisation introduces to distribute rewards among employees (Folger and 
Konovsky 1989). It has been noted that the two types of justice are influenced by 
different factors; distributive justice concerns the amount of one’ reward compared 
with those of others, whereas procedural justice is related to organisational practices. 
Folger and Cropanzano (1998:26) define procedural justice as ‘fairness issues 
concerning the methods, mechanisms and procedures used to determine outcomes’. 
Procedures are thus regarded as important for attaining fair outcomes, and authors 
have suggested that procedural justice may be just as relevant as distributive justice 
(Cropanzano and Folger 1991). 
Procedural justice is also a very important issue in PRP systems. PRP is popular 
when the quality of output and the level of discretion and initiative exercised by 
individuals are important to an organisation. As such, PRP involves an element of 
subjective evaluation of performance, which explains its attractiveness to employers 
(Gilman 2004). The subjective nature of the assessments made in PRP are due to 
rewards being based on the achievement of less readily quantifiable or tangible areas 
of performance, such as the quality of the work done and customer service (Heneman 
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1994). Subjective performance evaluations can give rise to bias, however. There is a 
danger that performance appraisals will be tainted by factors other than the 
individual’s work performance. PRP could, for instance, be influenced by a halo 
effect, where an employee who is viewed favourably, perhaps because of his 
readiness to agree with the manager, is unfairly assumed to have performed well, 
without any objective justification (Thomson 2004).  
A number of biases have been highlighted in the personnel literature, such as 
‘leniency bias’ where supervisors are reluctant to give bad ratings to employees, and 
‘centrality bias’ where supervisors compress ratings around some norm, rather than 
distinguishing good from bad performers. The compression of ratings, either by 
leniency or centrality bias, is more severe when ratings are important for pay setting. 
Supervisors are often reluctant to give bad news to workers if it means salary 
adjustments (Prendergast 1999). Prendergast (1999) also points to other distortions 
that can arise when pay is at the discretion of the impressions of the supervisor. The 
author explains the danger that a principal or supervisor might manipulate 
assessments and underreport the level of performance in order to save on wages. 
Thus, even if performance is high, the supervisor may claim otherwise in order to 
keep costs down. Marsden and French (1998) found that employees thought their 
assessments were being overridden by more senior managers in order to comply with 
an imposed quota for the number of employees who should receive additional 
payments.  
From the employer’s point of view, a quota system helps to control wage costs and 
also acts as a check on managers who might otherwise tend to be too extreme, one 
way or another, in their assessment of their employees’ performance. Even though 
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these reasons may be legitimate, employees may view such procedures as extremely 
unfair. The issue of procedural justice also links back to expectancy theory. If the 
assessment is thought to be influenced by factors other than the individual’s 
performance, such as a quota system, then the link between expectancy and 
performance pay will be broken. From a theoretical perspective, if the link between 
expectancy and performance is broken, the motivational effects of PRP will be 
diminished or, worse still, procedural inequity could demotivate employees (Brown 
and Benson 2003). 
Many of the characteristics of NPOs are shared by the public sector. Both sectors are 
responsible to multiple constituencies with a stake in the organisation. Taxpayers, 
clients, contractors, donors, board members and special interest groups are just some 
of the stakeholders concerned about the organisation’s performance. Moreover, in 
both sectors, organisations are expected to be equitable, responsive to unanticipated 
problems, process clients through systems of eligibility and treatment, and be true to 
their mandated purposes (Pynes 2009). They are also similar in the way they define 
themselves in relation to the often intangible and difficult-to-measure services they 
offer. Because of these similarities, it is possible to draw some lessons from many of 
the performance-related studies that have been carried out in the public sector in 
order to understand how PRP may or may not work in NPOs. The next section 
provides an overview of PRP studies conducted in the public sector. 
1.5 Performance-related Pay and Work Motivation in the Public Sector 
In the UK, PRP was promoted in the 1980s as part of the ‘Thatcher 
revolution’ (Kessler and Purcell 1995), and organisations saw the introduction of 
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PRP as a step towards the enterprise culture (Armstrong and Murlis 2004). Plans for 
the public sector under later Labour governments continued to emphasise 
performance and the use of PRP as a mechanism for achieving improved 
performance. The logic seems to have been that, if firms want to compete then they 
have to be performance driven and one way this can be demonstrated is by adopting 
a payment system that links the level of pay to the employee’s performance. Public 
sector agencies moved away from a budget control measure of effectiveness to the 
use of output measures. As the controls became more output-oriented, performance 
became more critical, making a pay system linking pay to performance more 
attractive (Thomson 2004). Attempts to link motivation to PRP have been covered 
extensively in the literature (Cannell and Wood 1992; Thompson and Buchan 1993; 
Marsden and Richardson 1994; Thompson and McHugh 1995; Marsden and French 
1998) and much of the evidence about the motivational ineffectiveness of PRP 
comes from the public sector, where there are constraints regarding the nature of the 
workforce and the nature of the organisation, both of which make it less likely that 
PRP will be an effective motivator (Kessler 2000). 
The first study that evaluated the effects of PRP on the work motivation of public 
sector employees tested the three conditions of expectancy theory and claimed that 
public sector employees were not more motivated by PRP than they had been under 
their previous seniority-based pay (Pearce and Perry 1983). The longitudinal study 
suggested that the small effect of PRP on the motivation of workers was due to 
difficulties related to the implementation of the performance appraisal system. The 
appraisal results did not lead to a sufficient differentiation between the bonuses 
received by high and low performers. Heneman and Young (1991) conducted a 
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survey to evaluate the effects of PRP on the motivation of 120 managers of schools 
in the US. They explained the lack of increased motivation they found among school 
managers by a negative perception of the monetary rewards proposed. The managers 
expressed a preference for an increase in basic pay rather than a bonus based on 
achieving the required results.  
Studies conducted in the UK confirm these results. Marsden and Richardson (1994) 
assessed the effects of PRP on the work motivation of employees in the Inland 
Revenue and found that, although the majority of employees supported the principle 
of linking pay to individual performance, PRP had failed to lead to a significant 
increase in work motivation. Even though employees believed they were able to 
perform to the desired level, the majority did not believe that their increased 
performance would lead to a monetary reward, breaking the performance-outcome 
expectancy. In addition, many stated that the size of the reward was not enough to 
persuade them to change their behaviour at work. Another important finding of this 
study is related to the perceived fairness of the appraisal system introduced in the 
Inland Revenue. The existence of quotas on the number of high ratings that could be 
given had led to feelings of unfairness in the workplace. This survey in the Inland 
Revenue was complemented by a wider survey (Marsden and French 1998; Marsden 
2004; Marsden and Belfield 2006), among the most comprehensive in the field of 
work motivation in the public sector. The results were again unfavourable to PRP, 
showing that it had led to jealousy among co-workers and perceptions of unfairness 
due to the quota system.  
These studies show that PRP has had little positive impact on employee motivation 
and organisational performance in the public sector. Most importantly, they note that 
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the failure to find a significant pay-motivation relationship is due to a lack of 
adequate funding for PRP and a lack of the organisational and employee 
characteristics needed to make PRP work in government settings (Perry, Mesch et al. 
2006). A number of studies (Pearce and Perry 1983; Kessler and Purcell 1992; 
Marsden and Richardson 1994) support the idea that PRP has been unsuccessful in 
the public sector and that, due to the reasons explained above, the underlying 
foundation of expectancy theory has failed to materialise. Poor implementation could 
well be a reason for that but it is unlikely to be the sole explanation for the failure of 
PRP. According to Perry, Engbers et al. (2009) the fundamental deficiencies of PRP 
in the public sector are rooted in the basic institutional differences between market 
and non-market settings. Budget constraints are a feature of public and nonprofit 
institutions and will always challenge the viability of PRP. It is unlikely that PRP, in 
either public or nonprofit organisations, can be designed in such a way that the pay 
rewards reach the 10 to 15% required by expectancy theory (Perry, Engbers et al. 
2009).  
Studies (Wittmer 1991; Rose-Ackerman 1996) also highlight the intrinsic reward 
preferences of public and nonprofit employees and how they differ from private 
sector employees. Marsden and French (1998) found that the majority of hospital 
employees claimed that the ability to help other people was a central factor in their 
choice of profession, pointing to the intrinsic element of their work motivation. 
Similar results have been found in the education sector. The public nature of these 
jobs has a major impact on the effectiveness of PRP, while its introduction assumes 
that public sector employees are closer to the private sector than they actually appear 
to be (Marsden 2004). It is also assumed by PRP that private and public sector 
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employees are similar in terms of what characterises their motivation. However, as 
established in both theoretical and empirical studies, this is hardly the case. The 
values and motivations of public servants play a central role in the success or failure 
of PRP. Growing importance has thus been given to public service motivation (PSM) 
theory as a means to explain the motivational aspects of this workforce. Public sector 
employees attach considerable importance to the nature of their jobs, such as helping 
others or serving the public interest, and PSM theory is based, among other things, 
on this assumption (Wright 2007). 
1.6 Public Service Motivation Theory and the Nonprofit Sector 
It was the early work of Rainey (1982) that led to the first notion of PSM. 
The author compared 275 middle managers from five public organisations and four 
private ones and found that civil servants do not attach great importance to monetary 
rewards and give more importance to altruistic and ethical values. However, the first 
explicit assessment of PSM theory was carried out by Perry and Wise (1990:368), 
who defined PSM as ‘an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded 
primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organisations’. Their definition is the 
most widely accepted and stems from the belief that the motives of public servants 
are different from those of private sector employees. The work of Perry and Wise 
also distinguishes between three different types of motive associated with PSM. The 
first is the rational motive, where civil servants are motivated by maximising their 
own utility and the desire to satisfy the private interests of certain groups. It must be 
noted, however, that civil servants’ self-interest often coincides with that of the 
public organisations they work for and consequently that of the community. Such 
interests are likely to include the opportunity to contribute to policy and to serve the 
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interests of the groups to which they are affiliated. The second motive associated 
with PSM is the normative motive, which relates to the desire to adhere to an ethical 
standard, such as serving the public interest or ensuring social equity by enhancing 
the welfare of minority groups who lack economic resources. The third is the 
affective motive, that is the strong desire to see certain organisational missions 
realised, such as educating, caring, defending and protecting people. These three 
motives conceptualise PSM as a multifaceted construct consisting of four 
dimensions: attraction to policy making (rational motive), commitment to the public 
interest (normative motive), compassion and self-sacrifice (affective motives) 
(Koumenta 2010). Vandenabeele (2008a) adds a fifth dimension to that scale, named 
governance values (falling under the normative motive), which refers to values such 
as accountability, equity and due process, all particular to the characteristics of 
public bureaucracies and how individuals think the public interest is best served. 
Each dimension is different and they can all vary independently but they all 
contribute to the construct of PSM. Researchers, however, have tended to drop some 
of the dimensions or to use a limited set of items (Brewer, Selden et al. 2000; 
Moyniham and Pandey 2007), either to reduce the length of the study or so as to fit 
the dimensions to a particular context. 
Perry and Wise (1990) argue that individuals who respond to incentives such as the 
opportunity to serve a goal greater than themself have PSM. They hypothesise the 
following: First, the greater an individual’s PSM, the more likely it is that they will 
seek membership in a public organisation. Second, in public organisations, PSM is 
positively related to performance. Third, public organisations that attract members 
with high levels of PSM are likely to be less dependent on utilitarian incentives to 
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manage individual performance effectively (1990:370). According to Perry (1997), 
PSM has significant behavioural implications. However attempts to link differences 
in PSM to any specific performance or behavioural consequences have produced 
mixed results (Wright 2007). Naff and Crum (1999) found that PSM has a strong 
positive effect on the job satisfaction and performance ratings of employees. He also 
found a negative association between PSM and the intention to leave the public 
sector. Alonso and Lewis (2001), however, did not find any association between 
PSM and performance, nor did they find any evidence that the link between material 
rewards and performance mattered any less to those with high PSM.  
Gabris and Simo (1995) criticise the PSM construct and argue that employees are 
more likely to be attracted to public sector employment by non-pay incentives such 
as job security, pension and work-life balance schemes. Their empirical study 
highlights that the motivation to serve the community is not a characteristic exclusive 
to any particular sector. However, proponents of PSM argue that intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations are not mutually exclusive and that self-interested behaviour 
can co-exist with PSM (Koumenta 2010). The work of Lewis and Frank (2002) 
confirms this assertion and point out that, even though job security and pay are very 
strong predictors of an individual being attracted to work for the public sector, the 
desire to help the society is also a key reason for joining the government. Similarly, 
Vandenabeele (2008b) demonstrates that, despite job security, pension and flexible 
working arrangements being amongst the key considerations for individuals 
interested in the public sector, public sector employees also display higher levels of 
PSM, confirming that PSM is clearly an attribute of public servants. 
53 
 
Other studies have found a link between PSM and organisational performance 
(Brewer, Selden et al. 2000; Kim 2005a). The link between PSM and organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction and organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB) has 
also been investigated. Crewson (1997) claims that PSM in the federal sector is 
positively associated with organisational commitment. Kim (2005a) found a positive 
relationship between PSM and job satisfaction and between PSM and organisational 
commitment. In another study, the same author found that government employees 
with high PSM also had higher OCB (Kim 2005b). Research has also been carried 
out to try to identify what factors may affect PSM. Perry (1997) identified several 
antecedents of PSM with a potentially important influence on it, such as parental 
socialisation, religious socialisation, professional identification, political ideology 
and individual demographics. His results suggest that the individual’s PSM develops 
from exposure to a variety of experiences, some related to childhood, some to 
religion and some to the individual’s professional life. Interestingly, Koumenta 
(2010) found that trade union membership is positively associated with PSM, which 
is consistent with Perry’s findings about professional identification. Koumenta 
suggests that trade unions have traditionally been based on professional identity and 
that professional and ethical values are often communicated in trade unions’ mission 
statements.  
The majority of PSM research focuses on the public/private dichotomy (Mann 2006). 
However, as scholars find motivational similarities between public and nonprofit 
sector workers, PSM is likely to be applicable to the nonprofit sector too. In fact, 
Perry and Wise’s (1990) definition of PSM seeks to emphasise motives commonly 
associated with public and nonprofit employees, and various researchers (Brewer and 
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Selden 1998; Francois 2000; Houston 2006) have tried to expand the application of 
PSM theory to the nonprofit sector. Rainey and Steinbauer (1999:20) propose a more 
general definition of PSM, as a ‘general altruistic motivation to serve the interests of 
a community of people, a state, a nation or humankind’. According to the authors, 
PSM is by no means a characteristic restricted to civil servants; the pro-social 
behaviour inherent in PSM is also found among nonprofit workers. Both public and 
nonprofit organisations have values-oriented missions, multiple stakeholders and 
outcomes that are not easily measurable. Therefore, employees in both sectors are 
more likely to be public service motivated than employees in the private sector 
(Houston 2006). In fact, studies have demonstrated that nonprofit employees are 
even less concerned with pay and job security than their public counterparts (Mirvis 
and Hackett 1983; Wittmer 1991).  
The study of Perry, Brudney et al. (2008) provides additional support for the validity 
of the PSM construct for volunteer workers. The research used a sample of morally 
committed individuals who provided a public service to others but were not public 
employees. Another study (Light 2002) uses a number of survey items common to 
PSM and compares a sample of nonprofit employees against two other comparable 
surveys of government and private employees. The author suggests that nonprofit 
employees display much higher PSM than public and private employees.  
According to the views of researchers above, PSM is an inherent characteristic of 
nonprofit employees and they may select themselves into the nonprofit sector 
regardless of the extrinsic rewards being offered. Nevertheless, Moyniham and 
Pandey (2007) opened a new avenue for PSM research by stating that PSM is not 
only a result of the individual’s socio-historical background but also a result of the 
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organisational environment in which they find themselves. Their study reveals that 
organisational tenure negatively affects PSM and they explain this finding by arguing 
that those who join an organisation with a strong commitment to public service may 
find themselves increasingly frustrated if their hopes to contribute to the public good 
are diminished as time passes. Koumenta (2010) also finds that workplace 
characteristics, such as job design, influence PSM. Since workplace characteristics 
may have the ability to shape the individual’s PSM, one could argue whether pay 
systems such as PRP can have any influence on the PSM of nonprofit employees. 
The PSM construct utilised here is paramount to assert that the organisations studied 
are motivationally similar in regards to PSM and that they will vary only in relation 
to their pay systems.  
Conclusion 
The theoretical and empirical research presented here emphasises the 
difficulties associated with the successful implementation of PRP in NPOs. NPOs 
have some inherent features, shared by public sector organisations, that are more 
likely to make PRP problematic. The multiplicity of stakeholders, the often 
intangible objectives, as well as limited funding are some of the difficulties 
encountered by nonprofits that make PRP systems less likely to succeed. 
Additionally, nonprofits operate under the non-distribution constraint, meaning that 
they are prohibited from distributing profits or residual earnings to individuals 
controlling the organisation. Therefore, it is believed that they have higher public 
service motivation and a greater concern for the public interest than for-profit 
organisations. The non-distribution component of nonprofits is crucial in explaining 
the unique characteristics of their employees and how nonprofits are able to produce 
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socially desirable outcomes and attract an intrinsically motivated workforce willing 
to exchange extrinsic rewards for the opportunity to contribute to a social cause. This 
first chapter forms the basis for the discussion of whether PRP can increase the work 
motivation of nonprofit employees, and indeed fit, as a pay system, into the 
characteristics of the sector and its workforce.  
The next chapter will address the reasons why nonprofits make the decision to 
implement PRP for their employees and institutional theory is the rationale used to 
explain reward decisions in these organisations. Chapter 2 also places the nonprofit 
sector within the context of this thesis. It provides definitions and a classification 
system in an attempt to describe the sector in terms of its organisation. It explores, in 
particular, the context of housing associations and how this subsector has developed 
to become one of the largest public service sectors in England and Wales. The aim is 
to analyse the impact of government reforms on the environment in which nonprofits 
operate. The housing sector case presented here addresses the major changes that 
have occurred through government reforms. The sector has become more 
competitive and, as a result, institutional pressures have led HA’s to embrace 
managerial practices that are widespread in the business world.  
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Chapter 2  An Institutional Theory Perspective 
Agency theory has been the dominant theoretical explanation for 
reward decisions for some time. However, given the paradox between the popularity 
of PRP in nonprofit and public sector organisations and its apparent ineffectiveness 
at increasing employee motivation and organisational performance (Pearce and Perry 
1983; Heneman and Young 1991; Marsden and Richardson 1994; Perry, Engbers et 
al. 2009), a complementary perspective is necessary. As reward decisions are not 
always in line with the prescriptions of agency, institutional theory questions the 
overemphasis on efficiency when making decisions about reward strategies. 
Institutional theory proposes that institutional forces make organisations more similar 
without necessarily making them more efficient (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This 
approach suggests, as opposed to the agency approach, that the purpose of reward 
strategy decisions in organisations may well be to conform to other organisations and 
market practice so as to gain legitimacy. This means, for instance, that the desire to 
minimise shirking when monitoring is difficult or costly is not the only explanation 
for the introduction of PRP. The introduction may be in line with the best practice 
perspective, thus emphasising the relative uniformity and stability of human resource 
management (HRM) practices in organisations (Sherer and Leblebici 2001). The 
argument here is that reward decisions in NPOs may be influenced by coercive, 
mimetic and normative pressures if operating under certain norms is thought to 
confer legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This perspective recognises the 
importance of context and the external environment, and their role in shaping the 
behaviour of organisations (Marsden and Belfield 2010).  
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2.1 Institutional Isomorphism Explained 
According to institutional theory, organisational choice is limited by a variety 
of external pressures, and organisations must be responsive to external demands and 
expectations in order to survive (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The exercising of 
strategic choice is driven by the need to incorporate practices and procedures defined 
by concepts institutionalised in society. Organisations that do implement such 
practices increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the 
immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures (1977:340). This 
perspective also emphasises the importance of obtaining legitimacy in order to 
demonstrate social worthiness and mobilise resources (Oliver 1991). Legitimacy is 
defined here as ‘a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman 1995:574). The homogenisation of 
organisations reflects the pressure of their institutional environments and has little to 
do with their technical notions of performance accomplishment (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991; Greenwood and Hinings 1996). This process is called isomorphism and 
is best described as a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to 
appear similar to other units that face the same set of environmental conditions 
(Hawley 1968). Institutional isomorphism is subdivided into three mechanisms and 
they will be explained next.  
2.1.1 Coercive Isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism ‘results from both formal and informal pressures 
exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent’ 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983:150). These pressures may be either forced upon 
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organisations or represent an invitation to comply, through laws and regulations 
established by the government, such as employment legislation. Equal pay rights for 
men and women, hours of work and holiday entitlements, maternity and paternity 
rights are all encouraged by legislation. Other examples include the adoption of 
pollution control technologies to conform with environmental regulations, or 
nonprofits having to maintain accounts and comply with performance indicators to 
ensure eligibility for central and local government funding (1983:150). Nevertheless, 
coercive pressures may not always be of a legal or political nature. Subsidiaries may 
be pressurised to adopt a particular set of practices derived from the home base of the 
organisation. Head office managers may transfer practices, people and resources to 
subsidiaries in order to maintain control, without taking into account the institutional 
contexts of the latter organisations (Morgan and Kristensen 2006). 
Oliver (1991) suggests that organisations within the same legal environment will try 
to manage regulatory and government pressures, leading to a convergence to the 
same practices. In the case of NPOs, their reliance on government funding, private 
donations and fees makes them vulnerable to institutional pressures (Verbruggen, 
Christiaens et al. 2011). In their study of NPOs, Verbruggen, Christiaens et al (2011) 
found that coercive isomorphism played an important role in explaining why 
organisations comply with accounting and reporting standards. The authors argue 
that the government is the institution that sets the rules as well as controls important 
financial resources for many NPOs. External audits of financial statements, for 
example, are a way of coercing nonprofits to comply with the norms. NPOs are 
generally thought to be highly dependent on their funding sources, and may therefore 
be subject to coercive isomorphic pressures (Leiter 2005). Miller-Millesen (2003) 
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considers the influence of funding agents on nonprofit board behaviour, in particular 
their rationale for taking on certain activities that enhance approval and legitimacy in 
the context in which they operate. Cunningham (2010) explores how the purchaser-
provider relationship in the UK voluntary sector impacts upon the human resources 
(HR) of these organisations. The author discusses the increase in state regulation 
through the requirement for all care providers to have National Vocational 
Qualifications (NVQs), and how HR in voluntary organisations needs to comply with 
new training and development strategies in order to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of 
funders and regulators (2010:194). He also points out how purchasers monitor the 
quality of the workforce in voluntary organisations and minimise the risk from 
contracting out to the sector by ensuring that recruitment strategies comply with best 
practices. These coercive pressures leave voluntary organisations having to prove, 
through the adoption of best practices, that they are competent enough to participate 
in the delivery of public services (Tonkiss and Passey 1999; Brandl and Guttel 2007; 
Cunningham 2010). Although this may not be a bad thing, organisations may not 
have a choice over which practices best fit their requirements. Coercive pressures are 
not the only constraints faced by organisations. Mimetic and normative isomorphic 
pressures are less explicit than the above examples but nonetheless are also placed on 
NPOs by their surroundings.  
2.1.2 Mimetic Isomorphism 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when one organisation copies the approaches 
and policies adopted by other organisations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Mimetic 
behaviour derives from uncertainty within the imitating organisation (Miller-
Millesen 2003). When goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates 
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uncertainty, organisations may model themselves on other organisations that they 
perceive to be legitimate or successful. (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The Japanese 
modelled new government initiatives on successful western prototypes, such as the 
banking system in the US, the army in France and the navy and postal system in the 
UK. Later, Americans and Europeans implemented the Japanese model to solve 
productivity and personnel issues. Quality circles and work-life balance practices 
then became widespread in America and European countries. These practices may or 
may not solve organisational problems but what they certainly do is enhance 
organisations’ legitimacy and demonstrate to stakeholders that they are at least 
concerned with improving the working conditions of their employees (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983:151). 
Arrowsmith and Sisson (1999) identify mimetic pressures in their study of the 
printing, engineering, retail and health sectors. The authors examined pay processes 
and outcomes, and working time, in a survey of the four sectors, and found that, after 
the decline in collective agreements, the institutional arrangements for pay in the 
sectors did not lead to different outcomes. The authors argue that ‘employers tend to 
move like ships in a convoy when managing change’ (1999:51) and that this is due to 
the growing uncertainty in the sectors and increasing importance being given to 
legitimacy. They also allude to the role of networks in disseminating information on 
pay issues in the sectors. They conclude that, even without a centralised collective 
bargaining process, organisations continued to operate in a collective way when it 
came to pay and working time arrangements. They comment that the organisations 
seemed reluctant to deviate from the norm and shared a best practice approach 
without necessarily basing it on a rational assessment of business requirements 
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(1999:71). Other authors have also identified the importance of networks in diffusing 
practices and policies through the institutional environment of organisations. The use 
of consultants and recruitment agencies has led to a number of practices being 
endorsed by consultants in the field. Large organisations choose from a small pool of 
major consulting firms, which spread a few organisational models within the sector 
in which they operate (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The use of these experts may 
bring legitimacy to the organisations adopting such practices (Barkema and Gomez-
Mejia 1998; Main, Jackson et al. 2008).  
Diverging from standard practices within their environment may lead to uncertainty, 
and organisations will try to avoid uncertainty as much as possible (Norman, Artz et 
al. 2007). This perspective has also been employed in studies of NPOs. Arnaboldi 
and Lapsley (2004) demonstrate in their study how a healthcare NPO adopted 
accounting techniques, not required by the government, in order to present itself as 
up-to-date and modern to its external environment by mimicking private sector 
practices. Other studies have also shown how the need to move from amateur 
administration to professional management has pressurised NPOs to conform to for-
profit sector practices. Helmig, Jegers et al. (2004) show how fundraising and 
marketing practices are being adopted by nonprofits, and it has been observed in the 
literature that European NPOs facing financial uncertainty have begun to use 
activities such as fundraising over the past decades (Anheier 2005). Another example 
of this is the use of awards to demonstrate performance. Paton and Foot (2000) 
investigate the use of the ‘Investors in People’ and International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) 9000 awards by NPOs and find that these awards introduce 
significant similarities among the organisations that adopt them. Many of the 
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interviewees in their study mentioned that their organisations had adopted such 
standards in order to be, and to be seen as, private organisations. These awards 
promise a way of raising, reinforcing and publicising performance standards within 
the organisation and also of differentiating an organisation in the market for 
contracts, grants and donations (2000:331). These actions can all be interpreted as 
forms of mimetic isomorphism. 
2.1.3 Normative Isomorphism 
Normative isomorphism stems primarily from professionalisation (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). It refers to the relation between managerial practices and the 
background of employees in terms of educational level, job experience and networks 
of professional identification (Paauwe and Boselie 2005). Universities and 
professional training programmes are important centres for the development of 
organisational norms. They play an important role in the professionalisation of 
individuals and, in turn, these same individuals are responsible for shaping and 
diffusing similar practices within organisations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
DiMaggio (1991) studied art museums in the US between 1920 and 1940 and found 
that, prior to the 1920s, a lack of resources prevented museum personnel from 
developing their skills and establishing professional associations in the field. 
Towards the late 1920s, a large grant from the Carnegie Corporation changed this 
and led to the introduction of specialised training programmes for personnel. The 
author points out that employees from a wide variety of museums attended the same 
training programmes, leading to a standardisation of museum operations across the 
US. This is a good example of normative isomorphism. Standards of practice provide 
norms and guidelines relating to how practices are to be carried out within the 
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institutional setting (Lawrence 1999). They are shaped by professional associations 
and influential actors within the institutional environment. Greenwood, Suddaby et 
al. (2002) carried out a study of institutional change within the accounting profession 
in Canada and discovered that professional associations, having to respond to market 
forces for a range of new services, modified the political context of accounting firms 
and reshaped the breadth of their services to extend beyond the traditional. The 
professional associations also played a significant role in legitimising this change. 
Many types of professional occupations are active in establishing normative elements 
in organisations. They develop principles and standards that represent their 
specialised knowledge in a distinct field (Scott 2008). These professional 
associations lack the coercive powers exercised by the government but attempt to 
influence the behaviour of others by setting standards, propagating principles and 
proposing benchmarks to gauge progress (2008:226). In the context of this thesis, 
reward consultants are a good example. In the UK, formal reward qualifications are 
well established and networks of reward practitioners have been paramount in 
spreading practices through conferences, professional bodies and reward 
consultancies (Chapman 2011). ‘New pay’ prescriptions, stating that pay should be 
linked to performance (Lawler 1995), have been widely promoted by professional 
bodies and reward consultants, and these normative pressures have led to what 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call the structuration of organisational fields. Chapman 
(2011) argues that the reward arena has emerged as an organisational field and 
concludes that a trend of increasing interaction between reward practitioners and 
professional groups through the proliferation of forums is one indication that it has. 
Moreover, the author suggests that the diffusion of dominant paradigms (such as 
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‘new pay’) as best practice across a wide range of organisations, and the willingness 
of practitioners to share examples of practices – often to competing organisations 
through case studies, conferences etc. – indicates a commonality pointing to reward 
being an emergent field (2011:62). Individuals taking part in this arena of discussion 
and exchange will exhibit much similarity with their professional counterparts in 
other organisations, and organisational arrangements are more likely to be based on 
normative processes than on any concrete evidence that the adopted models will 
enhance efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
2.2 Institutional Isomorphism in the Context of Rewards: Empirical 
Evidence 
Paauwe and Boselie (2003) argue that coercive, mimetic and normative 
mechanisms affect the shaping of HRM in organisations. Considering the effects 
institutional pressures appear to have on organisations, it is reasonable to expect that 
institutional pressures will also influence reward choices in organisations. The 
central focus of this chapter is that reward decisions are not always associated with 
organisational fit but may instead be based on institutional pressures exerted on 
organisations, as well as their desire to appear legitimate among their peers. St-Onge, 
Magnan et al (2001) state that incentives are not only used to reduce the agency 
problem. They are also implemented as a symbolic tool, aiding the desire of the 
organisation to imitate the practices of their competitors in the sector in order to be 
seen as part of a particular social context.  
One of the first studies to provide evidence of the potential importance of 
institutional factors on the design and implementation of rewards in organisations 
was by Eisenhardt (1988). The author examined the choice between commission and 
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salary compensation for salespeople in retailing, using agency and institutional 
theory predictions. She observed that the type of product and age of the organisation 
explained the variance in pay-performance sensitivity beyond that explained by 
agency theory variables (Eisenhardt 1989). The study suggests that the choice of 
reward – commission or salary – is consistent with the accepted practice within a 
sector rather than being a strategic choice. 
A study of variable compensation for middle managers in the Spanish banking sector 
found that the design of pay systems is not conditioned only by objectives of 
efficiency but also reflects other objectives such as enhanced legitimacy. The 
findings suggest that variable pay is not always designed to reward practices and 
procedures that should enhance the performance of the organisation but may instead 
be used to enhance the organisation’s social standing and reputation in its 
institutional context (Fernandez-Alles, Cuevas-Rodriguez et al. 2006). In other 
words, organisations follow the fashion or social convention within their industry or 
sector (Meyer and Rowan 1983; DiMaggio 1991). Bender’s (2004) interview-based 
research aimed to determine why companies use PRP for their executives, using 
institutional theory to explain the results. The study shows that organisations base 
their decisions on market practices and the need for legitimacy within their sector. 
The author suggests that PRP is adopted, not so much to enhance performance, but 
so that organisations meet ‘best practice’ and do not attract adverse attention from 
their institutional shareholders. Pay structures were designed to attract and retain 
executives despite the belief that the money did not motivate the executives. PRP 
was seen as a symbol of executives’ success, both internally and among their peers in 
other organisations, and to comply with the norm within the sector (2004:521).  
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Another study on executive pay investigates how UK remuneration committees 
(RCs) operationalise and justify long-term incentive pay schemes for their executives 
in privatised water companies (Ogden and Watson 2008). The research illustrates 
that RCs, confronted with a wide range of comparative pay benchmarks and firm 
performance metrics to determine the overall remuneration package for their senior 
executives, end up making decisions of a political and controversial nature. The 
authors suggest that the uncertainty pervading the institutional environment 
surrounding executive pay decisions increases the pressure on RCs to ensure that 
their choices of long-term incentive plans are regarded as legitimate. Legitimacy will 
largely depend on the adoption of appropriate structures and practices in line with 
prevailing cultural norms, beliefs, symbols and rituals in the institutional 
environment (Ogden and Watson 2008:714).  
The search for legitimacy, however, does not necessarily imply negative economic 
consequences (Scott 1995). Research on PRP in Korean firms identifies economic as 
well as social and political factors influencing the adoption and coverage of PRP 
schemes (Kang and Yanadori 2011). Growing globalisation and capital mobility has 
resulted in a greater exposure of Korean firms to global firms’ employment practices. 
In the late 1990s, Korea experienced a financial crisis and began to be criticised for 
its traditional structures and management systems, facing increased pressure to 
transform its pay practices. The authors argue that, while Korean firms undergoing 
institutional change embrace newly legitimised PRP practices in order to conform to 
changing institutional norms, these same firms determine the coverage of the adopted 
pay practices according to their functional need to maximise economic efficiency. 
Despite institutional pressures, therefore, the Korean firms ‘did not blindly imitate 
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performance-related pay practices in search of legitimacy, rather they proactively 
adapted the practices using economic efficiency mechanisms when designing their 
PRP practices’ (Kang and Yanadori 2011:1857). 
It seems that the design of compensation systems is not always the result of an 
economically rational prior choice, as proposed by agency theory. Nevertheless, 
reward choices that are explained by institutional theory do not necessarily have to 
be classified as irrational (Fernandez-Alles, Cuevas-Rodriguez et al. 2006). The 
adoption of certain practices legitimised by the organisation’s environment could 
indicate that managers are complying with the requirements of powerful external 
pressures (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Securing legitimacy could also benefit the 
organisation by, for instance, facilitating access to certain valuable resources 
(Elsbach and Sutton 1992). The adoption of practices and policies that confer social 
legitimacy on an organisation could be seen as logical behaviour on the part of 
managers (Paauwe and Boselie 2005).  
Other factors may also underpin organisations’ endorsement of PRP systems. The 
attempt to use PRP as a means of facilitating change in the organisational culture 
could be one of them (Kerr and Slocum 1987; Kessler and Purcell 1992; Kessler 
1994). Pay is widely recognised as an important tool for bringing about such change 
(Kessler 1994; Brown 1995). Kessler (1994) claims that political and cultural drivers 
are more important considerations than increased employee motivation in the 
introduction of PRP in privatised organisations. Batstone, Ferner et al. (1984) point 
out that PRP was part of a management strategy designed to break down the Post 
Office ideology of corporate paternalism and bureaucracy. Similarly, voluntary 
organisations have become more professionalised and performance driven in order to 
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meet the demand for public services. Top management may see the implementation 
of a performance-based system as a way of communicating to employees the new 
performance-driven environment in which the organisation is now operating and the 
need for workers to change their mind sets towards a more ‘business-like’ approach.  
PRP sends a strong message to employees about the importance that the employer 
places on performance because it relates pay to performance. Lawler and Jenkins 
(1990) assert that all pay systems influence organisational culture, but argue that pay 
for performance does it more dramatically than other pay systems because it 
communicates the norms of performance in the organisation. PRP may be used, not 
because it fits the organisation, but because it fits the type of organisation that it 
would like to become. This relates closely to institutional pressures. An organisation 
changes its culture in order to adopt, mimic and maintain organisational legitimacy 
through alignment with political and social concerns, shifts in business focus or the 
development of professional associations (Hofstede 1997). Nevertheless, there is a 
danger in determining pay systems by mimicking other organisations or complying 
with normative pressures. Organisational fit may be more beneficial than 
succumbing to mimetic and normative pressures and thus mismatching business 
strategy with inappropriate practices (Sherer and Leblebici 2001). 
The next section provides an overview of the nonprofit sector in the UK and places 
housing associations in the context of public service provision. The housing sector in 
England has seen a dramatic change in the environment in which it operates and this 
is what makes the sector a particularly interesting topic for this research. Institutional 
pressures such as changes in the funding regime and increased market competition 
have increasingly led HAs to conform to private sector management practices 
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(Walker 1998). Particularly, reward decisions made based on coercive, mimetic and 
normative pressures.  
2.3 The UK Voluntary Sector: The Case of Housing Associations 
2.3.1 A Sector Rich in Definitions and Activities 
The literature on the nonprofit sector varies immensely in its terminology. 
The different terms and definitions that have emerged over the past decades show an 
attempt to bring clarity to a diverse and varied field of research. ‘Definitions and 
classifications are hardly the stuff of high drama. Yet they are crucial to clear 
thinking and careful analysis’ (Salamon and Anheier 1997: 6). Labels such as ‘third 
sector’, ‘voluntary’, ‘nonprofit’, ‘charitable’ and ‘independent’ organisations have 
emerged over time, each bringing a different approach to these types of 
organisations. The term ‘third sector’ is frequently used in the US literature and is 
defined as an emergent sector occupying a space outside the market and the state. 
Levitt (1973:49) states that society has come to accept the existence of two broad 
sectors, the private and the public. He considers the third sector to refer to a variety 
of organisations whose purpose is ‘to do things business and government are neither 
doing, nor doing well, nor doing often enough’. In the US literature, nonprofit 
organisations (NPOs) are defined as organisations prohibited from distributing any 
profits generated to the owners, the board or the managers, known as the non-
distribution constraint (Hansmann 1980). The voluntary sector term is also used to 
describe the range of organisations studied here. The term is widely used in the UK 
and emphasises the fundamental role volunteers play in these organisations. Also 
popular in the UK, as well as in the US, the term charity refers to NPOs and 
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emphasises the support these organisations receive from private donations (Salamon 
and Anheier 1997).  
Salamon and Anheier (1997) point out that the variety of terminologies in the sector 
tends to emphasise one aspect of reality at the expense of others. Thus, ‘charitable 
sector’ emphasises support from charitable donations but ignores other income 
sources; similarly, ‘voluntary sector’ excludes the growing role of paid staff, and 
‘independent sector’ ignores the financial dependence of some organisations on the 
government and business. The UK government also refers to ‘value-driven’ 
organisations when referring to nonprofits. However, since all organisations are 
driven by values of one kind or another, the use of the term suggests a political rather 
than social purpose (HMTreasury 2006). The terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘nonprofit’ are 
used in this study as the main descriptive terms, since they seem to be the most 
accurate and best understood concepts in the UK context and in the literature, in 
general, respectively. They are used interchangeably, also, in the interest of 
providing some variety.  
Arriving at an agreed definition of nonprofits is almost impossible. A number of 
writers have attempted to bring together the defining characteristics of a NPO, often 
in terms of what makes them different from their private and public counterparts. 
Gladstone (1979:4) defines the NPO as ‘involving a group of individuals who 
associate without a commercial motive, to further their own welfare or the welfare of 
others’. Rather general, this definition lacks in terms of identifying the features that 
characterise NPOs.  Hatch (1980:15) defines NPOs as:  
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‘(i) being organizations, not informal groups; (ii) not established by 
statute or under statutory authority; and (iii) not commercial in the sense 
of being profit-making or (like much of the private sector in health and 
education) being mainly dependent for their resources on fees and 
charges paid by private individuals’. 
Hatch (1980) attempts to provide a definition based on the functional characteristics 
of voluntary organisations. However, he defines the NPO by what it is not rather than 
what it is. Brenton (1985:9) proposes a type model that establishes that ‘a voluntary 
body should be a formal organisation, constitutionally separate from government, 
self-governing, non-profit-distributing…and of public benefit’. The author places 
much emphasis on the self-governing characteristic and argues that financial 
dependence on public funds should not necessarily mean there is external 
intervention. The notion of not making a profit as a defining characteristic is also 
examined in Mason (1984). The author designs a list of characteristic contrasts 
between nonprofit and for-profit firms. His central argument is that voluntary 
organisations could not be as precisely measured as business firms. He suggests that 
money is a means in the voluntary sector, while in business enterprises it is seen as 
an end.  
Salamon and Anheir’s (1997:33) international definition of the nonprofit sector is the 
one adopted in this study. It emphasises the structure and operation of the NPO. 
According to the authors, in order to be considered part of the nonprofit sector, the 
institution must be organised, showing some degree of organisational performance 
such as rules and procedures, private, neither part of the government nor controlled 
by it, non-profit-distributing, not returning any profits generated to the owners or 
directors, self-governing, that is it must control its own activities and, lastly, it must 
73 
 
be voluntary, that is it should involve some degree of voluntary participation. 
Although these conditions may vary depending on the type of organisation, they 
must appear to a reasonable degree in order for an organisation to be considered part 
of the nonprofit sector. This definition fits the voluntary sector in the UK. In 
particular, HAs meet the five criteria. 
Moving away from the arena of definitions, a classification of organisations in the 
sector is also essential. The diversity of the sector makes it crucial to have a 
classification system in order to identify the systematic differences among its 
organisations. Voluntary organisations are extremely different from each other, 
which makes classification a difficult task. Nevertheless, the task is a first step 
towards identifying commonalities in the behaviour of these organisations. Some of 
the attempts that have been made to create a coherent categorisation of nonprofit 
enterprises will now be examined. 
Johnson (1981) looked at geographical spread and identified four types of NPO - the 
entirely local organisation, the entirely national organisation, the national 
organisation with local branches, and the national association with local affiliates. 
This rather simplistic categorisation leads to a vague differentiation among 
organisations. Handy (1990:10) proposes that voluntary organisations fall into five 
categories: the service providers, the research and advocacy group, the self-help 
group whose firms give support and assistance to meet a variety of needs, another 
self-help group that is more related to recreational matters and, lastly, the 
intermediate bodies, such as councils for voluntary organisations. Hansmann (1987) 
indicates two kinds of NPOs: the philanthropic that are dependent on donations, and 
the commercial that receive all their income from the sale of services. Even though 
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Handy and Hansmann attempt to differentiate between the functions of NPOs, they 
fail to represent the full scope of nonprofits.   
The Home Office (1990:3) attempts to categorise the nonprofit sector according to 
the structural type of the organisation and method of resourcing. It identifies four 
main types of structure among NPOs: the national organisations running local offices 
and raising funds for local work, the national headquarter bodies providing support 
services to autonomous local groups that raise their own funds, the self-standing 
local bodies with no head office to provide support, and the national or local 
intermediary that provides support services to a range of voluntary organisations. 
The main problem with this classification is that it does not consider the 
characteristic functions of the different organisations. 
The work of Salamon and Anheier (1997) identifies the systematic differences 
among the organisations in the nonprofit sector and creates a more appropriate basis 
for grouping them. Based on three important classification systems – the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), the European Community’s 
General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities and the National Taxonomy 
of Exempt Entities (NTEE) – the authors combined the advantages of each of the 
above systems and developed an alternative classification system for NPOs at the 
international level called the International Classification of Nonprofit Organisations 
(ICNPO). The ICNPO uses the economic activities of organisations as the basis for 
classification and divides them into 12 major groups: Education & Research; Health; 
Social Services; Environment; Culture and Recreation; Development and Housing; 
Law, Advocacy and Politics; Philanthropic Intermediaries, Voluntarism; 
International; Religion; Business, Professional Associations, Unions, and Other. 
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These 12 major groups are in turn subdivided into a further 24 subgroups1. 
According to the authors, this system may not be ideal for some countries as it may 
not embrace the diversity of activities within them, but it does provide a ‘useful 
compromise between the level of detail that might be ideal for national work and the 
level that is feasible for comparative work’ (Salamon and Anheier 1997:67).  
There is no simple route in the UK to the identification of types of voluntary 
organisations as there are three different legal frameworks in the country (England 
and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). Nevertheless, Salamon and Anheier’s 
classification is representative of the NPOs in the UK (Kendall and Knapp 1997). In 
the UK, the voluntary sector’s role as a substitute and a complement for public 
service delivery have been encouraged by the government, and the next section will 
explore the evolution of its role as public service providers. 
2.3.2 The New Public Management Agenda and the Voluntary Sector in the 
UK: Partners in Public Service Delivery 
In the last two decades, the public sector in the UK has seen widespread 
attempts to reform public services in order to reduce costs and enhance performance 
(Bach 1999). Central to these reforms is the voluntary sector’s involvement in public 
service delivery. Previous Conservative governments sought to create a mixed 
welfare economy under which local authorities moved from being the providers of 
care to becoming the planners, commissioners and monitors of services contracted 
                                                 
 
1
 For more information on the classification groups, see Salamon and Anheier (1997:70-74). 
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out to the private and voluntary sectors. The aim was to cut the costs of service 
delivery by local government (Brenton 1985; Deakin 1995; Harris, Rochester et al. 
2001). This process of transformation led to an emphasis upon local accountability 
and decentralised local government, representing a major shift in government policy. 
The strategy of the government agenda in the 1980s was to weaken the power of 
local authorities and involve private and voluntary sectors with the introduction of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT). This meant that local authorities had to 
submit competitive tenders alongside private and voluntary organisations to compete 
for contracts to deliver their own direct services in key areas such as road building 
and maintenance, refuse collection, street cleaning, leisure management, catering and 
park maintenance. After 1992, CCT was extended to other services, such as housing 
management, legal and personnel (Di Domenico, Tracey et al. 2009). The Labour 
government that came into power in 1997 shared the same view as the Conservatives 
and the emphasis on contracting-out by local authorities increased, continuing to 
reinforce the contract culture. When the new government signalled an interest in 
promoting and enhancing the involvement of the voluntary sector in public service 
delivery, it was clear that its capacity would need to be boosted through 
improvements in governance, leadership and performance management. The Labour 
government established a number of regulatory changes to support the development 
of the new client-provider relationship (McLaughlin 2004; Cunningham and James 
2009; Macmillan 2010).  
CCT was abolished and Best Value Review (BVR) was introduced as a replacement. 
The latter approach did not reverse the previous Conservative reforms, however. 
While competitive tendering was no longer mandatory, its coverage was extended to 
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include all local government services, most notably social care (Richardson, Tailby 
et al. 2005). BVR was introduced by the Local Government Act 1999 and enforced 
in 2000, with the aim of encouraging continuous quality improvement in council 
services through a five-year audit cycle. For the first time, every local authority 
service would be subject to external inspection (Martin and Davis 2001; Harris 
2005). Following many criticisms related to the increased burden and paper work 
caused by BVR, the government introduced the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment (CPA) in 2002, to try to reduce the level of audit needed for well-
performing councils. The CPA was devised and is run by the Audit Commission, an 
autonomous body working to independently assess and report on the performance of 
improved public services. However, BVR remains at the heart of the reform agenda 
(Roper, James et al. 2005). Undertaking BVRs is a statutory requirement for all local 
authorities, encouraging them to continuously improve the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of their functions. Although there is no prescribed format, all reviews 
must undertake and evidence four primary activities, the so-called 4Cs: ‘to challenge 
why and how a service is being provided, compare its performance with others to see 
how the service could be better provided, consult with local taxpayers and service 
users about what they want from the service and compete, wherever practicable, 
fairly and openly to provide the best service’ (Harris 2005:683). These initiatives 
require local authorities to achieve targeted standards of performance across all the 
services they provide.  
The explicit use of measures of performance as well as a greater emphasis on output 
controls seeks to encourage a business-like approach to the management of public 
services. A variety of systems have been introduced in the public sector to reinforce 
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the link between individual and organisational performance. Organisational targets, 
individual target setting, performance reviews and PRP, all tested and widespread in 
the private sector, are now also used to measure the performance of public services 
(Boyne 2002). Obviously, nothing suggests these systems are not applicable in the 
public sector. Nevertheless, failure to take into account the specificities of the sector 
when importing private sector practices to support the modernisation agenda of the 
public sector may lead to negative outcomes in the services delivered (Boxall and 
Purcell 2000). Local authorities are very complex structures, serving and answering 
to a multitude of goals and stakeholders, and a top-down approach to performance 
measurement could lead to a long string of bureaucratic inspections and auditing 
regimes. In essence, the BVR introduced in local authorities is a performance 
measurement system that evaluates the outcomes against established benchmarks in 
order to identify performance standards to be achieved in the future (Harris 2001). 
Harris (2005:684) puts it well when she suggests that a local authority that has 
‘improved its performance from poor to average is likely to get a better report in its 
next inspection than one whose performance has consistently been rated as average 
but may well have had less scope for improvement’. This is only one of the many 
issues related to measurability in public as well as nonprofit organisations. 
Voluntary organisations have been drawn into this increasingly regulated 
environment ever since they started to become more involved in the delivery of 
public services. Local authorities are responsible for measuring the performance of 
nonprofits and allocating funding to their activities. Paton (2003) argues that the 
emergence of performance measurement in nonprofits resulted from central 
government’s initiative aimed at transferring the provision of social services from 
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government agencies (local authorities) to independent (private and nonprofit) 
organisations. Supervisory and monitoring tactics became widely diffused in the 
voluntary sector through the use of funding restrictions by public donors. Such 
government-led reforms, referred to as New Public Management (NPM), have 
contributed to reshaping the management of many NPOs (Walker 2000). This is the 
case with the HAs studied in this research. The rationale behind this choice of sector 
is elaborated next. 
2.3.3 Housing Associations and the Provision of Public Service Delivery 
The housing sector is one of the largest and most significant public service 
sectors in England and Wales, with an annual turnover of over £10 billion. The 
sector comprises around 2,000 registered bodies known as Registered Social 
Landlords (RSLs), or simply called Housing Associations (HAs). HAs are an 
excellent example of how the nonprofit sector is taking a major role in public service 
provision, and offers a fascinating context to observe (Mullins 2002; National 
Housing Federation 2010).  
After the First World War, housing was the responsibility of local authorities, and 
HAs played a secondary role. However, the last few decades have seen them play an 
increasingly central role in social housing provision. In the late 1970s and 1980s, 
when Conservative governments began the transfer of local authority housing stock 
to existing HAs, the housing sector experienced its most significant transformation. 
Public funding was introduced for HAs with the aim of supporting and expanding the 
provision of public services in the sector. In addition to housing for people on low 
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income, HAs also became involved in niches such as housing for older people and 
other vulnerable groups.  
The huge amount of public funding being thrown at HAs led to the formation of new 
bodies to monitor and regulate their activities, as well as the development of 
financial and organisational capacity that would serve them later on (Mullins 2010). 
The Housing Act 1988 led to a new funding regime under which associations were 
seen as ‘non-public bodies with the ability to source private capital leveraged against 
the asset value of their existing stock holdings’ (Mullins 2010:10). This meant that 
private borrowing became their main source of income for the acquisition and 
development of new and existing homes, exposing associations to the financial risks 
from which they had been spared previously. By 1997, HAs had grown and 
expanded significantly and their market share had increased to 22%, from less than 
5% in 1974. The Labour Government continued to discourage local authorities from 
remaining as landlords and accelerated the pace of the stock transfer to HAs. In 
addition to transferring stock, local authorities also had the option to delegate the 
management of housing to the HAs while maintain ownership of the stock, a practice 
known as Arm’s Length Management Organisations (ALMOs). Another alternative 
was to offer public/private contracts for the long-term improvement and management 
of housing stock (Mullins 2010). In 2005, 45% of social housing was owned and 
managed by HAs and 15% by ALMOs (Pawson 2006).  
HAs have thus experienced a long process of change, from playing a secondary role 
in the provision of social housing, to being involved in the large-scale delivery of 
public services in England and Wales. They are defined as independent NPOs 
governed by voluntary boards that provide homes and support for people with 
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housing needs, as well as key community services (National Housing Federation 
2010). There are distinct categories of HAs, related to the types of activities or 
services they deliver. According to the National Housing Federation, HAs work in 
six key areas: they provide affordable rent to many people on low incomes or who 
are unable to work because of a disability, and who cannot afford to pay private 
sector rents; they also help people on low incomes to buy their homes through shared 
ownership programmes; HAs are involved in regeneration programmes in the 
community to improve the environment and reduce social exclusion; they provide 
housing-related support and floating support to people who need assistance to live 
independently – such services may include sheltered housing for older people, 
rehabilitation for people with drug and alcohol problems, job and life skills training, 
and housing for homeless people and victims of violence; they also provide 
temporary accommodation such as hostels for homeless people as well as community 
services including employment training, child care and community centres. HAs 
work in partnership with local authorities to meet housing needs and are regulated by 
the Tenant Services Authority (TSA) regarding the level of rent, the quality of homes 
and the involvement of tenants (National Housing Federation 2010). 
The four organisations presented in this thesis are HAs working within the 
homelessness sector in London. The homelessness sector is formed by a group of 
NPOs within the housing sector that share a focus on preventing homelessness. The 
1996 Housing Act defines homelessness as the state of lacking adequate 
accommodation in which one is entitled to live. Consequently, rough sleepers are not 
the only homeless people in the UK. This category also includes those living in 
hostels, bed and breakfasts, squats, overcrowded accommodation, or ‘sofa surfing’ 
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with family and friends (Buckingham 2010). The homelessness sector divides itself 
into two subgroups: The first comprises housing advice organisations working on 
policy and development, training and campaigning, operating at regional and 
national levels. Some well-known organisations in this field include Shelter and the 
Salvation Army. The other subgroup, to which the four case studies belong, consists 
of housing-related support organisations that provide a diverse range of services, 
from supported accommodation and hostels, to day centres and soup-runs, to help 
people who have experienced homelessness or are at risk of homelessness to achieve 
independent living (Joseph 2010).  
Housing-related support organisations are funded by the Supporting People (SP) 
programme and the four organisations studied in this thesis receive between 40 and 
54% of their total funding from this programme. The SP was launched by central 
government in 2003 with the aim to end social exclusion and to enable vulnerable 
people to maintain or achieve independence through the provision of housing-related 
support. The Department for Communities and Local Government allocates SP 
grants to local authorities, which are responsible for contracting the services of HAs 
and other charities working in the homelessness sector and providing SP-relevant 
services (Supporting People 2009).  Local authorities, as well as supplying funding, 
are also responsible for monitoring the housing-related support offered to homeless 
people, through a series of inspection regimes, targets and contract specifications 
(Mullins, Jones et al. 2009). The majority of the contracts to provide SP services are 
allocated through a competitive tendering system, where organisations have to bid 
for contracts. That has led to a cost versus quality issue. In the SP Programme Report 
(2009), UNISON members voiced their concern at the emphasis local authorities had 
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been placing on the cost of services at the expense of quality. This contract culture 
based on ‘the cheapest bid wins’ is said to have created an environment of 
uncertainty and put pressure on organisations to do more for less (Joseph 2010).  
Contracting places a much tighter set of controls, legally enforceable, upon 
homelessness organisations and the services they provide. Moreover, it creates a very 
competitive environment among the organisations bidding for contracts. Morris 
(1999) suggests that the rivalry between organisations caused by the ‘contract 
culture’ goes against the natural culture of voluntary organisations. She describes 
how one of the organisations she researched told her of how it had once shared 
information with another organisation that had then undercut it in a bid for a service 
delivery contract. Eventually, the organisation therefore stopped sharing information 
with others. One could argue that, if nonprofits refrain from sharing information and 
working together when seeking funds from the same pot of money, the difference 
between them and their private counterparts will become less clear, which could be 
damaging for the sector and society in general.  
The uncertainty and turbulence that characterise the operating environment of the 
housing sector has thus resulted in changes in the organisational behaviour of these 
organisations. HAs are moving towards flatter management structures, decentralising 
operational management, empowering operational staff, and taking decision making 
closer to the customer. They are developing sophisticated business-planning, 
strategic management and management techniques as they increasingly conform to 
private sector management models (Walker 1998). The susceptibility of HAs to 
institutional pressures brought into play by the increased competition and funding 
restrictions in this new climate, have contributed to mimetic isomorphism in the 
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sector. A new discourse has entered HAs, including business terms such as goal-
setting, appraisals and PRP, and the new business-focused approach of HAs might be 
expected to result in a more hard-nosed attitude towards management (Pawson 2006) 
and carry consequences for reward decisions taken in HAs. However, there is a great 
deal of complexity involved in delivering housing-related support for homeless 
people and, as a result, performance measures can be noisy, expensive to monitor 
and, most importantly, detrimental to the quality of the service being provided 
(Koumenta 2010). These points are even more evident when performance is linked to 
pay.  
Conclusion 
Substantial research evidence has been produced over the years on the 
existence of a performance culture within HAs (Clapham and Satsangi 1992; Kemp 
1995; Walker 2000; Mullins 2002). However, most of the research exploring how 
increased competition and regulation in the sector have led to a business culture in 
HAs is carried out at the sectoral level (Walker 2000). What is of particular note here 
is that little is known about how performance regimes have altered the management 
of HR in HAs and how this has influenced the choice of pay systems in the 
organisations. HAs are vulnerable to coercive, mimetic and normative pressures, 
which in turn play a role in the introduction of reward practices such as PRP. This 
issue has not come under the scrutiny of researchers and its investigation is one of 
the contributions of this thesis.  
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Chapter 3  Research Methodology 
A key issue in the selection of a research design is its appropriateness 
for addressing the proposed research question. The main research question proposed 
in this thesis seeks to address whether PRP acts as a motivator for nonprofit 
employees and is consequently an appropriate pay system for NPOs. This chapter 
presents the research approach adopted here and describes the context of the cross-
sectional study of the four organisations in which data were collected, as well as the 
data collection procedures, response rates and characteristics of the samples for each 
organisation. As the main research method comprised a survey questionnaire, the 
contents of the survey instruments are also provided.  
3.1 The Case Study Approach 
The initial focus of this research is based on a case study design. According 
to Feagin, Orum et al. (1991), the case study is a multi-perspective method that 
enables empirical studies to be conducted through in-depth investigation. Yin (1994) 
defines the case study approach as exploratory research into a contemporary 
phenomenon within the context in which it occurs. In this research, the cases studied 
permit a more in-depth examination of whether PRP acts as a motivator for nonprofit 
employees by placing it in the context in which it occurs. Yin (1994) argues that the 
case study does not represent a sample but deals with a limited number of events or 
cases. However, case studies can consider not just the cases themselves but also the 
groups to which they belong and the relationships between the cases. This approach 
is put forward here as one of the primary research designs in which quantitative and 
qualitative methods are combined. It has been said that it is unusual for quantitative 
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and qualitative research methods to be allocated equal roles within an overall 
research design (Coyle-Shapiro 1996). This study is no exception in that greater 
emphasis is placed on quantitative methods. 
3.2 Rationale for Quantitative Design 
Quantitative research methods have been implemented in this study. Such 
methods are particularly useful for testing the hypothesis about the motivational 
effects of PRP among nonprofit employees. There is a substantial body of evidence, 
largely from the public sector (Kessler 2000), to show that PRP is not a strong 
motivator for employees (Pearce and Perry 1983; Thompson and Buchan 1993; 
Marsden and Richardson 1994; Marsden and French 1998; Marsden and Belfield 
2006). These studies focus on the employee as a unit of analysis and use quantitative 
methods to give a more detailed picture of the effectiveness of the PRP scheme. The 
present study continues in that tradition and takes another step towards advancing 
our understanding of incentive pay in NPOs. It also sheds light on a key question, 
that is, to what extent research on incentives in private organisations can be applied 
more generally.  
A quantitative research design offers a number of benefits, including a relatively high 
level of measurement precision. A survey is deemed the best way to access all the 
variables studied here in a standardised manner so as to investigate the theory-driven 
hypothesised relationships amongst these variables. In addition, previous research on 
pay systems has relied on quantitative measures, and following a similar strategy 
here facilitates comparison, not only among the participants in this study, but also 
between the findings of this and other studies. Quantitative methodologies facilitate 
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replication and, consequently, compared with research in the field, improve our 
understanding of the variables investigated. Therefore, a quantitative research design 
was deemed most appropriate for this study, given its theory-driven hypotheses and 
the number of variables involved.  
3.3 Case Study Choice and Criteria 
The criteria for selecting cases should be grounded in the research question 
and the analytical framework proposed. This research aims to answer, primarily, 
whether PRP motivates employees to improve their work within their organisations. 
In order to answer that, four HAs for the homeless are used in this study. For reasons 
of confidentiality, pseudonyms are used to identify the organisations. Two 
organisations with PRP systems have been selected, PRP1 and PRP2, and the other 
two, PM1 and PM2, have seniority-based pay systems with performance 
management. The latter two have been selected to function as a control group. The 
motivational effects of PRP will be compared with the motivational effects of PM 
that is not linked to pay. The cases have been selected because they show some 
important similarities. The whole of this study is regarded as a case study of England 
and I decided to select cases from the city of London. The regional context is 
important in the choice of cases since pay systems and wage structures may vary 
between different regions of England. Selecting all four cases from London also 
helped to minimise differences in labour characteristics and the level of pay of the 
employees, since all the organisations studied compete for employees in the same 
labour market. Another important similarity among the cases is the source of their 
funding. All four organisations receive between 40 and 54% of their total funding 
from the Supporting People Programme and therefore compete for contracts in the 
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majority of London boroughs under the same regulations. They also work with very 
similar client groups consisting of homeless people or people under the threat of 
becoming homeless. The similarities in their client bases means that their employees 
have similar qualifications for dealing with their clients and also similar requirements 
when it comes to accessing the quality and quantity of work they do within each 
council to which they provide services. In order to investigate and compare the 
motivational effects of PRP and PM not linked to pay, the cases must be 
observationally equivalent in respect to their demographic structure, types of activity, 
client bases etc. The next section introduces the cases.  
3.4 Research Settings 
3.4.1 PRP1 
PRP1 is a NPO that was established in 1973. At that time there was a growing 
gap in the market for high-quality, affordable accommodation for single people on 
low incomes. In 1974, PRP1 became affiliated to the National Federation of Housing 
Associations and the following year registered with the Housing Corporation. In 
more recent years there has been an increased focus on providing accommodation 
and services for young people, families and people with learning disabilities, as well 
as increasing the capacity and geographical spread of floating support services 
offered to people in their own homes. PRP1 currently works in partnership with 24 
local authorities and primary care trusts to meet the housing and care needs of their 
local residents. In 2007, it supported over 3,000 people, including rough sleepers, 
people with mental health needs or learning disabilities, homeless families, single 
homeless people, women and children fleeing from domestic violence, people with 
substance misuse issues and ex-offenders. PRP1 works in 21 boroughs in London 
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and has over 50 separate accommodation-based support, floating and outreach 
services. There are 1,371 people in supported housing, 938 people using tenancy 
sustainment services, 440 in hostels, 450 using outreach floating support services and 
49 people in registered care homes. 
3.4.2 PRP2 
PRP2 was founded in 1969 and is a registered charity legally organised in the 
form of a company limited by guarantee and governed by its Memorandum and 
Articles of Association. PRP2 is also a registered social landlord and acts entirely as 
a non-profit-making organisation. PRP2’s overall purpose is to help promote social 
inclusion and eradicate youth homelessness, working primarily with people aged 16-
25 years old. Its work provides a range of accommodation-based services, including 
emergency night shelters, short-stay hostels and specialist projects for care leavers. 
Services are also provided for ex-offenders, and young single parents, including 
supported flats and floating support services. As part of its direct work, PRP2 offers 
employment, training, education and specialist support for young people with mental 
health, drug and alcohol issues at different London and national locations. PRP2 has 
traditionally focused its efforts in London but, in 1989, in response to the growing 
demand from agencies outside London, it set up a national development unit to 
provide consultancy services to specific geographical areas, helping local voluntary 
and statutory agencies to design, deliver and implement coherent youth homelessness 
strategies. It now supports organisations based in four government regions across 
England – the North East, Yorkshire/Humber, the West Midlands and the South 
West. PRP2 has two subsidiary companies. However, at the time of the fieldwork, 
they were not integrated with PRP2’s reward system and therefore did not take part 
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in the study. PRP2 offers about 500 beds to young people and, in 2007, worked with 
just over 1,800 people. 
3.4.3 PM1 
PM1 is a registered charity and a company limited by guarantee. It was 
created in April 2002 from the merger of two London homelessness agencies. One of 
them, based in West London, had been providing shelter and support to homeless and 
vulnerable people since 1977, housing and caring for nearly 1,500 single homeless 
people each year. The other, based in Camden since 1981, provided services both 
directly to homeless people and to agencies who worked with them. PM1 provides a 
range of services to meet the needs of homeless and vulnerable people in London. 
The services include street outreach, the PM1 Centre, which offers services to rough 
sleepers, hostels and supported housing, and advice services that assist with benefits 
and debt management. It also provides a range of education and training 
opportunities that help its clients to develop skills and increase their employability. 
In addition, it works with other agencies that support homeless people, to promote 
best practice. PM1 works in 34 boroughs in London and aims to meet both the 
immediate and long-term needs of people experiencing homelessness. It provides 
help to rough sleepers, people with mental and physical illnesses, people with 
substance misuse issues, and ex-offenders, among others. In 2007, it provided direct 
support to around 3,000 people. 
3.4.4 PM2 
PM2 was founded in 1969 and is a HA and a charity exempt from 
registration. The organisation started with volunteers in Battersea, providing support 
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to rough sleepers. PM2 is one of London’s largest hostel providers and its services 
also include street outreach, floating support, care homes and prison services. PM2 
provides emergency services such as emergency shelters and hostels, and outreach 
teams who work on the streets with people sleeping rough. It also provides drug and 
alcohol treatment, and physical and mental health care. PM2 runs semi-independent 
housing projects for nearly 700 people and offers high-support housing to 400 people 
in danger of sleeping rough. The organisation provides work and learning services 
for people seeking jobs, and training such as IT and woodworking skills. Its prison 
service offers advice to prisoners who may experience housing difficulties on release 
from prison. PM2 has nearly 1,700 beds across London and currently works in all 33 
London boroughs.  
3.5 Data Collection 
Case study research typically includes a range of data collection techniques. 
Below, the techniques utilised in this study are described. 
3.5.1 Interviews 
Interviews are an essential source of case study evidence. The respondents in 
this research provided important insights into their organisations and offered 
explanations as to why certain pay systems had been introduced, and how they had 
been developed and implemented in the organisations. Given the quantitative nature 
of this study, the purpose of the interviews was to gain a better understanding of the 
work context of the employees, and ensure that the concepts used in the 
questionnaire were consistent with the reality for the employees in all four 
organisations. Following Fowler’s (2001) recommendations for questionnaire 
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development and adaptation, interviews were carried out with managerial staff in 
order to gain knowledge of the pay system in all cases. HR Directors and one Chief 
Executive were initially interviewed and provided an overview of the services 
offered by their organisations and the pay systems currently in effect. Subsequently, I 
interviewed other line managers in the organisations to get a better understanding of 
how the pay systems worked in practice. The results of the interviews are discussed 
in Chapter 4, where I present the pay structures in the organisations as well as their 
PM and PRP systems. The interviews were carried out between May and August 
2008. They followed the semi-structured format and lasted between 45 and 60 
minutes. Below is the list of partiipants from each organisation: 
PRP1 
- HR Director 
- HR Managerc 
- Mental Health Support Services Contract Manager 
- Senior Homelessness Manager 
PRP2 
- Chief Executive 
- HR Director 
- Line Manager from the Department of Health  
- Contracts and Performance Manager 
PM1 
- HR Director 
- Services Manager 
- Assistant Manager, Day Centre 
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PM2 
- HR Director 
- Community Services Manager 
- Group Manager, Work and Learning Services Department 
3.5.2 Documentation 
The HAs provided documents, reports and other material on pay structures 
and grades, and the reward and PM systems, including appraisal forms, guidance 
notes for appraisers, performance ratings and competency frameworks. The 
documentation gathered provided the initial and core information about the reward 
system in each organisation. It served as useful evidence for verifying details and 
information obtained through the interviews. This information is also presented in 
Chapter 4. 
3.5.3 Survey Distribution 
The surveys at PM1 and PRP1 were conducted between June and July 2008 
and the surveys at PRP2 and PM2 were conducted between September and October 
2008. The online questionnaires were distributed to respondents via their email 
addresses which were provided by the organisations, and the employees answered 
them on company time. Electronic surveys bring several advantages, such as the 
elimination of paper, postage, mail-out and data-entry costs. In addition, the time 
required for survey implementation can be reduced from weeks to days or even 
hours. One of the main advantages of the introduction of these new technologies is 
the potential for reducing the correspondence between sample size and survey costs, 
resulting in decisions to survey entire populations rather than only a sample (Dillman 
2007). However, the use of online questionnaires raises an entirely new issue of 
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security and confidentiality that must be considered (Dillman 2007). According to 
Cooper (2000), electronic surveys may cause some concern to employees regarding 
perceptions of confidentiality, and also incur a risk of coverage error. To minimise 
these issues, some important measures were taken in this research. First, the coverage 
issue was addressed. All employees in all four organisations studied had access to a 
company email address and regularly checked their email account as part of their 
daily routine at work. Second, the security and confidentiality issues were addressed. 
Prior to sending the email to the respondents containing the link to the online survey, 
I sent each manager an individual covering letter, explaining the study, with 
instructions to distribute hard copies of the covering letter, signed by me, to all 
employees. It is known that personalised covering letters on letterhead stationary 
play a significant role in establishing trust, and consequently increase response rates 
(Dillman 2007). As part of the instructions, the managers were also asked to send an 
email to the employees, confirming that the organisation endorsed the survey.  
The letter distributed to the employees contained an explanation of the study and the 
date on which the survey would be launched, and indicated once again that the 
research was endorsed by their employing organisation. It also assured 
confidentiality to the respondents and explained that all survey responses would be 
sent to me, the researcher, and not to the organisation. The letter also contained my 
email address at the LSE, and welcomed them to contact me for clarification or if 
any concerns arose. The email sent to the employees containing the link to the online 
survey also contained a brief introduction to the study and a thank you for 
completing the questionnaire. Email reminders were sent to the employees, 
encouraging them to participate in the study, every two weeks during the two-month 
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period for which the survey was active in their organisation. Making the survey 
available for two months in each organisation was aimed at giving the opportunity to 
employees on annual leave to answer the survey on their return. The reminders sent 
to each organisation were identical, save for references to the organisation’s name 
and to the length of time since the survey had been distributed. Questionnaires, cover 
letters and reminders can be found in Appendix 2. 
A small-scale pilot study was conducted in all the organisations between May and 
July 2008. Pilot studies are used to pre-test the survey instruments that will be 
utilised in the main data collection process to ensure all items are understood by the 
respondents and to test the logistics involved, prior to the large study (Creswell 
2002). The main purpose of this pilot test was to ensure that the item wordings were 
understandable and that appropriate terms related to the reward system and appraisals 
were identified in each organisation. For instance, in one organisation the appraisal 
was called an appraisal meeting, and in another organisation it was called a 
performance development review. Some minor changes in wording were made as a 
result of the feedback from the respondents. A small random sample of 10 employees 
in each organisation answered the pilot test and, on average, they took between 15 
and 18 minutes to complete the questionnaire.  
3.5.4 Response Rate and Sample Characteristics 
The survey was distributed to all 161 permanent employees at PM1 and 83 
usable questionnaires were returned (51.6%). At PRP1, the survey was distributed to 
all 579 employees and 267 usable questionnaires were returned (46.1%). At PRP2 
the survey was distributed to all 247 employees and 130 usable questionnaires were 
returned (52.6%). At PM2 there were 800 employees but, due to another internal 
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survey being distributed around the same time, my survey was distributed to a 
random sample of 262 employees and 137 usable questionnaires were returned 
(52.3%). The total survey sample was 1,249 employees and the total response rate 
was 617 employees (49.4%). In all organisations, the majority of the participants 
were full-time female employees, and between 30 and 34% held supervisory 
positions. 57.3% of the employees at PRP1 were between the ages of 30 and 49 
years, and 60.6% at PRP2, 61.4% at PM1 and 74.7% at PM2 were in the same age 
group. Table 3.1 presents a summary of the sample characteristics by organisation. In 
all four cases studied, the respondents were representative of the population 
distribution in each organisation. 
Table 3-1: Sample Characteristics by Organisation (in %) 
Characteristics PRP1 PRP2 PM1 PM2 
Female 59.3 63.1 62.2 55.9 
Full-Time 92.4 93.1 86.7 89 
Managers 30.7 31.5 34.9 33.3 
Age     
Under 20 - 1.6 - - 
20-29 24.3 29.9 30.1 14.2 
30-39 27.1 32.3 33.7 39.6 
40-49 30.2 28.3 27.7 35.1 
50-59 16.1 7.1 8.4 7.5 
60 or more 2.4 0.8 - 3.7 
Tenure     
Less than 1 year 23.5 22.7 18.8 15.7 
1 to less than 2 years 16.5 11.7 21.3 15.7 
2 to less than 5 years 36.9 32 33.8 32.8 
5 to less than 10 years 14.9 24.2 15 15.7 
10 years or more 8.2 9.4 11.3 20.1 
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3.5.5  Contents of Survey Instruments 
The survey contained measurements that assessed (a) biographical 
information (e.g., gender, age, tenure, education, supervisory status, and trade union 
membership), (b) motivation, (c) public service motivation, (d) perceptions of 
fairness, (e) affective commitment, (f) job satisfaction, (g) pay satisfaction, (h) goal 
setting and (i) quality of appraisals. Below is a detailed explanation of the main 
variables. 
3.5.5.1  Measurement of Motivation 
Motivation is treated here as a willingness or preparedness to undertake 
certain kinds of action (Marsden and Richardson 1994). It is measured using the 
responses of the nonprofit employees to a variety of statements about themselves in 
relation to the PRP scheme. Employees in the two organisations with seniority-based 
schemes were given the same statements but, instead of the PRP scheme, they were 
asked about their PM system. The statements were presented to and discussed with 
senior managers in the organisations and were in line with the organisations’ 
expectations about the behaviours of their employees as a result of either the PRP 
scheme or PM system. Therefore, it was appropriate to ask these questions when 
trying to discover the motivational effects of PRP and PM. All items were answered 
on a five-point Likert response scale and the managers also responded to the same 
statements about their employees. 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed with AMOS using the 
maximum likelihood method of estimation (Table 3.2). The CFA identified two 
factors in the motivation scale. I termed factor 1 MotivationDiscretion and factor 2, 
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MotivationEffort. This finding is consistent with Katz’s (1964) views of different 
types of employee behaviour necessary to increase performance in the organisations. 
The employee’s willingness to work beyond the requirements of their work, show 
initiative and get work priorities right is an example of autonomous motivation, 
where he or she acts with a sense of discretion. On the other hand, willingness to 
work harder, increase the quantity of work and improve the quality of work could be 
an example of controlled motivation, where the employee acts with a sense of 
pressure (Gagne and Deci 2005). According to the authors, autonomous motivation 
and controlled motivation are both intended and necessary to the organisation. 
Table 3-2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Motivation Model 
  
Factor Loadings                                      
(Standard Errors) R² 
Factor/Items Motivation Discretion 
Motivation 
Effort 
  
The existance of Performance-related Pay (PRP) 
gives me an incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of my job. 
.84*                                           
(.03)                    
 
.70 
The system of PRP makes me want to show 
more initiative in my job. 
.91*                                           
(-)                    
 
.82 
PRP gives me a greater incentive to get my work 
priorities right. 
.88*                                          
(.03)                    
 
.77 
PRP makes me willing to work harder. 
 
.88*                                           
(.02)                    .82 
PRP makes me willing to improve the quality of 
my work. 
 
.93*                                           
( - )                    .86 
PRP makes me willing to increase the quantity 
of work I do.   
.88*                                           
(.02)                    .78 
Note: * p < .001 ( - )  
Regression weight was fixed at 1 
Different models were compared and the one with the best fit to the data was 
selected. The motivation model used here is a two-factor model with correlated latent 
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variables (Table 3.3). As can be seen from Table 3.3, the results of the analysis 
demonstrate a good model fit. The first measure of model fit is the χ². The χ² should 
be a non-significant and small value, which indicates that what is observed in the 
data is not significantly different from what is expected to be the case in the 
population, if the model is to be regarded as true (Fife-Schaw 2000). However, 
according to Jöreskog (1990) the χ² is only a reasonable measure of fit in models 
with about 75 to 200 cases and can be problematic with larger sample sizes (400 or 
more). As n increases, the value of the χ² will also increase, becoming almost always 
statistically significant, even with unimportant differences. In an attempt to make the 
results less dependent on sample size, the relative chi-square (χ²/df), which is the chi-
square fit index divided by degrees of freedom, is used here. Values between 2 and 5 
indicate a good fit (Marsh and Hocevar 1985). Two other fit indices were used to 
estimate the model fit of the motivation scale: the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) and the comparative fit index (CFI). The RMSEA is 
currently the most popular measure of model fit and is reported in virtually all papers 
using CFA or structural equation modelling (SEM) (Kenny, Kaniskan et al. 2011). 
Stevens (1996) suggests that a RMSEA value of .05 or less indicates a good fit of 
model, while models with .10 or more have a poor fit. Other authors, however, are 
more flexible with regards to this universal cut-off of .05. Hu and Bentler (1999) 
suggest that, when the RMSEA value is .06 for instance and the CFI is .90 or greater, 
then the model has a good fit. In addition, more recent research (Curran, Bollen et al. 
2003; Chen, Curran et al. 2008) demonstrates that there is no empirical support for 
the use of 0.05 or 0.10 as universal cut-off values to determine adequate model fit 
and that the .05 cut-off value does not work consistently well across different models 
and sample sizes. The scale’s reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) was also 
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computed and its value was found to be .95, above Carmines and Zeller’s (1979) .70 
threshold of acceptable reliability. 
Table 3-3: Fit Statistics for the Motivation Model 
        
Contrast with 
baseline model     
χ² df χ²/df 
χ² 
difference 
df 
difference CFI RMSEA 
Motivation Baseline 
(one-factor) 179.35 9 19.93 .94 .17 
Motivation Model 1 
(two factor 
uncorrelated) 565.82 9 62.87 386.47 0 .79 .31 
Motivation Model 2 
(two factor 
correlated) 20.7 8 2.59 158.65* 1 .99 .05 
* p .001 
After performing the CFA for the motivation model, it was deemed necessary to 
investigate whether the model presented a good fit for all of the organisations 
studied. In other words, I wanted to investigate whether the motivational measures 
were consistent between the four cases. All four HAs answered the same questions in 
the motivation scale. However, two answered about the motivational effects of 
‘performance management’ and two about the motivational effects of ‘performance-
related pay’. In order to be able to make the assumption that the scale was measuring 
the same trait of ‘motivation’ in all groups, a test of measurement invariance (MI) 
was necessary. The aim of the MI test is to evaluate the equivalence of scores used in 
different sample groups. In this case, the aim was to ensure that the ‘motivation’ trait 
related to the same set of observed variables, in the same degree, for all four 
organisations. Vandenberg and Lance (2000) state the importance of performing a 
MI test across different samples in organisational research. A multigroup CFA was 
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undertaken to cross-validate the motivation model. When performing a MI test, three 
different types of MI are tested in the analysis: configural invariance, where the 
latent variable is measured by the same number of observed variables across the 
groups, metric invariance, which tests the equivalence of the factor loadings across 
the groups, and scalar invariance, which tests the equivalence of intercepts across the 
groups. All three types of measurement equivalence were found to exist across the 
organisations and the motivation scale presented an excellent model fit in all 
organisations (Table 3.4). For the other scales used in this study, testing for 
measurement equivalence was not necessary since there was no reason to believe that 
the other latent variables used here would have different meanings across the 
organisations. 
Table 3-4: Multigroup Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Motivation Model across 
the Four Organisations: Chi-square and Goodness-of-fit Statistics 
  χ² df χ²/df CFI RMSEA 
Motivation Model (two factor 
correlated) 50.17 29 1.73 .99 .03 
3.5.5.2  Measurement of Public Service Motivation (PSM) 
PSM theory (Perry and Wise 1990) explains that the motivations of public 
and nonprofit workers are different from those in for-profit organisations. The theory 
suggests that public and nonprofit employees attach considerable importance to the 
nature of their jobs, which includes helping others and serving the public interest 
(Wright 2007). In this study, the motivational effects of PRP and PM are compared 
and, consequently, every effort was made to determine whether the employees in all 
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four organisations were observationally similar. Thus, this study looked at whether 
the employees in the four organisations were similar in terms of their PSM. 
The PSM construct was originally developed within an American context by James 
Perry (Perry 1996). However, further research in other countries has confirmed its 
universal relevance (Kim 2005b; Castaing 2006; Cerase and Farinella 2006; 
Vandenabeele, Scheepers et al. 2006; Koumenta 2010). Perry’s (1996) original scale 
consisted of 40 items used to measure six dimensions of PSM – attraction to policy 
making, compassion, self-sacrifice, commitment to the public interest, social justice 
and civic duty. Using CFA, he found that the final three dimensions could be 
combined into a single dimension, and his final 24 items were then based on four 
dimensions: attraction to policy making, public interest, compassion and self-
sacrifice. Despite the scale’s high reliability and validity, concerns have been raised 
regarding its ability to fully capture and measure the public service construct in non-
US contexts (Vandenabeele 2008a). Vandenabeele (2008a) added a fifth dimension, 
‘democratic governance’, which captures public service values that are closer to the 
European and UK public service context. The five-dimension scale has been 
implemented by Koumenta (2010) in a study of public prisons in the UK and shown 
to work well in the UK context.  
The dimension ‘attraction to policy making’ captures the extent to which respondents 
are attracted to public service because they have an interest in politics and policy 
making. The ‘democratic governance’ dimension looks at the extent to which 
respondents agree with particular values characteristic of a public bureaucracy 
(access, accountability and rule of law). Because I am studying a sample of nonprofit 
employees who are not formally tied to a traditional public administration and who 
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are not involved in policy making as part of their work-related activities, I decided to 
drop the items related to these two dimensions. In a study of PSM in a sample of 
morally committed citizens, Perry, Brudney et al. (2008) dropped the ‘attraction to 
policy making’ dimension and only used the ‘public interest’, ‘compassion’ and 
‘self-sacrifice’ dimensions to assess the level of PSM among volunteer workers. 
Following the same line of argument, it seemed appropriate to only include items 
related to public interest, compassion and self-sacrifice in this study. In a study of 
PSM and job performance in the federal sector, Alonso and Lewis (2001) performed 
a CFA using six items from Perry’s scale, two self-sacrifice questions plus one each 
for policy making, compassion, public interest and social justice. They found that 
these six questions could be collapsed into a single index of PSM. In this study, I 
also perform a CFA with AMOS using the maximum likelihood method of 
estimation. 10 items from Perry’s 24-item scale were chosen based on best model fit 
for this scale: three questions were used for public interest, three for compassion and 
four for self-sacrifice. No items loaded on multiple factors and all items rendered 
significant factor loadings above the .40 threshold (Table 3.5). Model fit indices were 
also computed and the results demonstrate a good model fit (Table 3.6). The scale’s 
reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) is .79. 
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Table 3-5: Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Public Service Motivation 
Factor/Items 
Factor Loadings 
(Standard 
Errors) 
R² 
To me, before anything good citizens should think of 
society 
.48*                                 
(.08) .23 
Serving the community interest is an important drive 
in my daily life 
.66*                              
(.09) .44 
I voluntarily contribute to my community .56*                              (.10) .31 
To me, helping people who are in trouble is very 
important 
.45*                              
(.06) .21 
Without solidarity our society is certain to fall apart .41*                                 (.09) .17 
To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of 
others 
.40*                                      
(.09) .16 
Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself .58*                                        ( - ) .33 
I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of 
society 
.64*                                       
(.09) .40 
I feel people should give back to society more than 
they get from it 
.48*                                   
(.09) .23 
Making a difference in society means more to me 
than personal achievements 
.62*                                    
(.11) .39 
Note: * p < .001 
( - ) Regression weight was fixed at 1 
Table 3-6: Fit Statistics for the Public Service Motivation Model 
  χ² df χ²/df CFI RMSEA 
PSM 130.08 35 3.71 .92 .06 
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3.5.5.3  Measurement of Goal Setting  
Goal setting was measured using items related to the SMART criteria 
followed in appraisal meetings. A CFA was performed with AMOS using the 
maximum likelihood method of estimation (Table 3.7). Model fit indices were also 
computed and the results demonstrated a good model fit (Table 3.8). The scale has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .91.  
Table 3-7: Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Goal Setting 
Factor/Items 
Factor 
Loadings 
(Standard 
Errors) 
R² 
The objectives set were clear and measurable .86                                                ( - ) .74 
The objectives focused on issues which I have direct 
control over 
.75                                         
(.04) .56 
The meeting helped to relate my objectives to wider 
objectives at Centrepoint 
.75                                             
(.04) .56 
The meeting provided a good opportunity to discuss my 
development needs 
.80                                               
(.04) .64 
I am in a position to achieve the objectives set to me .79                                            (.03) .62 
I understand how the objectives will be monitored and 
reviewed 
.76                                             
(.04) .57 
Note: * p < .001  
( - ) Regression weight was fixed at 1 
Table 3-8: Fit Statistics for the Goal Setting Model 
  χ² df χ²/df CFI RMSEA 
Goal Setting 42.84 9 4.76 .98 .07 
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3.5.5.4 Measurement of Other Variables 
Perceived fairness was measured using items from a scale developed by 
Leventhal (1976). The items ask respondents about the appropriateness of their pay, 
given their contributions and responsibilities, and whether their pay is fair compared 
to that of other employees in similar positions in the organisation. The scale has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .81. The items used here are similar to other measures 
commonly used in the organisational justice literature (Moorman 1991; Sweeney and 
McFarlin 1993). Affective commitment was measured using items from a scale 
developed by Allen and Meyer (1990). For affective commitment, it was appropriate 
to ask respondents not only whether they felt ‘part of the family’ in their organisation 
but also whether they felt ‘part of the family’ within their project as well. Social 
workers often work away from the organisation’s headquarters and spend most of 
their time working with their colleagues and clients on support projects in various 
boroughs. The affective commitment scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of .81. Job 
satisfaction was measured using items from a scale developed by Hackman and 
Lawler (1971). The scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of .84. The measures of affective 
commitment and job satisfaction are included in this study in order to assess 
employees’ similarities across the organisations and, once again, to confirm that the 
employees in all cases are observationally similar. Further discussion of the measures 
and their role in this study is provided in the analysis in Chapter 5. Two statements 
were used to measure the quality of appraisals: ‘My most recent performance 
appraisal grade was a fair reflection of my performance’ and ‘My line manager 
knows enough about my work to assess my performance accurately’. A Cronbach’s 
alpha was computed for these two items and the internal consistency score of the 
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scale was found to be .71. Appendix 1 presents the table of means, standard 
deviations and correlations for all the variables in the study of housing associations. 
At the end of the questionnaire distributed to the employees, I also included an open 
question about the PM and the reward system in their organisation. The purpose of 
the open question was to give employees the opportunity to talk about the issues 
addressed in the survey and to gather further information about how well PM and 
PRP was working in practice. Of the 617 respondents, 206 answered the open 
question, giving valuable data that helped me to interpret the statistical results in 
Chapter 5.  
Having described the research settings and the methodology utilised in this study, the 
thesis will now address the research aims outlined in the theoretical chapters. The 
following chapter provides a detailed description of the PM and PRP systems in the 
four organisations. An evaluation of the design of such schemes is paramount to 
eliminating poor design as a cause of failure.  
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Chapter 4  The Cases Studied – An Overview of their PM and PRP 
Systems 
Before investigating whether PRP is an appropriate pay system for 
nonprofit employees, it is first important to gain an understanding of how the 
organisations studied here have laid out their PM and reward systems. The 
complexity of the linkages between pay and performance are such that only well-
thought-out schemes have any chance of success (Marsden and French 1998). In 
order to eliminate poor design, as one of the main causes of failure of PRP schemes 
in HAs, I examine whether the organisations have introduced systems that follow 
appropriate implementation guidelines. This chapter presents information gathered 
from the interviews with HR directors and managers (Appendix 3), as well as 
internal documents related to their reward and PM systems. 
The advice and guidelines provided by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS) have been used here to investigate whether sound procedures have 
been put in place by the case organisations. The ACAS provides impartial advice that 
is particularly useful for those establishing new procedures or redesigning old ones 
(Bamber 1987) and it is widely recognised as a leading authority on employment 
relations, given its access to the perspectives of key workplace players such as 
employers, employees and trade unions. The ACAS promotes best practice in the 
workplace, through the provision of independent advice, on many employment 
relations issues, and its advisory activity covers a wide variety of organisations and 
sectors. Its guidelines provide a benchmark for employers who want to assess their 
HR practices (Stuart and Martinez Lucio 2008). 
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There is no single model of an effective PM or reward system, nevertheless good 
practice should be observed to ensure a scheme is effective. The ACAS booklets on 
Performance Management (ACAS 2010) and Appraisal Related Pay (ACAS 2005) 
provide an illustration of sound guidelines and procedures for the implementation of 
well-designed PM and PRP across organisations. The ACAS suggests that schemes 
should include individual employee performance plans that contain the objectives the 
employee is expected to achieve, following the SMART criteria for Specific, 
Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound objectives, the competencies or 
behaviours employees need to perform their job at the appropriate level, and a 
personal development plan for the employee that will indicate, usually discussed 
during appraisal meetings, the development needs of the employee in order for them 
to perform their job. Development needs may include formal training courses, 
coaching, online learning, mentoring etc. (ACAS 2010). Because managing 
performance throughout the year involves an ongoing dialogue between employees 
and their line managers about how well they are doing and how they can improve, 
regular meetings to offer feedback and encourage progress are also crucial (ACAS 
2010). Other implementation guidelines for PRP explain the need for adequate 
resources and suitable training for the managers who will be carrying out appraisals. 
Moreover, PRP should be based on a formal system of performance assessment, 
should encourage consistency and there should be an appeals procedure in place for 
the employees. The schemes I observe in this chapter follow many of the tenets of 
current best practice as outlined by the ACAS Appraisal Related Pay booklet. The 
table below presents a summary of the practices implemented by each organisation 
(Table 4.1) and is followed by a detailed description of the PM and PRP in the four 
HAs. 
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Table 4-1: Procedures for the Implementation of PM and PRP by Organisation 
Organisation PRP PM Annual 
Appraisals 
Objectives 
Conform to 
SMART 
Criteria 
Regular 
Interim 
Meetings 
Personal 
Development 
Plan  
 Appeals 
Procedure 
Pay 
Structure 
PRP 
Fund 
Annual Pay 
Increase 
PRP1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Broad 
Bands 
5% - 
PRP2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Job 
Family 
5% - 
PM1 No Yes Yes/360° Yes Yes Yes Yes Pay Spine - 3% 
PM2 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Pay Spine - 2.45% 
Source: Interviews and documents provided by the organisations, 2008.
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4.1 PRP1 
In PRP1 the board and the senior management team are formed by a mixture 
of individuals with experience in the public and private sectors. The HR department 
has a relatively broad number of HR specialists dedicated to different functions such 
as pay and benefits, learning and development, engagement etc. The organisation 
has 579 employees, of which 43% work in Housing and Care services (Central, 
West and East London), 34% in Homelessness and Tenancy Sustainment services, 
13% in Central Support Functions such as Finance, HR, IT, Fundraising etc, 9% in 
Learning Disabilities services and 1% in Housing Management. 83.6% of its staff 
work full-time, managers account for 19.9% of all staff and 57.3% of all staff 
members are female. 
The majority of PRP1’s contract funding comes from local authority Suporting 
People (SP) teams (46%). It receives a further 32% of its income from rent and 
service charges, 14% from other local authority social services funding, 7% from the 
Department of Communities & Local Government funding and 1% from other 
income. PRP1’s turnover in 2007 was £29,463 million.  
4.1.1 The Pay Structure 
PRP1 had implemented PRP progressively over the previous few years. The 
scheme was first implemented in 2005 for all senior management staff and then 
extended to middle managers in 2006. In 2006, non-management employees 
received an invitation to move from their annual incremental increase to the PRP 
system, and received their first PRP pay increases on 1st April 2007. According to 
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the HR Director of PRP1, at the time of the interview 93% of all employees were in 
the PRP scheme. The other 7% were hourly paid ancillary staff not invited to belong 
to the PRP scheme (cooks, cleaners, kitchen porters etc). The PRP scheme was 
implemented together with a new grading system and broad-banded salary ranges 
for all salaried operational support staff.  
Table 4-2: Salary Scales at PRP1 2007-2008 
Grade Salary Ranges  
S1 (Staff 1) £13,000 - £21,500 
S2 (Staff 2) £15,000 - £28,500 
JM (Junior Management) £23,000 - £31,000 
M1 (Manager 1) £25,000 - £37,000 
M2 (Manager 2) £28,000 - £42,500 
SM1 (Senior Management) £32,000 - £48,000 
SM2 (Senior Management) £44,000 - £65,000 
Source: Documents provided by PRP1, 2008. 
Each year, the senior management team agrees upon the monetary value of the 
scheme’s total PRP fund. This is determined by the underlying rate of inflation, the 
overall performance of the organisation and its business strategy, its financial 
resources and funding levels, the government agenda, sector regulation and market 
competitiveness. Once a given percentage of the pay bill has been allocated to the 
PRP fund (5% in 2008), the senior management team decides on the percentage 
increase allocated to each performance rating in the PRP1 Performance 
Development Review (PDR) appraisal rating system. 
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Table 4-3: Appraisal Ratings at PRP1 
Rating  Assessment 
E Excelled 
H Highly Effective 
A Achieving Well 
M Meeting Objectives 
V Variable 
U Under Performing 
N Not Proven 
Source: Documents provided by PRP1, 2008. 
PRP1 has seven possible assessment ratings that result from the appraisal meetings 
(Table 4.3). For staff whose performance is rated as Underperforming (U), there is 
no automatic entitlement to receive any salary increase. According to the HR 
Director, they would be subject to close management of their performance under the 
organisation’s Capability, Disciplinary or Sickness Absence Procedures, depending 
on their particular circumstance. Depending on the amount of the total PRP fund in a 
specific year, staff whose performance is rated as Variable (V) or Not Proven (N) 
might be eligible for consideration for a percentage increase, up to the equivalent 
determined underlying rate of inflation. Staff who are assessed as Meeting 
Objectives (M) will receive a pay increase equivalent to the underlying rate of 
inflation. Staff who are assessed as Achieving Well (A), Highly Effective (H) or 
Excelled (E) will be considered for a pay increase in excess of the determined 
underlying rate of inflation, in accordance with the percentage increases allocated to 
each rating in any given year. The PRP increases awarded are expressed as a 
percentage of the basic salary and based on the salary as at the 31st March. Any pay 
increases that are awarded are consolidated into the basic salary and are subject to 
PAYE tax and NI deductions. Pay increases are applied to the April salaries 
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following the completion of the relevant PRP scheme year. Newly recruited staff 
joining PRP1 after the commencement of the scheme year on a date between 1st May 
and 30th September will receive an appraisal rating and will be eligible for a pay 
increase proportionate to the amount of time they have been in the scheme. 
4.1.2  The PM System 
The PM system at PRP1 includes a PDR meeting, which is an annual 
appraisal, an informal review every six months, monthly meetings with individual 
employees, the delivery of training and development activities to support the 
achievement of business objectives, and the management of the individual’s career. 
According to the HR Director of PRP1, the PDR meetings start in January, when 
directors and function heads have their performance and/or competence reviewed 
and agree future strategic objectives, and training and development needs with their 
own line managers. Having been appraised themselves, the function heads then 
become the appraisers in a cascading process. Once managers have been appraised 
and have a clear understanding of their own objectives, they can then appraise their 
staff. They review staff’s current performance and competence objectives, and their 
training and development, and agree future team or individual objectives. The 
process of formal appraisal review is completed by the end of March. PRP1 also has 
an informal review that takes place in September/October each year. The purpose of 
the informal review is to ensure that employees are on track to achieve their 
objectives. The informal review also addresses whether training needs have been 
addressed and whether there are any changes in the objectives agreed previously. 
Employees also have monthly supervisions with their line managers to discuss any 
issues related to their performance, developmental needs etc. 
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PRP1 has also designed four steps that must be followed for the PDR meetings. In 
step 1, appraisers and appraisees should prepare for the meeting. Both should review 
any information related to the appraisee’s performance objectives, competency 
development objectives and any training and development plans. Thus, they should 
come to the meeting having given some thought to the issues to be discussed. In step 
2, the appraiser should plan the meeting and gather evidence to support the 
employee’s assessment. They should plan possible courses of action required for 
improvement. Step 3 is the actual meeting, and the appraiser should use the PDR 
form as a framework to guide the meeting. As performance and development is 
discussed based on facts and evidence, the appraisers should make note of any issues 
raised. At this stage, new objectives and competence developments should be agreed 
upon. The number of objectives set should be between five and seven and they 
should follow the SMART criteria. Training and development needs should also be 
identified against each objective that is set. Step 4, action and follow-up, requires the 
managers to discuss the recommended performance ratings for their appraisees with 
their own line managers. Once these line managers have authorised the ratings, the 
appraising managers can then complete the PDR form. A copy of the form is given 
to the appraisees, the HR managers and the function heads so that they can plan any 
training or development activity for the year.  
PRP1 uses a Balanced Scorecard Competency Model to assess employees’ 
performance. There are four competence areas: Customer Relationship Management, 
Business Process/Operations, Results Orientation and Leadership. Employees have 
their competences assessed in these four areas. The competences, together with the 
performance objectives, are the criteria used to measure the employee’s performance 
and to determine their appraisal rating. There is a grievance procedure for staff who 
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are dissatisfied with the outcome of their appraisal, if they are not able to resolve 
their concerns with their line manager informally. The interviews and documents 
provided by the HR director suggest conformity with the advice and guidelines 
outlined by ACAS. 
4.2 PRP2 
In PRP2 the majority of board members has experience in the private sector 
with some currently working in public and non-profit organisations. The senior 
management team came from the private sector but have now been with the 
organisation for over 10 years. PRP2 has 247 employees, of which 72.5% work in 
the direct provision of services to young people, 26.3% work in central services such 
as Finance, HR, IT, Fundraising and Policy and Communications, and 1.2% work at 
PRP2 Partnering, which provides support and training programmes to partner 
organisations that also work with young people. 82.6% of the staff are full-time, 
9.3% are part-time and 8.1% are temporary. Managers account for 17.8% of all staff 
and 61.4% of all staff members are female.  
PRP2’s income is generated mainly from three sources: grants and contracts, rent 
and service charges, and donations and gifts. The total income for the year 2007 was 
£16.2 million. 54% came from grants and contracts, with the vast majority coming 
from the SP fund, 24% came from rents and charges, 18% from donations and gifts, 
and 4% from investments and other income. Its surplus for the year was £511K, just 
over 3% of total income. The surplus is set aside to help with the provision of 
services in case income suffers a shortfall. 
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4.2.1 The Pay Structure 
PRP2’s pay structure has three distinct Job Families, reflecting its three main 
business functions. All jobs within the organisation are assigned to one of these job 
families. The first family is Direct Provision. Employees in this family are directly 
responsible for the delivery of services and support to clients of the organisation. 
The second is Market Influence. The main focus of employees with job roles within 
this family is to influence and develop the external environment of policy, provision, 
public understanding and resources in which PRP2 operates. This includes those 
responsible for influencing central, regional and local government policy and 
provision, increasing commercial and corporate awareness, and developing various 
fundraising channels. The final family is Business Support. Those with roles in this 
family are responsible for finance and information technology, human resource 
management, internal facilities and general administrative business support 
functions. 
Within each job family, there is a grading structure consisting of up to 10 grade 
levels, as follows: 
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Table 4-4: Grade Structure at PRP2 
CEO/Directors (Senior Executive Team) 
Grade 0   
Senior Professionals 
Grade 1   
Grade 2 
All Other Staff 
Grade 3 
Grade 4 
Grade 5 
Grade 6 
Grade 7 
Grade 8 
Grade 9 
Source: Documents provided by PRP2, 2008. 
Each grade has a pay range showing the minimum and maximum salary for the 
grade. The pay ranges are based on reference data from the market (Charity Rewards 
Survey, local authority pay scales, NHS pay scales, monitoring press advertisements 
etc) and indicate the ‘going rate’ for each grade. According to the HR director, 
within each pay range there are three distinct zones reflecting levels of individual 
contribution, to support the approach to pay progression. These are named the 
Developing Zone, the Established Zone and the Excellence Zone. The Developing 
Zone within a pay range will generally be for individuals who are still developing 
their full competence in the job, and this includes newly recruited staff or those who 
have had limited time in the role (less than one year), assuming they have minimum 
qualifications for the role. However, depending on the individual’s experience, 
expertise and skill related to the job, he or she may be placed directly into the 
Established Zone. Employees in the Established Zone should have the appropriate 
skills, knowledge and behaviours to do their job. According to the HR director, this 
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zone is where the majority of employees are placed and generally covers a period of 
1-5 years spent in the role. The Excellence Zone was designed for employees who 
are able to demonstrate that they make a more significant contribution than most and 
who consistently deliver added value beyond the scope normally expected. These 
employees will be highly rated through the PM process and this zone will be 
reserved for a limited number of staff. Not everyone will reach this zone within their 
pay range. The pay range in the Excellence Zone reflects the upper quartile of 
market pay for the respective roles. 
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Table 4-5: Direct Provision Job Family 
Grade Benchmark Jobs Developing 
Zone 
Established 
Zone 
Excellence 
Zone 
0 Director of Services  
 
 
Pay 
determined by 
individual 
contracts 
 
1 Head of Services £38,297 to 
£40,822 
£40,823 to 
£43,348 
£43,346 to 
£48,398 
2 Project Manager 
Life Skills & Youth Work 
Manager 
Learning & Work 
Manager 
Supported Housing 
Manager 
Multiple Health Needs 
Manager 
£29,702 to 
£31,659 
£31,660 to 
£33.618 
£33,619 to 
£37,535 
3 Deputy Project Manager 
Support & Development 
Worker: Mental Health, 
Drugs/Alcohol, IT Tutor 
£26,070 to 
£27,789 
£27,790 to 
£29,509 
£29,510 to 
£32,947 
4 Support & Development 
Worker: Projects; 
Lifeskills: Basic Skills; 
Resettlement; Learning & 
Work; Housing Worker 
£22,220 to 
£23,685 
£23.686 to 
£25,150 
£25,151 to 
£28,080 
5 Night Support Worker £19,919 to 
£21,233 
£21,234 to 
£22,546 
£22,547 to 
£25,173 
6 Weekend Support Worker £19,240 to 
£20,509 
£20,510 to 
£21,778 
£21,779 to 
£24,315 
7 Project Receptionist £17,135 to 
£18,265 
£18,266 to 
£19,394 
£19,395 to 
£21,654 
8 No jobs at this level 
currently 
£12,561 to 
£13,389 
£13,390 to 
£14,216 
£14,217 to 
£15,874 
9 No jobs at this level 
currently 
£10,236 to 
£10,910 
£10,911 to 
£11,587 
£11,588 to 
£12,936 
Source: Documents provided by PRP2, 2008. 
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Table 4-6: Market Influence Job Family 
Grade Benchmark Jobs Developing 
Zone 
Established 
Zone 
Excellence 
Zone 
0 Director of Fundraising 
Director of Policy, 
Communications and 
Organisational Learning 
 
 
 
Pay determined 
by individual 
contracts 
 
1 NDT Manager £36,760 to 
£39,184 
£39,185 to 
£41,608 
£41,609 to 
£46,456 
2 Trusts & Statutory 
Fundraising Manager 
Director Marketing 
Manager 
Corporate Fundraising 
Manager 
£31,438 to 
£33,510 
£33,511 to 
£35,582 
£35,583 to 
£39,729 
3 Senior Media Relations 
Officer 
Senior Trust Fundraising 
Officer 
Major Donor Fundraising 
Officer 
Project Co-ordinator 
£27,519 to 
£29,332 
£29,333 to 
£31,145 
£31,146 to 
£34,775 
4 Trust Fundraising Officer 
Corporate Fundraiser, 
Policy & Research Officer 
Direct Marketing Officer 
Public Affairs Officer 
Executive Officer 
Events Officer 
Development Worker 
£24,089 to 
£25,677 
£25,678 to 
£27,266 
£27,267 to 
£30,442 
5 Communications Assistant £21,643 to 
£23,070 
£23,071 to 
£24,497 
£24,498 to 
£27,351 
6 Fundraising Adminstrator £19,153 to 
£20,416 
£20,417 to 
£21,680 
£21,681 to 
£24,206 
7 No jobs at this level 
currently 
£17,553 to 
£18,712 
£18,713 to 
£19,868 
£19,869 to 
£22,182 
8 No jobs at this level 
currently 
£15,847 to 
£16,893 
£16,894 to 
£17,937 
£17,938 to 
£20,027 
Source: Documents provided by PRP2, 2008. 
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Table 4-7: Business Support Job Family 
Grade Benchmark Jobs Developing 
Zone 
Established Zone Excellence 
Zone 
0 Director of Finance 
Director of Human 
Resources 
 
 
 
Pay determined by 
individual contracts 
 
1 Finance Manager 
Management Accountant 
IT Manager 
Facilities Manager 
£39,004 to 
£41,576 
£41,577 to £44,149 £44,150 to 
£49,291 
2 HR Manager 
Head of SID 
Volunteering Manager 
£34,126 to 
£36,378 
£36,379 to £38,628 £38,629 to 
£43,127 
3 Senior IT Support Officer 
Contracts & Performance 
Manager 
£28,551 to 
£30,434 
£30,435 to £32,315 £32,316 to 
£36,081 
4 Finance Officers 
Facilities Officer 
IT Support Officers 
Snr Research Officer 
HR Officer 
Maintenance Coordinator 
£24,228 to 
£25,826 
£25,827 to £27,422 £27,423 to 
£30,617 
5 Finance Officer – Payroll 
HR Adviser 
PA to CEO 
User Support Officer 
Statutory Monitoring 
Officer 
£22,280 to 
£23,749 
£23,750 to £25,219 £25,220 to 
£28,157 
6 Services Administrator 
Finance Assistant 
£19,162 to 
£20,427 
£20,428 to £21,691 £21,692 to 
£24,218 
7 Receptionist £17,206 to 
£18,340 
£18,341 to £18,462 £18,463 to 
£21,745 
8 Trainee Development 
Worker 
£15,507 to 
£16,531 
£16,532 to £18,157 £18,158 to 
£19,599 
9 No jobs at this level 
currently 
£12,164 to 
£12,966 
£12,967 to £13,767 £13,7768 to 
£15,371 
Source: Documents provided by PRP2, 2008. 
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The zones are monitored through a PM system. The employee’s contribution is 
judged in relation to both their outputs, determined based on their performance 
against their objectives, and inputs such as their competence, expertise and 
experience. According to the HR director of PRP2, the annual pay review process 
takes place between January and March each year, with any pay adjustments 
effective from 1st April. The PRP fund in 2008 was 5%. Each year, PRP2 and the 
Transport & General Workers Union agree the increase in the cost of living for all 
employees. Once the figure is agreed upon, the senior executive team will decide on 
the ratio between the basic and the contribution-related award. In 2008, it was 
agreed that the cost of living award would be 1.75%, which is what PRP2 calls the 
Basic Award. All employees receive the Basic Award, apart from those who are 
newly recruited. The Contribution Award is distributed according to individual 
performance. At PRP2, individual performance is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, as 
shown in the table below: 
Table 4-8: Appraisal Ratings at PRP2 
Rating  Assessment 
1 Outstanding 
2 Highly Effective 
3 Effective 
4 Development Needs 
5 Significant Shortfall 
6 Not Proven 
Source: Documents provided by PRP2, 2008. 
In 2008, employees who were rated as Outstanding received 5% on top of the Basic 
Award; Highly Effective employees received 3%; Effective employees receive 
1.25%; employees in both the Development Needs and Significant Shortfall 
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categories received only the Basic Award. Nevertheless, according to the HR 
director, the approach to these last two categories is quite different. Employees who 
score 4 will have their development needs prioritised in order that they can become 
Effective in the following year. Employees who score 5 will have a discussion with 
their managers to address any problems and decide whether they should continue 
working for the organisation. They will then have to perform better in the following 
year in order to remain at PRP2. The Contribution Award is applied to all those who 
achieve a minimum performance rating of Effective (3) and can be allocated as fixed 
consolidated pay and/or as a one-off contribution bonus. In 2008, all employees who 
received a Contribution Award had up to 3% of their total award (Basic plus 
Contribution) incorporated into their salaries, with the remainder paid to them as a 
cash lump sum. The reason for this is to avoid large differences appearing over the 
years between the salaries of people doing the same jobs, while still ensuring that 
employees receive relevant pay increases according to their performance each year. 
4.2.2 The PM System 
Based on the analysis of documents provided by the HR Director at PRP2, 
the organisation currently has a Behavioural Competency Framework in operation 
for all staff. This framework contains a set of six competencies defined by the 
organisation, against which all staff performance is reviewed. The Behavioural 
Competency Framework outlines common, basic standards and skills (such as 
adaptability and teamwork) required by all staff. PRP2 identifies two levels in the 
competency framework and makes a clear distinction between staff and managers. 
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Table 4-9: Behavioural Competencies for Staff and Managers at PRP2 
Behavioural 
competency 
Indicative behaviours - Staff Indicative behaviours - Managers 
Being 
responsive 
Respond to (sensible) requests from 
others, taking advice when 
necessary 
Listen carefully to what others say 
and try to understand their needs 
and take action accordingly 
Where you have referred 
clients/customers elsewhere, follow 
up to see that their issues have been 
dealt with. If not, seek to find a 
solution 
Put effort into communicating with 
colleagues and clients/customers 
Be aware and respectful of the 
needs and perspectives of 
individuals and groups, including 
those that are different from your 
own 
Make time for staff to express ideas 
and concerns during day-to-day 
work 
Ensure that responses to issues 
promote future dialogue and are 
acted upon 
Listen carefully and grasp well the 
thoughts/needs of others 
Demand high standards of 
responsiveness to the (reasonable) 
requests/needs of others 
Ensure that PRP2’s commitment to 
equal opportunities is fulfilled in all 
aspects of work 
Work hard to communicate 
effectively with colleagues and staff 
and establish systems (inc. 
feedback) to promote good 
communication 
Being 
constructive 
Be adaptable and open to change 
Provide feedback or comment when 
asked 
Be prepared to question where you 
do not understand and suggest ideas 
for change 
Find solutions to issues within your 
control 
Speak your mind appropriately – do 
not disagree in private 
Help individuals to bring ideas and 
issues to resolution 
Provide supportive and helpful 
commentary on ideas/concerns 
expressed 
Assist in removing barriers (real or 
imaginary) or open doors to 
facilitate change 
Be tenacious in resolving issues and 
do not give up but seek to find 
alternative routes to solutions 
Take initiative to make 
improvements and challenge the 
status quo 
Being 
realistic 
Be practical in finding solutions to 
issues 
Apply a common sense approach to 
work 
Do not promise things you or the 
organisation cannot deliver 
Be clear about the abilities and 
limitations of others / young people 
when working with them 
Organise work effectively to ensure 
that targets and commitments are 
met 
Apply practical solutions to issues, 
taking into account available 
resources, timescales etc. 
Guide and support staff in 
achievement of goals 
Curb overambition whilst 
continuing to motivate to achieve 
Ensure actions/initiatives are 
developed from sound information 
Establish and follow through on 
actions agreed with others 
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Behavioural 
competency 
Indicative behaviours - Staff Indicative behaviours - Managers 
Working 
with young 
people (and 
others) 
Ensure that the commitments made 
by PRP2 to young people are at the 
heart of activities undertaken and 
decisions made 
Do not dictate actions to others but 
seek to enable them to find their 
own solutions 
Work with other colleagues/clients 
as part of a team 
Give your opinion but, if overruled, 
accept and support the final 
decision made 
Recognise clients and colleagues as 
customers and partners and deal 
with them with courtesy and respect 
Work across teams / functional 
disciplines and encourage reporting 
staff to do the same 
Consider impacts on 
colleagues/clients of 
work/initiatives in own functional 
area 
Look for ways to promote and 
support collaborative working for 
self and others 
Be respectful of the needs and 
capabilities of others and develop 
effective working relationships 
Delegate appropriately and 
support/coach staff as needed 
Learning 
from 
experience 
Actively try to avoid making the 
same mistake repeatedly 
Share experiences and knowledge 
with others and ensure that you 
learn from the actions of others 
Do not be afraid to try out new 
ideas/approaches within the 
frameworks laid down by your 
manager / the organisation 
 
Develop an environment of 
‘managed risk’ where staff feel safe 
to contribute and develop their 
potential to the full 
Celebrate success and ensure 
criticism is delivered in a 
supportive and motivational way 
Treat mistakes initially as 
opportunities to learn – only 
‘blame’ when mistakes are made 
repeatedly or through negligence 
Promote ways to share experiential 
learning and encourage 
development 
Identify your own barriers/gaps to 
progress and take action to limit the 
impact of this 
Take responsibility to promote and 
manage change 
Being 
authoritative 
Maintain your knowledge to an 
appropriate level and utilise to the 
benefit of clients and colleagues 
When dealing with external 
partners, be clear and professional 
in representing the needs of young 
people and PRP2  
Ensure that PRP2’s values, ‘rules’ 
and procedures are understood, 
communicated and adhered to 
Know when to say ‘no’ and take 
responsibility for doing so 
Approach issues from a strategic 
standpoint – try to avoid reactive 
decision making 
When dealing with issues and 
considering new initiatives ensure 
that PRP2’s vision, policy and 
partnerships are appropriately 
positioned and managed  
Ensure technical/work-related 
knowledge and skills are 
maintained at the appropriate level 
and utilised to the benefit of the 
organisation 
Be prepared to make and stand firm 
on decisions that are ‘right’, 
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Behavioural 
competency 
Indicative behaviours - Staff Indicative behaviours - Managers 
regardless of challenge and 
difficulty 
Set clear standards for staff and be 
seen to lead by example 
Know when and how to break rules 
as appropriate and which rules 
cannot be broken 
Ensure staff are aware of codes of 
conduct / procedures / authority 
levels etc and operate appropriately 
within those boundaries 
Source: Documents provided by PRP2, 2008. 
The Behavioural Competency Framework is used as a core part of the appraisal and 
supervision systems (setting objectives, reviewing performance etc.). According to 
the HR Director at PRP2, the annual performance appraisal takes place in February 
and a half-year appraisal happens in August. In the annual meeting, performance 
objectives are agreed for activities that are subject to planned change or 
improvement. Employees have between five and seven objectives at any one time 
and they should all conform to the SMART criteria. Staff and managers also discuss 
a development plan during the appraisal meeting. They should agree personal 
development objectives that aim at enhancing or maintaining current performance 
levels, address any knowledge or skills gaps, and improve career potential within 
PRP2. At the meeting, employees are given the opportunity to discuss career 
aspirations if they wish to move from their existing role. Managers may also give 
guidance on a lateral move into another area or role when appropriate and not just 
promotion to a more senior position. 
The half-year appraisal, which is called the Interim Performance Review, should be 
used to summarise the employee’s performance against the agreed performance plan 
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and behavioural competencies. Any changes to the performance objectives or the 
development plan should be recorded. The half-year appraisal helps to keep 
employees on course to achieving their objectives throughout the year. In the 
following annual meeting, the manager should summarise the employee’s 
performance across the whole review period and incorporate information and 
evidence from the interim review. Following discussion with the countersigning 
manager, the manager should then allocate a performance rating to the employee. 
The employee is given a summary copy with an overall comment on their 
performance signed by their manager and the countersigning manager. Copies of the 
final document must also be sent to HR. An appeals procedure has been put in place 
for employees who are dissatisfied with the outcome of their appraisal meeting. At 
the time of interviews, PRP had been in place at PRP2 for three years, for all 
employees, and according to the documentation provided by the organisation, it is 
fair to say that most of the ACAS advice and guidelines had been put into practice.  
4.3 PM1 
The senior executive team is formed by a mixture of individuas with 
experience in the private, publi and nonprofit sector. The HR department has a 
number of HR specialists dedicated to different aspects of the HR function. In March 
2006, PM1 set up a trading subsidiary to promote services such as Human 
Resources, IT and Finance consultancy to small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
non-profit, private and public sectors. PM1 is the smallest of the four organisations 
presented here. It has 161 employees working in three areas of the organisation: (1) 
Central Services including HR, Finance, IT, Fundraising and Communications, (2) 
Services Delivery, which includes all staff working in the provision of housing 
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services to homeless people, and (3) Matrix Services, which provides a range of 
specialist support, including welfare and benefits advice, essential skills and 
personal development training, employment coaching and advice. 83% of the staff 
work full-time, 7% work part-time and 10% are temporary. Managers account for 
30% of all staff and 64% of the people working at PM1 are female. 
Similar to other charities, the majority of PM1’s contract funding comes from local 
authority SP funding (41.5%). It receives 29.1% from grants, donations and gifts, 
24% from rents and 5.4% from other sources. In its first year of trading, the 
subsidiary to promote consultancy services to other organisations contributed £30K 
of gift aid to PM1. PM1’s turnover in 2007 was £9.1 million.  
4.3.1 The Pay Structure 
The pay structure at PM1 is a traditional local-authority-style one. Job 
evaluation scores are cross-matched to scale points in a pay spine based on the 
National Joint Council (NJC) rates. The NJC salary scales are widely used in the 
voluntary sector in the UK. According to the HR Director of PM1, an incremental 
increase in line with the local government pay award is applied every year to all 
staff. In April 2008, the pay increase was 3.0%. Staff are eligible for a pay increase 
every year until they reach the top of their pay grade. 
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Table 4-10: Pay Scales at PM1 
Pay Grade Value incl London 
Weighting (£) 
No of Staff 
on this Pay 
Grade 
% of Total 
Trainee 18,927 - 19,842 6 4% 
Admin Assistant 19,236 - 21,084 3 2% 
Administrator/Cook/ Night Worker 21,084 - 22,716 8 5% 
Old Administrator Grade  21,552 - 23,994 5 3% 
Main Grade / Senior Admin 24,690 - 27,054 58 35% 
Old Riverpoint Project Worker  24,690 - 28,536 12 7% 
Co-ordinator/Specialist 27,807 - 30,594 32 20% 
Assistant Manager / Team Leader 29,292 - 32,112 10 6% 
Manager 32,961 - 36,423 14 9% 
Specialist Manager 38,088 - 41,415 5 3% 
Head of Division 40,578 - 45,609 6 4% 
Director 53,706 - 56, 403 1 1% 
Director with Market Supplement 55,706 - 58,403 2 1% 
Deputy Chief Executive 58,731 - 62,406 1 1% 
Chief Executive 69,060 - 73,407 1 1% 
Source: Documents provided by PM1, 2008. 
4.3.2 The PM System 
The PM system at PM1 has five key elements to it: setting clear performance 
expectations with each individual in the organisation; annual and probationary 
performance appraisals; regular support and supervision sessions with the line 
manager; induction into the organisation and the requirements of the job for newly 
recruited staff; and a personal development plan. Line managers at PM1 are required 
to make performance expectations clear to newly recruited staff members, to 
existing staff members who are transferred to a new post, and at every appraisal 
meeting (annual or probationary), when objectives and competency levels should be 
set, to be achieved in the new annual review period. Probationary appraisals take the 
same format as annual appraisals. The only difference is that probationary appraisals 
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have the additional purpose of making an assessment as to whether or not an 
employee should be confirmed in the post. Each employee is appraised against a 
competency profile and performance objectives. PM1 has a Competences 
Framework document with full details of the competency profile for each post and 
level. Each competence is defined and a list of example behaviours given, which are 
intended to describe what an effective demonstration of the competence would look 
like. The table below lists the competences used for the different positions at PM1 
(Table 4.11).  
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Table 4-11: Competences for Staff at PM1 
STAFF & TRAINEES 
Essential Competences 
Personal Contribution • Personal effectiveness 
• Organisation and delivery of results 
• Proactivity and initiative 
• Creativity and Innovation 
• Problem solving and decision making 
• Analysing and interpreting written and numerical 
information 
• Self-development 
Working with Others • Communication 
• Managing self and relationships with others 
• Teamwork and cooperation 
• Negotiating and influencing 
Organisational 
Contribution 
• Customer/client focus and managing diversity 
• Building and using systems 
• Using IT 
Developmental Competences (where applicable) 
People Management 
Project and Resource Management 
Setting up Systems 
Expertise 
ASSISTANT MANAGERS, TEAM LEADERS & CO-ORDINATORS 
Essential Competences 
Leadership & Management • People management 
• Customer and client focus and managing diversity 
• Project and resource management 
• Setting up systems 
• Building effective external relationships 
Working with Others • Communication 
• Managing self and relationships with others 
• Team-working influence 
Personal Contribution • Personal effectiveness 
• Using IT 
• Proactivity and initiative 
• Creativity and innovation 
• Problem solving and decision making 
• Analysing and interpreting written and numerical 
information 
• Expertise 
Developmental Competences (where applicable) 
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Organisational Awareness and Strategic Thinking 
Leadership 
Management of Projects, Finances and Other Resources 
External Awareness and Managing External Relationships 
MANAGERS 
Essential Competences 
Leadership & Management • Organisational awareness and strategic thinking 
• Leadership 
• People management 
• Management of projects, finances and other resources 
• Customer and client focus and managing diversity 
• External awareness and managing external relationships 
Working with Others • Communication 
• Managing self and relationships with others 
• Teamwork and cooperation 
• Influence 
Personal Contribution • Personal effectiveness 
• Using IT 
• Analytical thinking and judgement 
• Creativity and innovation 
• Expertise 
Developmental Competences (where applicable) 
Strategic Thinking and Planning 
External Awareness 
Drive to Deliver Results 
Integrity 
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AREA MANAGERS 
Competences 
Leadership & Management • Organisational awareness, strategic thinking and planning 
• Leadership 
• People management 
• Management of projects, finances and other resources 
• Customer and client focus and managing diversity 
• External awareness and managing external relationships 
Working with Others • Communication 
• Managing self and relationships with others 
• Teamwork and cooperation 
• Influence 
Personal Contribution • Drive to deliver results 
• Integrity 
• Personal effectiveness 
• Using IT 
• Analytical thinking and judgement 
• Creativity and innovation 
• Expertise  
SENIOR MANAGERS 
Competences 
Direction • Leadership 
• Strategic thinking and planning 
• External awareness 
• Drive to deliver results 
Management • People management 
• Management of projects, finances and other resources 
• Managing external relationships 
Working with Others • Communication 
• Managing self and relationships with others 
• Teamwork and cooperation 
• Influence  
Personal Contribution • Integrity 
• Personal effectiveness 
• Using IT 
• Analytical thinking and judgement 
• Creativity and innovation 
• Expertise 
Source: Documents provided by PM1, 2008. 
The performance objectives should describe specifically what the member of staff is 
expected to achieve. Managers should link the individual’s objectives to the goals of 
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PM1 as a whole and to those of their own department. Each performance objective 
should follow the SMART criteria. Against each objective, a list of measures and 
standards should be agreed to indicate how the staff member and their line manager 
will know that the objectives are being met. The measures should relate to 
observable and objective results – outputs and/or outcomes – and may include 
quantitative measures such as percentage increase in membership or funds raised, 
qualitative measures such as positive feedback from external or internal customers, 
target deadlines for the completion of key stages that lead to the realisation of a 
project-related objective or target, or turnaround times for key processes, such as all 
invoices being processed within a given number of days of receipt. The measures 
used will vary depending on the post. 
Every staff member at PM1 should have a full performance appraisal towards the 
end of their first six months in the post – the probationary appraisal – and further 
appraisals annually, thereafter. PM1 uses a 360-degree appraisal system to enable 
line managers to collect evidence from a variety of stakeholders working closely 
with the employee being appraised. Line managers have to collect evidence that 
demonstrates objectives and standards have been achieved, and feedback from the 
employee’s key stakeholders, and enter this on appraisal feedback forms. There are 
four appraisal feedback forms for each employee: the upwards appraisal form is 
distributed to staff managed by a line manager who is being appraised; the peer 
appraisal form is distributed to team colleagues or other people on a similar level in 
other teams and with whom the employee works closely; the external/internal 
customers’ form is distributed to people who depend on the services the staff 
member provides; the suppliers’ form is distributed to those who work closely with 
employees. For external/internal customers and suppliers, the line manager should 
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agree with the appraisee a representative sample of 8-12 people to approach, rather 
than trying to get feedback from everyone. The line managers circulate the appraisal 
forms to stakeholders well in advance of the appraisal preparation and the HR 
director issues a letter to accompany each form, explaining the aims of the feedback 
each stakeholder is asked to provide and the core competences against which the 
appraisee’s performance is being measured. 
Once the line managers have collected all the evidence, they must start preparing for 
the appraisal meeting with their staff member. Both manager and employee are 
given a preparation form to fill in prior to the appraisal meeting. The form requests 
information on the performance standards and competency assessment of the 
appraisee, and whether the objectives have been fully or partly met, or not met. 
Employees should also give their reasons why any objectives have been partly met 
or not met. A date for the appraisal should be agreed and scheduled. The line 
manager and appraisee are required to exchange their preparation forms at least one 
day in advance of the meeting. At the appraisal meeting, they should discuss the 
appraisee’s performance against competences and objectives, identify any obstacles 
to achievement and look at possible solutions, identify key strengths and areas for 
development, and discuss future objectives, setting a personal development plan for 
future development and training to meet identified needs. According to the HR 
Director, the appraising manager is responsible for ensuring that feedback from 
stakeholders is handled anonymously and in a sensitive manner, to avoid placing any 
participating employee in a situation that is uncomfortable or embarrassing. 
Appraisees get an appraisal rating for each of the competences they are measured 
against. Scores 1 and 2 mean below expectations / improvement required; score 3 
means that the employee meets expectations and has achieved good performance; 
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employees who score 4 or 5 have exceeded expectations or been outstanding. PM1 
does not produce a single final appraisal rating for its employees as the other 
organisations do. 
The final appraisal report is an edited version of the appraising manager’s initial 
preparation form. Manager and employee should agree on any changes to this initial 
assessment during the meeting, and a copy of the final report should be given to the 
relevant senior manager for checking and signing. After that, a copy of the final 
appraisal form is sent to the appraisee, and to the HR department to be placed in the 
employee’s personnel file. There is also an appeals procedure for employees 
dissatisfied with the outcome of their appraisal meeting. In circumstances where, 
despite PM1’s support and guidance, a staff member is unable to meet required 
performance standards, the matter is referred to a separate Capability Procedure. If 
managers come to the conclusion that underperformance is a result of the staff 
member’s unwillingness to perform, rather than incapability, then the case is 
referred to the Disciplinary Procedure. Where an employee has been or is about to 
be referred to either of the above procedures, and an annual appraisal is due for 
them, the appraisal will normally be suspended until the matter has been resolved 
under those procedures. A member of the senior management team makes the final 
decision as to whether an appraisal should be suspended, and when it should be 
rescheduled for. 
Another element of the PM scheme at PM1 is the Support and Supervision (S&S) 
sessions. Employees should have an S&S session with their line managers every 
four to six weeks. The purpose of the sessions is to assess progress against 
performance objectives and identify and resolve any obstacles to achievement. 
138 
 
Objectives may change during the year and the sessions are the place to review 
them. In the sessions, managers review the individual’s personal development plan. 
They should try to identify new learning and development needs, evaluate the 
benefits of training and development activities already undertaken, and identify 
ways for the staff member to apply what they have learned to their work. The HR 
department suggests an agenda for discussion and general guidance in S&S sessions, 
for all appraising managers. 
4.4 PM2 
Board members and executive directors have a wide range of skills and 
experience coming from private, public and nonprofit organisations. PM2 has a 
broad HR department dedicated to different aspects of the HR function. PM2 is the 
largest of the four organisations presented here. It has 800 employees, of which 30% 
work in Central Services (Finance, Fundraising, Human Resources, Public 
Relations, IT, Training, Information and Quality departments). The other 70% work 
in Operational Services, which are services related to housing, care services, 
Tenancy Sustainment, work and learning services etc. 90% of its staff work full-
time, managers account for 24.4% of all staff and 51.6% of staff members are 
female. 
PM2’s turnover in 2007 was £43.6 million and over 40% of its contract funding 
came from SP grants (£17.9m). £12.2m came from rents, £4.8m from central 
government, £3.8m from local government contracts, £3.7m from fundraising, and 
the remaining from grants for major repairs, interest income and other sources. 
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4.4.1 The Pay Structure 
The system that PM2 has in place is a traditional local-authority-style pay 
structure. Job roles are attached to a pay spine, pay progression is service-related, 
and salary levels are based on the NJC rates and increased in line with the local 
government pay award. In April 2008, the pay increase was 2.45%. Staff are eligible 
for a pay increase every year until they reach the top of their pay grade.  
Table 4-12: Salary Scale at PM2 2007-2008 
Scale 
Point 
Salary (£) 
incl. LW* 
Scale 
Point 
Salary (£) 
incl. LW 
Scale 
Point 
Salary (£) 
incl. LW 
4 11,264.10  27 22,109.71  50 40,932.96  
5 11,524.56  28 22,832.55  51 41,796.27  
6 11,916.71  29 23,733.92  52 42,656.66  
7 12,291.30  30 24,527.00  53 43,531.69  
8 12,677.60  31 25,299.59  54 44,444.76  
9 13,052.19  32 26,045.85  55 45,378.31  
10 13,327.28  33 26,821.37  56 46,300.16  
11 14,184.75  34 27,576.41  57 47,222.00  
12 14,483.25  35 28,152.93  58 48,135.07  
13 14,860.77  36 28,896.26  59 49,056.92  
14 15,150.49  37 29,709.83  60 49,984.62  
15 15,457.77  38 30,579.00  61 50,900.61  
16 15,823.59  39 31,582.79  62 51,822.46  
17 16,204.03  40 32,416.84  63 52,753.09  
18 16,523.02  41 33,274.31  64 53,657.38  
19 17,143.44  42 34,122.99  65 54,585.08  
20 17,766.78  43 34,977.53  66 59,025.38 
21 18,413.54  44 35,829.14  67 60,231.10 
22 18,893.48  45 36,633.93  68 61,448.53 
23 19,446.59  46 37,520.66  69 62,715.70 
24 20,084.57  47 38,381.05  70 63,991.65 
25 20,722.55  48 39,238.51    
26 21,395.64  49 40,069.64    
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Source: Documents provided by PM2, 2008. * LW = London Weighting 
At the time of the interviews, the HR Director said that the existing pay structure and 
progression arrangements needed to be reviewed. The growth in the number of new 
jobs had meant that there was little internal consistency. Government funders, who 
provide most of the organisation’s income, were putting pressure on the organisation 
to show value for money. There was an expectation for PM2 to have well-trained 
staff, make cost reductions and demonstrate performance. The HR Director was 
working with a consulting firm to implement a competency framework system to 
support staff development and performance.  
Under the new system, PM2 was planning to introduce a job family structure for its 
front-line, support, middle management and senior management employees. Front-
line employee pay would be linked to NVQ care standards, whereas support staff 
would have their pay based on their relevant professional qualification, e.g. CIMA 
(for Finance), or CIPD (for Human Resources). The starting salary would be pitched 
at the lower quartile of the London public sector market rate, with progression up to 
the median. Senior managers would be placed on spot salaries linked to the lower 
quartile. The HR Director said that the change would help employees to understand 
the behaviours and competences required to meet the organisation’s values and how 
PM2 would reward them. The change was due to take place in 2009. However, the 
PM system presented in this thesis is based on the system that was in place at the 
time of the fieldwork in 2008.  
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4.4.2 The PM System 
The PM system at PM2 consists of an annual appraisal that takes place 
between January and March, and supervision meetings that happen every four to six 
weeks. An interim appraisal also takes place half-yearly. Line managers are 
responsible for assessing the performance of their staff in a cascading process. 
Employees are assessed and new targets are established for the coming year. 
Between five and seven objectives are set and they should follow the SMART 
criteria. During the appraisal, employees have the opportunity to discuss training 
needs required to achieve objectives. The individual monthly supervision meetings 
between employee and line manager aim to discuss work issues as well as any 
personal issues. According to the HR Director, working with homeless people can be 
very stressful for many employees and, during supervision meetings, line managers 
are also able to assess whether the employee is suffering from burnout. In the 
meeting, the line manager and employee discuss how work is being carried out, any 
upcoming obstacles and any need for further training. The monthly meetings help 
staff to keep on track with targets established during the annual appraisal.  
Table 4-13: Appraisal Ratings at PM2 
Rating  Assessment 
1 Exceeded 
2 Achieved 
3 Below 
4 Not acceptable 
Source: Interview with HR Director, 2008. 
The rating system applied at the annual appraisal meetings is shown in Table 4.13. 
For each post, there is a group of competences and targets, against which the 
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employee’s performance is measured. Employees who are underperforming are 
required to attend a meeting with their line manager to identify the reasons for their 
low performance and determine whether more training is required. There is also an 
appeals procedure for employees dissatisfied with the outcome of their appraisal 
meeting. During the interview conducted for this research, the HR Director admitted 
that, even though the organisation provides training to line managers on how to 
appraise staff, they were experiencing problems related to inconsistency in how 
appraisals were carried out within the organisation. According to the HR Director, 
this was one of the key drivers for the change mentioned above. Since the PM 
system at PM2 was to go through a process of change in 2009, the HR Director tried 
to emphasise the new system rather than the existing one. Thus, no documentation 
on the PM system or appraisals used as of 2008 was made available for this research. 
Nevertheless, the old PM system seems to have followed some of the important 
advice and guidelines outlined by ACAS. PM2 had a PM system that included 
annual appraisal meetings, with objectives set following the SMART criteria, 
interim appraisals, monthly supervision meetings and a discussion of training 
requirements aimed at helping staff to achieve the objectives set for them. These 
aspects are all consistent with the performance plans used in the other case 
organisations. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a detailed description of the PM and PRP systems 
implemented in the four HAs discussed in this study. Despite differences in their pay 
structures, the interviews and documents provided by the HR directors indicate that 
the organisations are similar in the way they implement their PM and PRP systems 
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and that they follow many of the guidelines of best practice illustrated in the 
advisory booklets produced by ACAS. In the case of the PRP organisations, their 
PM systems used to support PRP are not naïve but rather sophisticated, and 
demonstrate that poor design cannot be blamed if the PRP fails to motivate these 
nonprofit employees to increase their performance. The next chapter investigates 
why Housing Associations implemented performance-related pay. 
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Chapter 5  Why Do Housing Associations Use Performance-related 
Pay? 
Institutional theory is the rationale employed here to explain why 
HAs have introduced PRP, and the central argument is that reward decisions are not 
always associated with organisational fit, nor are they necessarily an economically 
rational choice, as posited by agency theory. Instead, institutional pressures play a 
significant role in shaping the reward decisions made by HAs. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) posit that, when organisations are placed in an 
environment with increased uncertainty, they may model themselves on other 
organisations they perceive to be legitimate and successful. Diverging from accepted 
standard practices may increase the uncertainty within organisations. On the other 
hand, conforming to best practices legitimised in the sector is likely to provide a 
sense of security to these organisations and this may lead to an increase in the 
uniformity of pay practices within the sector. This view is consistent with the 
context in which HAs operate. HAs have experienced a long process of change, 
from having a secondary role in the provision of social services to being responsible 
for the large-scale delivery of public services in the country. This change, led by 
government reforms, has established a very regulated environment, with funding 
restrictions and increased market competition for contracts to provide social 
services. This climate has steered HAs towards a progressive conformity to private 
sector management practices (Walker 1998). Here, I investigate whether the same 
assumptions can be made regarding the reward decisions in the sector. 
The purpose of this chapter is to report on the data collected to address reasons why 
HAs have introduced PRP for their employees. This chapter presents the results 
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from four interviews with senior managers of the case HAs with PRP, and also 
interviews with four reward consultants operating in the housing sector. This chapter 
is intended to provide a complementary perspective to the main study of this thesis. 
In Chapter 6, the quantitative methods used relied strongly on measurement and, 
although consistent with the research question proposed in the main study, they did 
not capture the wealth of subjective experience that can be obtained through 
interviews (Yin 1994). The interviews used here aid our understanding of how 
reward decisions have been reached in HAs and point to the main drivers of the 
decision to implement PRP. How and why these decisions are reached is not an area 
of objectivity but a process that needs to be interpreted. As a result, an understanding 
of this could not be pursued through a survey.   
5.1 The Interviews 
Face-to-face interaction is the most complete method available for exploring 
the thoughts and perceptions of individuals (Lofland and Lofland 1995) and, 
although the participants in this research may have given subjective accounts of 
what influenced the decision to implement PRP, ‘their accounts constitute their 
reality, and, arguably it is the way they view the world which shapes their future 
actions’ (Chell 2004:58). Interviews appeared to be the most appropriate method of 
investigation for this chapter, and they followed the semi-structured format. 
The decision to interview reward consultants was based on their expert knowledge in 
the field. Consultants have strong relationships with the senior management of 
organisations and can also play a significant role in reward decisions (Clark and 
Fincham 2002; Bender 2008). Their insights about the sector also provided an 
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alternative perspective to the organisations’ responses regarding why they had made 
certain choices. This chapter provides a better understanding of why and how these 
HAs selected PRP as their pay systems. Semi-structured interviews lasting 45 to 60 
minutes were carried out with reward consultants from four large reward 
consultancies with a knowledge of the housing sector. The interviews took place 
between September and November 2011. For reasons of confidentiality, the 
consultants are identified here by the numbers 1 to 4. Significant use of direct 
quotations is made so that the views of the participants can be heard through the 
presentation of the findings.  
Consultant 1 is Head of Housing Group in the UK in a large global consulting firm. 
Reward is one the three main practice areas in which he works and the group has a 
stable client base of 50 HAs with which they work every year. Consultant 2 is the 
Chief Executive of a national consulting firm with long-standing experience in the 
voluntary sector. The firm has a client base of 200 organisations, 70% of which are 
HAs, spread across the UK. The consultancy offers a range of HR services to these 
organisations but the majority are focused on reward strategy solutions. Consultant 3 
is the Managing Director of a national consulting firm. It works across the UK with 
over 300 organisations, including social housing and other nonprofit organisations, 
local authorities and the private sector. Its services cover recruitment and selection, 
remuneration and reward, talent management, governance and change management. 
Consultant 3 has a long history of working on remuneration in HAs. Consultant 4 is 
the Managing Director of a national HR consultancy firm based in London, offering 
a range of HR strategic consultancy to small and medium-sized enterprises and 
NPOs. Consultant 4 specialises in remuneration and performance management. 
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The interviews were conducted to collect evidence of the reward consultants’ 
experience of organisational practices. The participants were asked about real 
examples of practices they had witnessed in their work as consultants in NPOs and, 
if applicable, HAs. An initial discussion of their approach to reward strategy was 
encouraged in order to establish their views on the best practice versus best-fit 
approaches to rewards. A discussion of who is responsible for the reward decisions 
in nonprofits and HAs was followed by a discussion of the factors that determine the 
decision to introduce PRP. The interview questions posed to the reward consultants 
are given in Appendix 4. Previous authors have suggested that, whenever possible, 
researchers should look to increase the sample size in qualitative research, in order 
to potentially identify a greater variety of similarities and/or differences across the 
sample (Miles and Huberman 1994). Other reward consultants were contacted at the 
time of data collection but, unfortunately, were not available for an interview. Given 
the time pressures on this research, the data collection was completed with these four 
consultants. The purpose here is to provide a complementary perspective to the 
answers offered by the senior managers of the HAs with PRP. 
5.2 The Interviews in the PRP Organisations 
In PRP1, interviews were held with the HR Director and the HR Manager, 
and at PRP2 the Chief Executive and the HR Director were interviewed. The 
interviewees discussed a range of factors that they took into account when deciding 
to implement PRP, and institutional pressures were identified. 
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5.2.1 PRP1 
Market competition, the contract culture in the voluntary sector and 
organisational culture were identified as the main drivers of PRP in PRP1: 
‘There is a huge competition out there and we are required to be very 
very competitive to win contracts, to retain contracts. We’re accountable 
to our commissioners, to local authorities for giving them value for 
money in the services we provide, and in order to do that we need to 
have switched-on commercially minded people and performance-related 
pay supports that. So, we need to talk business language…’ (HR 
Director, PRP1). 
On organisational culture, the following comments were made: 
‘No, we don’t have any problem with PRP, organisationally. There 
might be some individuals within the organisation that are still having 
difficulty getting their head around it (PRP) and that is why one of the 
big projects within HR is the culture change project, where we are 
constantly reinforcing that message. If we cannot be successful in 
business because we are not efficient and we are not commercially 
minded, then we are not going to stay in business and we are not going 
to have customers to serve, and that is not where we want to be, really’ 
(HR Director, PRP1). 
It seems that the need to change the organisation’s culture comes from the need to 
adapt to the new competitive environment in which HAs operate. There is pressure 
to demonstrate good value for money when competing for contracts to provide 
services on behalf of local authorities. Kerr and Slocum (1987) suggest that 
performance-based types of rewards are used in organisations with a ‘market 
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culture’. They highlight that the market culture emphasises a contractual relationship 
between individual and organisation that is essentially utilitarian, since each part 
uses the other as a means of furthering its own goals. The market culture, rather than 
promoting a feeling of membership in the organisation, encourages a strong sense of 
independence and individuality, in which everyone pursues their own interests (Kerr 
and Slocum 1987). The implementation of PRP in voluntary organisations may be 
seen as a way of generating a sense of ownership, initiative and responsibility for 
decisions among employees. However the ‘market culture’ is in no way 
representative of the culture of NPOs. The quotation below suggests this view: 
‘Some managers are struggling in the new system because they’ve never 
really been pushed to operate in that way. It’s not an easy thing. They 
need developing and supporting and they need their confidence building 
up to make pay decisions. And we need to be creating a culture where it 
is ok to take risks, it’s ok to make mistakes and it’s ok to take decisions. 
Not all managers want to do that. This decision making, some of them 
don’t want to do it, some of them don’t have the experience. Some of 
them, frankly, will never be up to it’ (HR Director, PRP1). 
The HR Manager agrees with the director’s views: 
‘We have never been so performance-driven as now and I think the 
organisation has taken a step towards aligning our pay system to this 
new climate. And for that, the whole culture needs to change. Local 
authorities have higher expectations of how we run our services in order 
to be effective with clients. This performance orientation is bringing a lot 
of changes in the organisation” (HR Manager, PRP1). 
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It is interesting how the performance-driven environment dictates changes in the pay 
system and, subsequently, in the culture of the organisation, and not the other way 
around. Often, organisations recognise a need for a change in their culture, and then 
make use of HR practices to drive that change. When asked about who is responsible 
for reward decisions in the organisation, the HR Manager replied: ‘Well, senior 
management really. I suppose our HR Director had a lot of influence in that as well 
since she came from the private sector and she has a lot of experience with these 
types of pay systems’ (HR Manager at PRP1). The HR Director in PRP1 had 
extensive experience working for the private sector and as seen above, was one of 
the decision makers, together with the senior team, pushing for the implementation 
of PRP in the organisation. Normative isomorphism can be identified in this case. 
Professionals are responsible for establishing normative elements in organisations 
and in the case of PRP1, it could be said that the HR Director is one to set standards, 
propagate principles and practices established in the private sector.  
5.2.2 PRP2 
In the interviews at PRP2, we discussed similar issues and also identified 
market pressures and the contract culture as the main drivers behind the introduction 
of PRP in the organisation. The interviewees also mentioned cost control and market 
benchmarks as influencing reward decisions: 
‘We did a bit of research about what is available out there and what 
sorts of pay systems are being used and we came to the conclusion that it 
(PRP) is right for us. We want to reward people according to what they 
are achieving and their performance’ (Chief Executive, PRP2).  
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The use of benchmarking to make reward decisions shows the mimicking behaviour 
discussed in the literature, which contributes to uniformity in pay decisions (Ogden 
and Watson 2008). Competition and the contract culture were also identified, as 
mimetic pressures faced by the organisation: 
‘We are under a lot of pressure to perform and, therefore, a business-
like approach is essential to show that we are indeed performance-
driven. Our pay system demonstrates what we value and what we aim for 
in the organisation’ (Chief Executive, PRP2). 
The HR Director shared these views: ‘…because we are having to act in a far more 
competitive manner. We need to be far more competitive in what we do, we need to 
perform at a far greater level, and performance-related pay certainly supports the 
ability to do that.’ 
Another reason for the introduction of PRP pointed out by the HR Director at PRP2 
was affordability. Traditionally, many voluntary organisations have linked pay to the 
Local Authority NJC scales. However, many organisations, and indeed HAs, have 
complained of the difficulties in maintaining this link since the annual funding they 
receive does not always cover the full cost of local authority pay increases 
(Cunningham and James 2009). Introducing PRP could therefore perhaps be a way 
for management to take control over annual pay rises: 
‘We simply could not afford paying people with annual increments any 
more. We got out of the NJC because it was becoming too expensive for 
us’ (HR Director, PRP2). 
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In both organisations, PRP1 and PRP2, the participants’ views confirmed the 
institutional pressures on HAs that influence reward decisions. Even though the 
interviewees felt that PRP was a strategic decision that fitted the needs of their 
organisations, all of them identified increased competition for contracts to deliver 
public services as one of the drivers behind the choice of PRP, along with culture 
change and costs. In PRP1 normative pressures were also identified with the HR 
Director being one of the decision makers on the implementation of PRP. It seems 
reasonable to conclude that, in order to work in an uncertain environment with 
market competition and funding constraints, these organisations, under mimetic and 
normative pressures, make use of pay systems that are widely known for their 
performance orientation.  
Non-PRP HAs are faced with the same market pressures and competition in the new 
contract culture. Despite the fact that the non-PRP HAs studied in this research had 
not opted to introduce PRP, one of them did indicate that they were reviewing their 
PM systems and exploring other options for their pay in order to cope with funding 
pressures. This was suggested in an interview with the HR Director at PM2: 
‘Government funders have an expectation for well-trained employees, 
cost reduction and performance (…) We are working with a consulting 
firm to implement a new competency framework system to contribute to 
our staff development and performance and we aim to, in the future, to 
be able to link our pay to a competency framework to encourage 
employees to develop their skills and gain new qualifications’ (HR 
Director, PM2). 
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PRP is one way of coping with institutional pressures. Nevertheless, other schemes 
may also be the result of mimetic isomorphism, especially when they are legitimised 
by consulting firms. The next section presents the results of the interviews with 
reward consultants in the sector, providing a complementary outlook to the 
organisation’s responses. The reward consultants confirm that PRP is not necessarily 
a strategic choice, but may be the result of institutional isomorphism. 
5.3 The Interviews with Reward Consultants 
The participants all had a long background of consulting on reward strategy, 
combined with experience in the nonprofit sector. A range of factors influencing 
reward decisions were raised. Mimetic pressures, and to a lesser extent normative 
pressures, dominated the discussion of PRP in housing associations. Coercive 
pressures were not identified. To set the scene, each interview started with a 
discussion of the consultant’s approach to reward strategy. 
5.3.1 Best Fit versus Best Practice in Reward Strategy 
Reward consultants provide paid advice to organisations on designing their 
reward strategies and therefore have the ability to influence pay decisions within the 
sector. Consequently, their views and approaches to reward strategy were 
investigated first, before I moved on to looking at the factors influencing the 
decision to implement PRP. 
Consultant 1, who was the head of the housing group of a large global firm, 
remarked:  
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‘Our approach to reward strategy is to put in place a recognition 
framework that makes sense for whatever the business is trying to do 
(…) So our approach tends to be not “here is the best pay structure in 
the world, please implement it”. It tends to be “what are you trying to 
achieve out of your reward recognition framework?” ’ 
Consultant 1 seems to be saying that the pay system should fit the purpose of the 
organisation. However, later in the interview, when issues of cultural fit to PRP were 
raised, the best practice approach to reward strategy became more evident: 
‘The issue is not whether it is private sector practice or commercial 
practice, it is about best practice for me. So all our research shows that 
you can get up to 30% better performance from an individual if you 
create the right environment for them to perform at their best (…) so for 
housing associations it is more about the right environment being 
created, where this organisation, housing association X, can attract 
people who care about the business and can deliver the services that the 
business needs. So if, in the new world, that includes being more careful 
with money, aka commercialism, then that is fine; measures should be 
put in place to incentivise people to behave in that way. Why do people 
call us? It is because they want to establish the right employer brand, 
and through the pay system. With the job advert, people think, “Do I 
want to go and work for that organisation?” So, “is the pay level right? 
Do I get access to the right level of benefits and total reward?” So, I 
don’t think housing associations are becoming more private sector. I just 
think that they are becoming more sophisticated in being effective 
organisations. You look at the most admired companies in the world; 
they have performance-related pay. So it is not a commercial, public, 
private, it is a good, company’. 
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The above quotation suggests that consultants may be active in establishing 
normative pressures in organisations. Reward consultants, as do professional 
associations, attempt to influence the behaviour of others by setting standards, 
propagating principles and advising on benchmarks to gauge progress (Scott 2008). 
Nevertheless, the comments of the consultants in the other firms were more akin to 
the best-fit approach to reward strategy: 
‘We firmly believe that the business strategy should guide HR practices. 
In that sense, the reward strategy is only there to help the organisation 
to achieve its goals. We are aware of current best practice but we also 
understand that best fit is more important’ (Consultant 2). 
‘We work with them to understand what would best make or motivate 
staff to achieve. There won’t be one size that fits all [in] the reward 
strategy. We will flex and amend the reward strategy (…) So it’s really 
starting with what the strategic objectives are, what they are trying to 
achieve and how their reward strategies best achieve it’ (Consultant 3).  
‘We sit alongside the organisation and try to discuss their goals and 
what they are trying to achieve with their employees. We also discuss 
affordability. Then we try to identify what would best fit the needs of the 
organisation’ (Consultant 4). 
5.3.2 Who is Responsible for the Reward Decisions in the Organisations? 
The question of who is responsible for reward decisions in NPOs is important 
so as to place in context the factors driving PRP. The consultants were consistent in 
saying that senior management, HR and occasionally the board generally pushed for 
the choice of PRP: 
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‘I think the main stakeholder will be the chief executive, who says this is 
right for the way in which the business strategy is going forward. But HR 
tends to drive the programme’ (Consultant 1).  
Consultant 4 said, ‘Senior management, most of the time, tends to make the 
decision’ and Consultant 3 said, ‘The board and senior management are usually 
involved in the decision’. Finally, Consultant 2 made the following remarks: 
‘In some organisations, senior management usually makes the decision 
and I think that if there was a more mature board structure within these 
organisations, that really challenged, “What’s the value this (PRP) is 
going to give to the organisation, and why they are doing it? How is it 
going to work? Where is it going to position us strategically?”, then I 
don’t think many organisations would have adopted what they adopted 
(…) There are other organisations where this is actually driven from the 
board because there are people from the private sector and therefore 
they make the leap between their other working professional lives and 
think it would work in this setting’ (Consultant 2). 
5.3.3 Drivers of PRP: Mimetic, Normative and Coercive Pressures 
The reward consultants were asked to discuss the factors that NPOs, and 
where applicable HAs, take into account when deciding whether to implement PRP. 
They were asked to base their responses on real examples from their client base so 
as to try to keep their own views to a minimum. Consultants 2 and 3 responded as 
follows: 
‘I think there has been a frustration in some organisations that we 
cannot change as quickly as we want to. And there is that idea that if we 
change our pay structure to be performance-related pay, that will, by 
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definition, change the cultural outlook of our workforce and develop a 
more commercialised view about how we need to manage the business’ 
(Consultant 2). 
‘What we’ve got to look at is what’s going on in the external 
environment for housing associations at the moment. They are losing 
their grants; their income stream is under threat from government 
policy. For example, through housing, they are changing the housing 
benefits. So, they have to be more performance-driven, maintain a 
healthy turnover, a high standard of services to customers, to compete 
for scarce grants. They need to have that commercial drive and I think 
that may influence the choice of performance-related pay’ (Consultant 
3). 
In both examples, it is clear that market competition and funding threats have 
somehow led HAs to opt for PRP in order to cope with the new climate. Another 
consultant said: 
‘The trigger tends to be a desire to modernise. I would say that the trend 
at the moment is that people are more concerned about getting a better 
return on their investment in terms of the money that they are spending 
on their employees. And performance-related pay is one measure of 
doing that’ (Consultant 1). 
Consultant 1 also suggested that recruitment at the senior level was an important 
factor influencing organisations’ choice of pay system. PRP is widely used for 
executives and, in order to attract talented executives or those that suit the new look 
HAs are trying to portray, PRP is implemented. This suggests mimetic behaviour. 
Cultural change was also mentioned: 
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‘I would say that attracting the right people, particularly at the 
managerial and senior level, is one factor. I think they want to be more 
competitive and the nature of the sector (housing), because it has 
become more commercial, more complex, more independent, requires a 
different sort of leader, an executive who may only be attracted by a 
variable pay package. Another key factor is the organisation wanting to 
reinforce what they stand for in terms of their employer brand, the 
behaviour that is acceptable in the organisation. So some of the ones 
that we have worked with specifically wanted to, for example, encourage 
innovation or commerciality alongside social purpose and, therefore, 
will reward the people who display that behaviour, so it starts to become 
the cultural norm’ (Consultant 1). 
Consultant 4 also commented on the use of PRP to achieve cultural change: 
‘Sometimes, what is around is that idea that we need to take a hammer 
to the system, smash it up, put something else in and inject some trauma 
into the organisation, which sounds a strange thing to say but I think 
some organisations have seen this (PRP) as a blunt instrument to effect 
cultural change in the organisation. I would say that there is a lack of 
sophistication in understanding the operating environment and just 
picking up one approach from one organisation and expecting it to work 
in the same way as in another organisation.’ 
According to some of the consultants, benchmarking is one of the tools senior 
managers in HAs use to make reward decisions: 
‘I think clients want to know what their options are and use us to advise 
them on the best option to deliver their strategy. Most clients have a look 
at PRP because it is out there on the market’ (Consultant 1). 
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‘So there is that sense of what’s being done in the market, let’s do some 
benchmarking research and find out what the competition is doing. Let’s 
try and do something similar with that’ (Consultant 3).  
‘Most strategic pieces of reward work that we are commissioned to 
undertake have part of their brief to at least explore whether 
performance-related pay is something that would be a benefit to the 
organisation, and this has to do with what is out there. But very few 
organisations really think about why they want performance-related 
pay’ (Consultant 2). 
Consultant 2 goes on to discuss some of the issues that HAs tend to overlook when 
trying to implement PRP: 
‘When you explore with these organisations why they want to go down 
performance-related pay, they will reach the conclusion that their 
workforce will be motivated in part through money. But then when you 
ask them how much money they’ve got, they haven’t got any money. So 
you say well, okay, what is it that you are putting in the pot here for 
performance-related pay, one and a half percent? Well if you’ve got one 
and a half percent, this is not going to incentivise people in the way in 
which you believe it will. (…) And if you are placing your strategy 
around PRP, then in order to make that meaningful and have a chance 
of working, you’re going to have to work on the premise that only a 
proportion of your workforce will get any money. But that also means 
that a large part or a proportion of your workforce won’t get any 
financial gain. And then they start to think about, well, actually that’s 
not the sort of organisation we want. We want a sense of pay equality 
and sending the right messages. So it all starts to unravel. Not to say 
they all agree. Some will still go down that path’ (Consultant 2). 
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Consultant 3 expressed similar views: ‘They (housing associations) will never be 
able to develop rewards for performance pay in the same way that the private sector 
has. They can copy the type of system but, in terms of the actual amount of cash, 
they’ll never get anywhere near.’ 
The quota system operated in organisations so that they can implement PRP was 
also discussed by the consultants. The suggestion was that PRP may not be a 
strategic decision after all. Due to the nonprofit nature of these organisations, the 
consultants explained, the lifecycle of PRP in HAs tends to be short: ‘I think housing 
associations find it difficult to maintain the system. I would say that the lifecycle of 
performance pay in housing would be about two or three years if they are lucky’ 
(Consultant 3). Similarly, Consultant 4 commented, 
‘When they realise the situation midway down the road, that if we are 
making all our payments based on performance and we are not 
upgrading base pay, and it’s not an issue at the moment, but we then find 
that in three or four years that our base pay rates are now much lower 
down the pay league, and we run into a problem around recruitment and 
potentially retention, certainly retention of talent. So the whole set of 
things is founded, for most organisations I think, on this copycatting 
phenomenon, if you like, about looking at different operating 
environments’ (Consultant 4). 
Two consultants elaborated on the mimicking behaviour of organisations, and raised 
the issue of trends and fashions in reward decisions: ‘It (PRP) comes and goes 
really. Some are introducing it, some are taking it away and some are looking at it. 
It depends on the trend at that moment’ (Consultant 1). Similarly, 
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‘Despite the fact that there are still people out there implementing it 
(PRP), up until about three years ago it was a lot more popular. As soon 
as the banking crisis unfolded, the number of calls that we got saying, 
“well we’ve got performance-related pay for our executive team in 
particular and we would like to explore how we decouple ourselves from 
it?” And the reason why people wanted to decouple themselves from it 
was because it was no longer fashionable. Overnight it became so… 
whilst the money was clearly nowhere in the same league, but the 
principle was the same. Everybody is seeing on television, including 
residents and tenants, these bankers walking away with millions of 
pounds and organisations having to be bailed out. Suddenly we’ve got 
housing associations, okay, the sums are modest but the principle is the 
same, suddenly being paid at a time when our rents are going up and 
where the whole notion of performance for executives has been 
discredited. And society has taken a whole different view about the 
concept of performance-related pay’ (Consultant 2). 
The fact that some HAs decided to distance themselves from PRP because it was no 
longer fashionable reinforces the evidence in favour of mimetic isomorphism. 
Reward decisions are not based on organisational fit, but on best practices dictated 
by the market. The choice of PRP is consistent with the acceptance of the practice 
within the sector rather than being a strategic choice. Once PRP became discredited 
by the crisis in the banking sector, other more legitimised practices were pursued.  
Coercive pressures on the reward decisions, exerted by government funders, were 
not identified during the interviews. One consultant said:  
‘I would be very surprised if funders were interested in whether 
organisations are introducing performance-related pay or not. They will 
establish whatever controls they need for organisations to perform but 
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they will have no view as to how performance is achieved. And I don’t 
think they would in any way be made confident if part of their rationale 
for distributing funding was based on that’ (Consultant 2). 
Despite the fact the coercive isomorphism is not described by interviewees, and 
consultants are not convinced that organisations are being forced to adopt one model 
or another, it could be said that government regulations represent an invitation to 
comply with widespread performance models in the public sector. The New Public 
Management agenda to enhance performance in public services contributes to a 
performance culture that is likely to lead to the implementation of best practices, 
such as PRP, to fit the new performance environment proposed by government 
reforms.  
5.4 Implications for the Main Study 
Institutional pressures are the main driver of the decision to adopt PRP in 
NPOs, rather than the idea, based on agency and expectancy theory, that PRP is a 
suitable reward system. HAs introduce PRP, not because it fits the needs of their 
organisation, but because they believe it fits the image they would like to portray. 
They are less concerned with any concrete evidence that PRP will enhance 
efficiency, and more concerned with the legitimacy that the pay system may bring to 
the organisation.  
Evidence of mimetic isomorphism was found in all of the interviews with the 
reward consultants. The interviews also suggest the existence of normative 
pressures, where consultants and HR professionals play a significant role in setting 
standards and best practices in the sector. Coercive isomorphism was not mentioned 
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by interviewees but, even though government funders do not have a say in the 
choice of reward system, their policies and funding threats certainly contribute to an 
environment where mimetic isomorphism is more likely to take place. The findings 
are also consistent with the interviews with senior management at the PRP 
organisations. In both groups, management and consultants, similar issues were 
raised regarding the implementation of PRP. Market competition and restricted 
funding have made the housing environment a lot more uncertain for these 
organisations and, consequently, led to a conformity with best practices. The next 
chapter presentes the survey results of the use of PRP in Housing Associations and 
whether PRP contributes to motivate nonprofit employees. The results do not point 
to a successful outcome and, perhaps, the fact that institutional pressures are the 
main reason for the introduction of PRP helps to shed light on why it may not be an 
appropriate pay system for NPOs.   
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Chapter 6  Performance-related Pay in Nonprofit Organisations 
This chapter presents the data analysis and a discussion of the use of 
PRP in housing associations in London. In this study, I compare NPOs using PRP 
with those using seniority-based pay systems. All four organisations investigated 
have well-established performance management (PM) systems in place and the aim 
here is to explore whether PRP motivates nonprofit employees to perform well at 
work any more than seniority-based pay in conjunction with PM does. PM is an 
integrated set of planning and review procedures that cascades down through the 
organisation to provide a link between the individual and the organisation’s strategy 
(Rogers 1994). Moreover, it incorporates processes, attitudes and behaviours that 
together produce a coherent strategy for raising individual performance 
achievements (Mwita 2002). The link with pay is not essential to PM and the 
intention here is to establish whether or not PRP is appropriate for voluntary sector 
workers.  
In Chapter 4, the PM systems of the organisations were described in detail, together 
with their pay systems. The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) 
provided an illustration of what is considered a soundly designed PRP scheme. An 
organisation must already have a system of PM in place, it must be possible to have 
informed, consistent and objective performance appraisals, and the employee must 
be capable of exerting control over the achievement of pre-set objectives, among 
other conditions (ACAS 2005; ACAS 2010). The ACAS reflects contemporary 
research and practitioners’ views of good practice and, according to the details 
presented in Chapter 4, all four organisations follow the recommendations contained 
in the ACAS’s standards of good practice for the implementation of PM and PRP 
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schemes. Satisfying the abovementioned conditions has been recognised as a 
necessary part of designing successful schemes and makes it possible, in this study, 
to eliminate poor design as a cause of failure of the PRP schemes.  
Having said that, poor implementation explanations for the failure of PRP mask 
more fundamental deficiencies that are rooted in basic organisational differences 
between for-profit and nonprofit settings. These differences include budget, wage 
equity and public expectations embedded in NPOs that prevent the success of PRP 
(Perry, Engbers et al. 2009). The nonprofit environment has limited funding to 
invest in PRP, an organisational culture that emphasises wage equity (Leete 2000) 
and a weak link between objectives and performance with outputs that are difficult 
to measure (Weisbrod 1989). Moreover, the non-distribution constraint that defines 
nonprofit institutions is subject to rules and expectations regarding how financial 
resources may be used (Perry, Engbers et al. 2009:10). Because of these external 
expectations, when nonprofit executives are known to be earning large amounts of 
compensation they may face public backlash, such as the stories that were prevalent 
in the media in 2010 about the ‘fat cats’ of HAs earning more than the prime 
minister. 
Nonprofit workers have a strong nonmonetary orientation (Light 2002) and are 
willing to exert themselves for reasons other than monetary compensation. Studies 
(Alvarado 1996; Theuvsen 2004; Devaro and Brookshire 2007:10) posit that 
nonprofit employees have different motivations for performing at work and their 
reward preferences, as well as their organisational environment, do not coincide with 
the motivational antecedents of PRP. The argument here is that such characteristics, 
inherent in NPOs, make it difficult to implement PRP successfully. In these 
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circumstances, the link with pay may cause more harm than good to the motivation 
of employees. For instance, wage equity may be a crucial component of maintaining 
employee motivation in the sector (Leete 2000) while PRP does the opposite, 
differentiating employees’ pay on the basis of their work performance. The problem 
is that the subjective nature of the performance assessment in PRP may prompt 
perceptions of unfairness, particularly if employees believe that a quota system is 
being implemented due to the limited funding available for PRP. Since limited 
funding does exist in NPOs, as in the public sector (Pearce and Perry 1983; Marsden 
and Richardson 1994; Marsden and French 1998), there is a risk that quota systems 
and the manipulation of appraisal assessments may be used to restrict wages in these 
organisations (Prendergast 1999). This chapter explores these issues and their impact 
on the motivation of employees with the aim of finding out whether PRP is 
appropriate for nonprofit workers.  
The research question in this chapter is whether PRP motivates nonprofit employees 
any more than PM without a link with pay. In order to address this question it is 
important to attend to a number of sub-questions such as whether the four 
organisations are motivationally similar when PSM, Affective commitment and Job 
Satisfaction of employees are compared; whether Perceived Fairness, Goal Setting, 
Quality of Appraisal and the existence of a Quota System influence the success or 
failure of PRP in organisations. The table below (Table 6.1) summarises the 
variables analysed in this study and the following sections will explain how the 
dependent and independent variables will be used here to help to address the 
research question. 
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Table 6-1: Summary of Variables Analysed 
Dependent Variables Independent Variables Control Variables 
MotivationDiscretion Organisation Trade Union 
MotivationEffort Perceived Fairness Age 
PSM Goal Setting  Tenure 
Affective Commitment Quality of Appraisal Salary 
Pay Satisfaction Quota System Education 
Job Satisfaction Incentive Effect Gender 
Appraisal Effect Managers 
Full-time Employment 
    Intention to Leave 
6.1 PSM, Organisational Commitment, Job Satisfaction and the Reward 
Preferences of Employees in HAs 
The first step, before investigating employees’ motivations for performing at 
work, is to determine whether employees in all four organisations are motivationally 
similar when it comes to working for a NPO and whether they differ mainly with 
respect to the pay system used. PSM, affective commitment, job satisfaction and the 
reward preferences of employees will be examined here to show that employees are 
observationally equivalent across all four organisations. In other words, they present 
similar levels of PSM, commitment and job satisfaction, and they also rank intrinsic 
rewards in similar ways. 
Public service motivation theorists (Perry and Wise 1990) assert that the motives of 
public and nonprofit employees are different to those of private sector employees. 
They argue that individuals who respond to incentives such as doing work that is 
helpful to others and being motivated by the good feelings they have about 
themselves as a result of the work they do have PSM. Perry (1997) suggests that the 
individual’s PSM develops from exposure to a variety of experiences, such as 
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parental and religious socialisation, professional identification or political ideology, 
and that the greater the individual’s PSM, the more likely he or she is to seek to 
work for a public or nonprofit organisation. This view is consistent with Rose-
Ackerman’s (1996) hypothesis of self-selection. Employees self-select themselves 
into NPOs in order to achieve their altruistic goals that are in line with the services 
provided by the NPOs. More recently, nevertheless, studies have pointed to the 
importance of the organisational environment in shaping the PSM of employees 
(Moyniham and Pandey 2007). As seen earlier, workplace characteristics such as job 
design influence PSM (Koumenta 2010). Given this, one could argue that pay 
systems might influence the PSM of the employees of NPOs. In other words, 
employees could be attracted to an organisation that offers PRP rather than 
altruistically self-selecting themselves. Therefore, it is necessary to establish first 
whether PSM varies across the organisations studied.  
Affective commitment is another measure used here to compare employees across 
organisations. Affective commitment, as defined by Meyer and Allen (1997), 
implies a degree of emotional identification on the part of the employee with their 
workplace and work colleagues. Furthermore, it provides the strongest and most 
favourable correlations with attendance, performance and OCB (Meyer, Stanley et 
al. 2002). If organisations differ in the affective commitment of their employees, this 
could well explain differences in their motivation to perform at work, tainting the 
results of the motivational effects of PRP and PM. Job satisfaction is also employed 
here to compare the organisations. The satisfaction and attitudes of employees are 
important factors in determining their behaviour and responses at work, and it is 
through these behaviours that organisations can achieve effectiveness (Ostroff 
1992). Some authors (Lawler and Porter 1967) argue that high satisfaction at work 
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will lead to low turnover and absenteeism because the satisfied worker is more 
motivated to go to work as his needs will be satisfied there. Likewise, job 
satisfaction leads to prosocial behaviours that include cooperation and collaborative 
efforts. Satisfied employees are more likely to engage in collaborative efforts and 
accept organisational goals (Ostroff 1992). However, whether or not an employee 
will produce up to his potential depends, in large part, on the way he feels about 
many aspects of the job, his co-workers and supervisors, his career and the 
organisation. Satisfaction and positive attitudes can be encouraged through the 
provision of a positive organisational environment that furnishes good 
communication, autonomy, participation and mutual trust (Argyris 1964). Because 
organisations vary in their ability to provide a positive work environment, and 
because employees have different views about many aspects of their jobs, it is 
essential to examine the job satisfaction of employees in all organisations.  
A separate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed to test whether there 
are any statistically significant differences between the organisations in terms of the 
PSM, affective commitment and job satisfaction of their employees. ANCOVA is a 
type of linear regression analysis where effects and interactions are assessed on the 
dependent variable scores after the dependent variable has been adjusted for by the 
relationship between the dependent variable and one or more covariates (control 
variables). The first ANCOVA (Table 6.2) takes PSM as the dependent variable and 
the organisation as the independent variable. The covariates introduced into the 
analysis are gender, supervisory status, age, tenure, full-time employment, trade 
union membership, intention to leave, salary and education. These control variables 
are used in all of the statistical tests performed in this chapter. The Bonferroni test is 
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used here to apply an adjustment to the probability level, keeping it at .05 for all 
comparisons. The Bonferroni test is an adjustment made to P values when several 
dependent or independent statistical tests are being performed simultaneously on a 
single data set. The more hypotheses are being tested, the higher are the chances of 
identifying at least one significant result. Therefore, the Bonferroni test is used to 
reduce the chances of obtaining false-positive results when multiple results are being 
performed on a single data set. This is done by dividing the P value at the critical 
significance level .05 by the number of hypotheses being tested. The statistical 
power of the study is then calculated based on this modified P value (Napierala 
2012). Affective commitment and job satisfaction are also taken as dependent 
variables and the organisation as the independent variable, with the same covariates 
as above. Table 6.2 shows that there is no statistically significant difference between 
the PSM, affective commitment and job satisfaction of the employees in the four 
organisations. The results suggest that employees in all organisations are 
motivationally, or perhaps observationally, similar when comparing their PSM, 
affective commitment and job satisfaction and they differ mainly with respect to 
their pay systems.  
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Table 6-2: Comparison of PSM, Affective Commitment and Job Satisfaction of 
Employees iν the Organisations: Analysis of Covariance 
 
PSM Affective Commitment Job Satisfaction 
Organisation Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
PRP1 23.04 2.73 168 .12 1.0 170 .14 .98 175 
PRP2 22.18 2.56 83 -.23 .85 99 -.14 .91 99 
PM1 22.12 2.57 53 .07 .94 67 .14 1.05 72 
PM2 22.70 2.94 105 -.04 1.07 111 -.09 .97 116 
Total 22.66 2.75 409 -.005 .99 447 .02 .98 462 
Note: PSM; (F(3,408) = 1.533, p > .05); Affective Commitment: (F(3,446 = 1.1216, p > .05); 
 Job Satisfaction: (F(3,461) = 0.984, p > .05) 
A further step is taken in order to confirm the similarities of the employees in the 
four organisations. Employees have different personal preferences about the rewards 
that motivate them to do their best work, and it is well established in the literature 
that the reward preferences of employees across different sectors (public, private and 
nonprofit) will vary. Public and nonprofit employees display more of a preference 
for intrinsic rewards than their private counterparts. Since all organisations in this 
study are nonprofits, it is possible that the employees will display similar 
preferences. However, it is still important to investigate whether the incentive 
system impacts upon the reward preferences of the employees, and whether the 
employees in the PRP organisations show a preference for pay and other extrinsic 
rewards.  
The measurement of reward preferences in this study employs a rank-ordering 
procedure, in which the individuals are asked to order rewards from most to least 
preferable. Selective orientation guides the measure of reward preferences used here, 
on the assumption that individuals generally do not value rewards equally (Wittmer 
1991). The respondents were asked to rank nine reward items (intrinsic and 
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extrinsic) from 1 (most important to them) to 9 (least important to them). An 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to determine whether the difference 
between the means for the organisations is statistically significant (Table 6.3). The 
analysis of the control variables and their influence on reward preferences is shown 
in Table 6.4. 
Much of the research on human resource management has focused on the types of 
policies and practices that might be bundled together to deliver higher organisational 
performance. Nevertheless, the employee’s expectations and perceptions should be 
acknowledged and interrogated, and not ignored as is so often done in the literature 
(Deery 2002). This is also one of the reasons why this question was posed to 
employees in the NPOs. To explore whether their reward preferences are consistent 
to what the organisations believe to be the appropriate reward system. 
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Table 6-3: Ranking of Reward Importance by Organisation: Analysis of Variance 
 PRP1                     
(N = 108) 
PRP2                     
(N = 84) 
PM1                       
(N = 57) 
PM2                        
(N = 82) 
F
 Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank (sig) 
Higher pay 4.81 4 4.67 3 5.3 6 5.17 5 .085 
(.481) 
Doing work that is 
helpful to others 
4.16 2 3.14 1 4.07 1 3.91 2 3.358 
(.019)* 
Recognition from        
organisation 
5.54 7 4.94 5 5.96 8 5.79 8 2.485 
(.061) 
Job security 4.56 3 4.89 4 4.98 4 4.95 3 .466 
(.706) 
Career progression 4.94 5 5.21 7 5.09 5 5.2 6 .275 
(.843) 
Good feeling about 
yourself as a result 
of work 
3.77 1 4.32 2 4.16 2 3.73 1 1.160 
(.325) 
Decision making 
and influencing 
organisation 
5.79 8 6.11 8 5.65 7 5.96 9 .521 
(.668) 
Training and 
development 
5.27 6 4.99 6 4.49 3 5.01 4 1.610 
(.187) 
Autonomy 6.16 9 6.73 9 5.3 6 5.27 7 6.055 
(.001)** 
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05 
According to Table 6.3, there is at least one statistically significant difference 
between the four organisations in terms of the reward ‘doing work that is helpful to 
others’. PM1 and PRP2 rank the reward in first place, whereas PRP1 and PM2 rank 
the reward in second place. There is also at least one statistically significant 
difference between the organisations when it comes to the reward ‘autonomy’. 
Employees at PM1 and PM2 have a higher need for autonomy in the workplace than 
employees at PRP1 and PRP2, in order to be motivated. However, all of the 
organisations’ employees rank autonomy as among the lowest rewards that motivate 
them to do their best job. Meanwhile, all of the organisations’ employees rank the 
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intrinsic rewards ‘doing work that is helpful to others’ and ‘good feeling about 
yourself as a result of the work’ in the highest two rankings. Both groups of 
organisations, PRP and PM, display a preference for intrinsic and nonmonetary 
rewards to motivate them to do their best work, regardless of their pay systems. 
Ranking intrinsic motivators in a comparable way strengthens the argument that the 
employees across these organisations are observationally similar. The control 
variables analysed in Table 6.4 show that there are statistically significant 
differences between the organisations in terms of their trade union membership, age, 
tenure and salary. PM2 has the highest trade union membership, the longest tenures 
and the oldest employees among all four organisations. PM1 has the highest salaries 
of the four (Table 6.4).  
Table 6-4: Control Variables by Organisation 
PRP1           
(N = 108) 
PRP2           
(N = 84) 
PM1            
(N = 57) 
PM2             
(N = 82) 
 
F 
  
Mean Mean Mean Mean (sig) 
TU Member .2952 .2262 .2321 .4938 5.912 (.001)** 
Full-Time 1.14 1.07 1.07 1.12 .828 (.479) 
Age 3.24 2.99 3.07 3.42 2.813 (.039)* 
Tenure 2.47 2.86 2.77 3.05 3.304 (.021)* 
Salary 3.45 3.05 3.73 3.43 3.885 (.009)** 
Education 3.29 3.12 3.05 2.65 2.263 (.081) 
Female  .6204 .6905 .5965 .5732 .885 (.449) 
Manager  .3889 .3571 .3684 .4024 .142 (.935) 
Intention to 
Leave  .26 .3896 .3333 .3210 
1.135 
(.335) 
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05 
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6.2 Employees’ Views of the Principle of PRP in NPOs 
The next task was to gauge the views of the employees of the two PRP 
organisations on the principle of using PRP in NPOs. Table 6.5 highlights the 
results. 
Table 6-5: Employees' Views on the Principle of PRP 
 PRP1 (N = 267) PRP2 (N = 129) 
 Agree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
Neither 
% 
Agree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
Neither 
% 
The principle of 
relating employees' 
pay to performance is 
a good one 
      
61.5 16 22.5 57.6 19.2 23.2 
Note: In the original questionnaire, this question offered response choices on a five-point Likert scale, from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. 
It is clear that the majority of employees in both organisations agree with the 
principle of PRP. However, an open question at the end of the survey gave the 
employees the opportunity to discuss any other issues they thought relevant and 
some of the examples of their comments presented below show that a few of them 
have strongly negative views about PRP. These views suggest that, despite the 
majority being in agreement with the principle of PRP, a minority believe that it is 
not an appropriate incentive to be implemented in their organisations, either because 
the system does not seem to recognise the measurability issues in the services 
provided or perhaps because the employees feel that money is not the main 
motivator that makes them work better or harder. 
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‘I fully support the PRP system and agree that those who perform well 
should be rewarded and those that don’t should not. I think increments 
based on length of service are unfair and do not promote performance 
and targets’ (PRP1 employee). 
‘PRP1 is not a bad company. It is a shame they have to become more 
corporate in order to survive in the current climate. Corporate practices 
do not work in this sort of work. I don’t blame PRP1; I think it is a 
reflection of the state of the country as a whole” (PRP1 employee).  
‘The idea of performance-related pay within this sector is utterly 
abhorrent. (…) Some staff have a tougher time with residents than 
others, which I guess this system does not take into account’ (PRP2 
employees). 
‘This kind of thing (PRP) has the capacity to warp people’s motivation 
for doing a good job. I’m really glad the social housing sector has been 
professionalised over the last few years because it means negligent staff 
have nowhere to hide, and I’ve seen them leaving to be replaced by 
people who really care about vulnerable adults. Now we’re being told 
that we don’t care about them, just money. And the clients will suffer 
because support offered will be manipulated to make it look better than 
it is’ (PRP2 employee). 
In order to put a successful PRP scheme in place, an organisation needs to have 
well-designed PM and appraisal systems. Table 6.6 summarises the results of 
separate binary logistic regressions performed for PRP1 and PRP2 to investigate the 
impact of the quality of appraisals on the employees’ views on the principle of PRP. 
Employees’ opinions about the use of PRP in NPOs were measured by asking them 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement, ‘The principle of relating 
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employees’ pay to performance in NPOs is a good one’, with possible responses on 
a five-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The responses 
were transformed into a dummy variable taking values Pro (agree and strongly 
agree) or Con (disagree, strongly disagree and neither agree nor disagree) PRP.  Pro-
Con PRP was then used as the dependent variable, while Quality of Appraisal was 
the independent variable. Quality of Appraisal was measured by asking the 
employees if they thought their most recent performance appraisal had been a fair 
reflection of their performance and whether they believed their line managers knew 
enough about their work to assess their performance. Control variables included in 
the analysis were Trade Union membership, full-time employment, age, tenure, 
salary, education, gender, manager and intention to leave. In both organisations, 
Quality of Appraisal was found to have a positive statistically significant association 
with Pro-Con PRP. Employees who believed that the quality of appraisals in their 
organisations was high were in favour of the principle of using PRP in NPOs. At 
PRP1, salary was positively associated with a favourable opinion of the principle of 
PRP. At PRP2, age was negatively associated with the PRP principle. Since the 
majority of employees at both PRP1 and PRP2 agreed with the principle of PRP, it is 
fair to say that they also believe their organisations have good appraisal systems in 
place. 
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Table 6-6: Quality of Appraisal and Employees' Pro and Con Opinions about PRP in 
NPOs 
 PRP1  
(N = 257) 
PRP2 
(N = 125) 
 B SE B SE 
Quality of Appraisal .406* .181 .734* .321 
TU Member -.550 .395 -.065 .581 
Full-time dummy -.330 1.000 -2.418 2.114 
Age -.209 .190 -.510* .300 
Tenure dummy -.049 .171 .189 .273 
Salary .643* .250 -.188 .353 
Education .105 .096 -.192 .154 
Female dummy .188 .371 -.250 .521 
Manager dummy .333 .533 .817 .752 
Intention to Leave -.790 .472 -.763 .576 
Note: *p<.05 
    
6.3 The Motivational Effects of PRP and PM in the Case Organisations 
This section focuses on the main research question of this thesis: Does PRP 
increase the motivation of nonprofit employees to perform well at work any more 
than seniority-based pay in conjunction with PM does? Table 6.7 presents the survey 
items presented to the employees and the percentages of employees who stated that 
they were in agreement/disagreement with these motivational effects of PRP/PM. 
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Table 6-7: Overall Percentages Regarding Motivational Effects of PRP/PM by 
Organisation 
Organisation  Agree 
% 
Disagree  
% 
Neither 
% 
PRP1  PRP gives me an incentive to work 
beyond the requirements of my job 
34.5 39.6 25.9 
 PRP makes me want to show more 
initiative in my job 
34.4 34.4 31.2 
 PRP gives me a greater incentive to get 
my work priorities right 
36.4 36.5 27.1 
 PRP makes me willing to work harder 16.8 51 32.2 
 PRP makes me willing to improve the 
quality of my work 
24.5 46.6 28.9 
 PRP makes me willing to increase the 
quantity of work I do 
18.3 51 30.7 
PRP2  PRP gives me an incentive to work 
beyond the requirements of my job 
27.6 42.3 30.1 
 PRP makes me want to show more 
initiative in my job 
22.9 39.3 37.8 
 PRP gives me a greater incentive to get 
my work priorities right 
24.5 39.3 36.2 
 PRP makes me willing to work harder 28.1 35.2 36.7 
 PRP makes me willing to improve the 
quality of my work 
29.1 36.2 34.6 
 PRP makes me willing to increase the 
quantity of work I do 
23.1 41.2 35.7 
PM1  PM gives me an incentive to work beyond 
the requirements of my job 
35.4 37.8 26.8 
 PM makes me want to show more 
initiative in my job 
45.7 25.9 28.4 
 PM gives me a greater incentive to get my 
work priorities right 
48.7 29.3 22 
 PM makes me willing to work harder 33.3 42 24.7 
 PM makes me willing to improve the 
quality of my work 
46.9 29.6 23.5 
 PM makes me willing to increase the 
quantity of work I do 
26.9 40.3 32.9 
PM2  PM gives me an incentive to work beyond 
the requirements of my job 
34.4 38.8 26.9 
 PM makes me want to show more 
initiative in my job 
42.8 24 33.2 
 PM gives me a greater incentive to get my 
work priorities right 
53.8 24.2 22 
 PM makes me willing to work harder 29.9 39.5 30.6 
 PM makes me willing to improve the 
quality of my work 
41.1 27.1 31.8 
 PM makes me willing to increase the 
quantity of work I do 
21.2 45.7 33.1 
Note: In the original questionnaires, these questions offered response choices on a five-point Likert scale from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. Valid percentages were used. N= 598. 
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A separate covariance analysis (ANCOVA) was performed to compare the 
motivational effects of PRP and PM in the organisations. Since objective measures 
of performance were not available, the analysis in this study is confined to 
identifying whether PRP increases employees’ willingness to perform better. The 
confirmatory factor analysis in Chapter 3 identified two motivation factors: 
MotivationDiscretion and MotivationEffort. MotivationDiscretion includes the 
following items: 
The existence of PRP/PM gives me an incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of my job; 
The system of PRP/PM makes me want to show more initiative in my 
job; 
PRP/PM gives me a greater incentive to get my work priorities right. 
MotivationEffort includes the following items: 
PRP/PM makes me willing to work harder; 
PRP/PM makes me willing to improve the quality of my work; 
PRP/PM makes me willing to increase the quantity of work I do. 
The respondents from all four organisations answered the same questions for the 
motivation scales, and the test of measurement invariance (MI) was performed 
across the different samples in order to make sure that the scales were measuring the 
same trait of ‘motivation’ (Chapter 3). Measurement equivalence was found in the 
motivation scales across all organisations. MotivationDiscretion and 
MotivationEffort were taken to be the dependent variables and the organisation was 
the independent variable. The covariates introduced were the same as those listed 
above and for all other statistical tests performed in this study. When using 
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MotivationDiscretion as the dependent variable there is only one statistically 
significant difference between the organisations (F(3.479) = 3.62, p < .05) and the 
difference is only between the PRP organisations: employees in PRP2 are more 
motivated than employees in PRP1 (Table 6.8). When MotivationEffort was 
introduced as the dependent variable a statistically significant difference was found 
between organisations (F(3.476) = 3.76, p < .05): employees at PM1 are more 
motivated to exert effort at work than employees at PRP1. It is fair to say that PRP 
does not motivate nonprofit employees to exert effort or discretion to perform well 
at work any more than PM with no links to pay does. In fact, in terms of 
MotivationEffort, the motivational effects of PM are stronger than the motivational 
effects of PRP.  
Table 6-8: MotivationDiscretion and MotivationEffort across Organisations: Analysis 
of Covariance 
 MotivationDiscretion MotivationEffort 
Organisation Mean SD N Mean SD N 
PRP1 9.60ᵃ 2.29 185 9.29ᵃ 2.43 185 
PRP2 10.32ᵇ 2.19 104 9.77ᵃᵇ 2.46 107 
PM1 10.10ᵃᵇ 2.44 71 10.18ᵇ 2.53 70 
PM2 10.03ᵃᵇ 2.24 119 9.96ᵃᵇ 2.63 114 
Total 9.94 2.29 479 9.68 2.43 476 
Note: Means whose superscripts differ are statistically different according to the Bonferroni test. 
Further evidence of the motivational effects of PRP and PM in the case 
organisations was obtained through asking managers for their views on the 
motivational effects of PRP and PM on their employees. Managers were asked about 
the following: whether PRP/PM makes many of their staff go beyond the 
requirements of the job; whether PRP/PM contributes to many of the staff sustaining 
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a high level of performance at work; whether PRP/PM contributes to increasing the 
quality of many of the staff’s work; whether PRP/PM contributes to increasing the 
quantity of work done by many staff; whether PRP/PM contributes to staff getting 
their priorities right. These questions were combined into a single variable, termed 
Managers’ Views (α = .91). An ANCOVA was then performed to compare the 
managers’ views of the motivational effects of PRP/PM in the organisations (Table 
6.9). The results show that there is a statistically significant difference between the 
organisations (F(4.206) = 8.313, p < .01). Managers at PM1 have a higher, positive 
opinion about the motivational effects of PRP/PM than those at PRP1 and PRP2. 
Also, PM2 managers have a higher, positive opinion about the motivational effects 
of PRP/PM than PRP2 managers.  
Table 6-9: Comparison of Managers' Views of the Motivational Effects of PRP/PM: 
Analysis of Covariance 
 Managers' Views 
Organisation Mean SD N 
PRP1  3.05ᵃᶜ .81 55 
PRP2  2.69ᵃ .63 29 
PM1  3.73ᵇ .61 24 
PM2  3.21ᵇᶜ .69 44 
Total 3.13 .77 152 
Note: Means whose superscripts differ are statistically different according to the Bonferroni test.   
Given the results on the motivational effects of PRP when compared with PM, an 
investigation was conducted of the variables perceived fairness, quota system, goal 
setting and quality of appraisals in the organisations to try to explain the differences 
between the motivational effects of PRP and PM. 
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At this stage, an ANCOVA was performed separately using the above variables as 
dependent variables to investigate the differences across the organisations (Table 
6.10). For Perceived Fairness, employees were asked about the appropriateness of 
their pay given their contributions and whether their pay was fair compared to that of 
other employees in similar positions. The covariance analysis shows that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the organisations (F(3.483) = 6.10, 
p<.001): employees at PM1 have higher perceived fairness scores than employees at 
PRP1 and PRP2, and those at PM2 have higher perceived fairness scores than those 
at PRP2 (Table 6.10). PRP tends to lead to different pay for employees doing the 
same work if those employees are judged to have different performance levels. The 
problem is that employees may have different views to the organisation and thus 
perceptions of unfairness could diminish the association between the financial 
incentive and performance (Kanfer 1990). If PRP leads to feelings of unfairness, it is 
likely that PM without a link to pay may be more motivating for employees. Below 
are some comments made by employees during the survey process, illustrating 
perceptions of (un)fairness in the organisations: 
‘I welcome the changes to the pay structure and PRP but feel there are 
inconsistencies that create tensions and mistrust. The lack of 
transparency is an issue for staff, as is the fact that managers and senior 
managers benchmark salaries so differently’ (PRP1 employee). 
‘I think a reward system is good if there is a fair system of evaluation 
and there is non-competitive, good working environment that genuinely 
promotes equal opportunity and harmony’ (PRP1 employee). 
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‘I think that, in theory, the reward policy at PRP2 should work. 
However, in practice I have found that it has not worked. Having worked 
extremely hard for the organisation and being graded 1 and 2 in my last 
appraisals, I find that I still have a very similar salary to other workers 
who do a lot less than myself – and for this reason I have been very 
demotivated’ (PRP2 employee). 
For the variable Quota System, employees were asked whether or not they agreed 
with the following statement: ‘Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt I 
will receive an Outstanding (Grade 1) or Highly Effective (Grade 2)’. This statement 
was used to try to identify whether a quota system is in operation in the PRP 
organisations. However, the statement also applies to organisations without PRP: 
just because appraisals are not linked with pay does not mean that they are free from 
bias. For example, an employee in a PM organisation may think that they will not 
get a top grade in their appraisal because they do not have a good relationship with 
their manager.  
The covariance analysis including Quota System as the dependent variable shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between the organisations (F(3.438) 
= 44.128, p<.001). The employees in the organisations with PRP have a stronger 
belief in the existence of a quota system for the appraisal grades distributed in their 
organisation than the employees in the PM organisations (Table 6.10). The lack of 
adequate funding for PRP in NPOs may lead to the implementation of quota systems 
to prevent organisations from running out of funding for pay awards to employees. 
Quota systems may well contribute to perceptions of unfairness in these 
organisations and weaken the motivational effects of PRP. Below are some of the 
employees’ views of the quota system in PRP organisations: 
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‘I am in favour of the PRP principle but if it is not applied properly it 
can become a disincentive (…) I have been putting 110% into my job in 
order to do a good job, then myself and several other high-performing 
colleagues were told we are graded as ‘meeting objectives’ as there 
can’t be too many high-performing people in one project. This system 
therefore served as a disincentive to me. There is no point having a 
performance-related pay scheme if there is not enough budget to reward 
hardworking employees’ (PRP1 employee). 
‘There were too many highly effective grades in 2006 and so the rewards 
were spread too thinly and were not meaningful. This had a negative 
impact on the way the system is perceived and brought up doubts about 
whether the majority of highly effective grades were at central office (…) 
My only real concern is that I do not feel PRP2 put enough money for 
people to become highly effective’ (PRP2 employee). 
46.6% of employees at PRP1 agreed (11.7% disagreed) and 62.3% of employees at 
PRP2 agreed (5.7% disagreed) that the amount of money an individual could get 
from the PRP award should be substantially increased. The perceptions these 
employees expressed about a quota system being operated in their organisations, and 
their dissatisfaction with the amount of money being offered, make it likely that two 
out of the three conditions of expectancy theory are not being met. However, it is 
interesting that 41.6% of employees at PRP1 and 32% of employees at PRP2 
expressed no opinion on the amount of money being offered by the PRP award. 
These percentages seem high considering that the amount of money received has a 
direct impact on the salaries of the employees. The lack of opinion could perhaps be 
explained by the fact that employees do not feel that money is the main motivation 
for them to increase their performance. Some of the employees’ statements suggest 
this view: ‘I feel that my own work would still be the same standard regardless of 
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the PRP and the same is true for much of the staff” (PRP2 employee). Another 
employee at PRP2 says: ‘The reward system isn’t a big factor in motivating me at 
work’. At PRP1 an employee said: ‘I don’t think the pay system affects my 
performance because I am passionate about my job and I am highly motivated by the 
job itself’. Another said: ‘My experience shows that most of the staff in this sector 
are mostly already committed and know exactly what is required from them, in spite 
of benefits’ (PRP1 employee). 
Goal setting was measured using items that asked about the SMART criteria 
followed in the appraisal meetings at the case organisations. The items describe 
preconditions for the successful introduction of PRP and PM systems. The items 
used in the goal-setting scale are as follows: 
The objectives set were clear and measurable; 
The objectives focused on issues that I have direct control over; 
The meeting provided a good opportunity to discuss my development 
needs; 
I am in a position to achieve the objectives set for me; 
I understand how the objectives will be monitored and reviewed. 
Research suggests that PRP can reinforce organisational objectives for employees, 
enabling clearer goal setting in appraisal meetings (Cannell and Wood 1992). If PRP 
plays an important role in redirecting employees’ efforts towards different goals, 
then it is expected that it is the link with pay that is responsible for improving goal 
setting in organisations. The ANCOVA including Goal Setting as the dependent 
variable shows that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
organisations (F(3.435) = 1.322, p<.267) (Table 6.10). The organisations have 
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developed similar systems of goal setting into their performance appraisals and PRP 
does not seem to improve goal setting any more than PM without a link to pay.   
On the other hand, there is a statistically significant difference between the 
organisations when comparing the quality of their appraisals (F(3.440) = 4.912, p 
<.01). Employees at PRP1 have a lower perception of the quality of appraisals in 
their organisation than those at either PM1 or PM2. It is worth noting that PM1 has a 
360° appraisal system in place. There is no statistically significant difference 
between PM1, PRP2 and PM2 (Table 6.10). As there is a statistically significant 
difference between the views of quota systems in the organisations, this is likely to 
impact upon the beliefs about the quality of the appraisals in the PRP organisations. 
If someone believes there is a quota system being operated in his/her organisation, 
he/she is more likely to believe that appraisals are not a fair reflection of 
performance.  
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Table 6-10: A Comparison of Perceived Fairness, the Quota System, Goal Setting and the Quality of Appraisals in the Four Organisations Studied: 
Analysis of Covariance 
 Perceived fairness Quota System Goal Setting Quality of Appraisal 
Organisation Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
PRP1  -.01ᵃᶜ 1.02 193 2.50ᵃ 1.12 184 21.09 3.48 176 -.15ᵃ 1.06 186 
PRP2  -.31ᵃ .89 104 2.60ᵃ 1.11 91 20.75 3.61 97 .01ᵃᵇᶜ .91 85 
PM1  .47ᵇ 1.08 70 3.70ᵇ .96 66 21.56 3.16 66 .29ᵇ .87 68 
PM2  .10ᵇᶜ .97 117 3.77ᵇ .88 98 20.24 3.56 97 .18ᵇᶜ .95 102 
Total .02 1.02 484 2.98 1.20 439 20.90 3.50 436 .02 .99 441 
Note: Means whose superscripts differ are statistically different according to the Bonferroni test. 
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The ANCOVA (Table 6.10) compares Perceived Fairness, Quota System, Goal 
Setting and Quality of Appraisal across the four organisations studied but it does not 
investigate the effects of these variables on the motivation of employees. For this 
purpose, multigroup structural equation modelling (SEM) using AMOS was 
performed. In this analysis, the above variables are used as independent variables 
(Tables 6.11 and 6.12). The multigroup analysis permits across-group variation to be 
assessed, in addition to analysing the peculiarities of each of the groups studied (Bou 
and Satorra 2010). In other words, it does not assume that all respondents come from 
identical organisations but acknowledges respondents’ differences, within each 
organisation. 
If employees believe there is a fair distribution of pay in their organisation and also 
perceive the quality of goal setting and appraisals to be high, they are more likely to 
experience the positive motivational effects of PRP. In the same vein, if employees 
believe there is a quota system for the appraisal grades, it is less likely that they will 
experience the positive motivational effects of PRP. The same is true for PM 
organisations. The dependent variable analysed here was MotivationDiscretion 
(Table 6.11).  
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Table 6-11: Multigroup Regression Results for MotivationDiscretion by Organisation 
 MotivationDiscretion 
 PRP Organisations Non-PRP Organisations 
 PRP1 PRP2 PM1 PM2 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Perceived 
Fairness 
-.011 .058 -.144 .086 .338*** .074 .174* .069 
Quota System .011 .033 -.037 .042 -.112* .046 -.080 .038 
Goal Setting -.151* .017 -.130 .022 .262** .026 .381*** .021 
Quality of 
Appraisal 
.139* .055 .244* .087 .371*** .087 .077 .073 
Female .005 .033 -.017 .042 -.057* .046 -.043 .038 
Manager -.020 .092 .053 .137 .071 .123 -.052 .105 
Age .054 .036 -.065 .048 -.040 .056 .064 .046 
Tenure .013 .033 -.045 .042 -.146* .046 -.115 .038 
Full-time .017 .092 .029 .137 .057 .123 -.041 .105 
Salary .058 .036 -.070 .048 -.041 .056 .072 .046 
TU Member .006 .118 .147 .166 -.260** .173 -.129 .128 
Intention to 
Leave 
.004 .033 -.017 .042 -.055* .046 -.038 .038 
Note: N = 617, χ²=1533.42, df=384, χ²/df=3.99 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
The results in Table 6.11 show that there is a positive statistically significant 
association between Perceived Fairness and MotivationDiscretion in PM1 and PM2. 
Goal Setting was found to be negatively associated with MotivationDiscretion in 
PRP1 and positively associated with MotivationDiscretion in PM1 and PM2.  
Quality of Appraisal was found to be positively associated with 
MotivationDiscretion in PRP1, PRP2 and PM1. Interestingly, Quota System was 
found to be negatively associated with MotivationDiscretion in PM1. Moreover, 
even though perceptions that a quota system is in operation in the PRP organisations 
are much higher than in the PM organisations, the perceived existence of a quota 
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system does not seem to impact negatively on the motivational effects of PRP for the 
nonprofit employees. At the time of the surveys, PRP1 had had PRP for all 
employees for a year and PRP2 for three years. Even though perceptions that there is 
a quota system do not seem to impact on the motivation of the employees, the 
question is whether this would remain the case in the long run. It is more likely that 
the longer perceptions of a quota exist, the more employees will start to feel the 
demotivational effects of PRP.  
Next, MotivationEffort was introduced into the regression analysis as the dependent 
variable and the independent and control variables remained the same as above 
(Table 6.12). Perceived Fairness was found to be negatively associated with 
MotivationEffort at PRP2. This means that employees who have high Perceived 
Fairness in the organisation have a negative view of the motivational effects of PRP.  
Perceived Fairness was positively associated with MotivationEffort at PM1 and 
PM2, perhaps because of the developmental aspect of PM, opposite to PRP. Quota 
System was negatively associated with MotivationEffort at PM2. In other words, the 
belief that there is a quota system in place has a negative impact on the motivational 
effects of PM at PM2. As explained in Chapter 4, the HR Director at PM2 admitted 
that, even though the organisation provides training to line managers on how to 
appraise staff, they were experiencing problems related to inconsistency in how 
appraisals were carried out within the organisation. This could help to explain why 
Quota System was negatively associated with MotivationEffort at PM2. Goal Setting 
was again positively associated with MotivationEffort at both PM1 and PM2. No 
significant association was found between Quality of Appraisal and MotivationEffort 
in any of the organisations. The control variables Female, Tenure and Intention to 
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Leave were all found to be negatively associated with MotivationEffort at PM2 
(Table 6.12). 
Table 6-12: Multigroup Regression Results for MotivationEffort by Organisation 
 MotivationEffort 
 PRP Organisations Non-PRP Organisations 
 PRP1 PRP2 PM1 PM2 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Perceived Fairness -.070 .061 -.206* .088 .238* .085 .232** .069 
Quota System .007 .034 -.069 .043 -.056 .053 -.131** .038 
Goal Setting -.077 .018 -.021 .022 .301** .030 .407*** .021 
Quality of 
Appraisal 
.085 .057 .089 .090 .158 .100 .145 .073 
Female .003 .034 -.031 .043 -.028 .053 -.071** .038 
Manager -.042 .096 .041 .140 .003 .142 -.060 .106 
Age .037 .037 -.055 .049 -.032 .065 .034 .047 
Tenure .007 .034 -.083 .043 -.072 .053 -.188** .038 
Full-time -.036 .096 .023 .140 .002 .142 -.047 .106 
Salary .040 .037 -.059 .049 -.033 .065 .038 .047 
TU Member .046 .123 .060 .170 -.174 .198 .062 .128 
Intention to Leave .002 .034 -.032 .043 -.027 .053 -.062** .038 
Νοτε:¨Ν = 617, χ²=1563.91, δφ=384, χ²/δφ=4.07 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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6.4 Pay Satisfaction in PRP/PM Organisations 
During the interviews with HR Directors and Managers in the PRP 
organisations, one of the reasons given for the introduction of PRP in their 
organisations was that, under seniority-based pay, they were risking losing good 
employees who were at the top of their pay scale, because they had stopped receiving 
their annual incremental increase. They said that implementing PRP had addressed 
this issue and made their pay more competitive in the labour market. A Chi-square 
test was conducted for PM1 and PM2 (non-PRP organisations) to find out whether 
there was a statistically significant difference between employees at the top of their 
pay scale and employees who intended to leave the organisation. Obviously intention 
to leave may be related to other factors but this investigation could at least answer 
whether the HR managers’ fears of losing good employees were reasonable.  
The test results show that there is no statistically significant link between intention to 
leave and being at the top of the pay scale at PM1 (X² (1) = .719, p > .1). Being at the 
top of the pay scale does not imply that an employee intends to leave the 
organisation. The same is true for PM2 (X² (1) = .162, p > .1).  
It is also relevant to investigate the employees’ satisfaction with pay across the 
organisations, since the promise of an award for good performance in the PRP 
organisations is likely to increase employees’ pay. The ANCOVA using Pay 
Satisfaction as the dependent variable (Table 6.13) shows that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the organisations (F(4.946) = 5.579, p < .01). PM1 
employees have higher satisfaction with pay than either PRP1’s or PRP2’s. PM1 and 
PM2 are not statistically different but PM2 and PRP2 are statistically different: PM2 
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shows higher pay satisfaction than PRP2. This could be explained by PM1 and PM2 
offering higher basic salaries than the PRP organisations. As seen earlier in Table 
6.3, PM1 offers the highest salaries of all the organisations. Employees may prefer 
an increase in their basic pay over the possibility of receiving a bonus for achieving 
the required results, as Heneman and Young (1991) found in their study of PRP for 
school managers. 
Table 6-13: Pay Satisfaction in the Organisations: Analysis of Covariance   
 Pay Satisfaction 
Organisation Mean SD N 
PRP1 3.16ᵃᶜ 1.016 204 
PRP2 2.88ᵃ .936 110 
PM1 3.58ᵇ .896 73 
PM2 3.32ᵇᶜ .947 122 
Total 3.20 .987 509 
Note: Means whose superscripts differ are statistically different according to the Bonferroni test. 
6.5 Appraisal Effect and Incentive Effect on the Motivation of Employees: 
Checking for Robustness 
Because Quality of Appraisal is measured by asking employees if their most 
recent performance appraisal was a fair reflection of their performance and whether 
they believe that their line manager knew enough about their work to assess their 
performance, one could argue as to the possibility of halo effects when investigating 
the impact of Quality of Appraisal on the motivational effects of PRP. It could be 
that the positive motivational effects of PRP might be tainted by whether or not an 
employee believes in the quality of the appraisal system.  
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A multi-linear regression analysis was performed for the two organisations with 
PRP; MotivationDiscretion and MotivationEffort were used (separately) as 
dependent variables and the effect of a good appraisal as the independent variable. 
Appraisal Effect was measured by computing a binary variable from the variable 
Quality of Appraisal. The mean of Quality of Appraisal was computed across all 
employees and if an individual’s score for Quality of Appraisal was smaller than the 
mean, then the binary variable Appraisal Effect was set to 0, otherwise to 1. In other 
words, the binary variable Appraisal Effect explains whether or not an employee 
believes that the quality of the appraisal system is high. The results (Table 6.14) 
show that there is no statistically significant association between Appraisal Effect 
and the motivational effects of PRP. A belief in the high quality of the appraisal 
system is not statistically associated with positive motivational effects of PRP. The 
results suggest that it is unlikely that halo effects could be tainting the motivational 
effects of PRP. 
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Table 6-14: Appraisal Effect on the Motivational Effects of PRP 
 PRP1 (N = 247) PRP2 (N = 126) 
 Motivation 
Discretion 
Motivation 
Effort 
Motivation 
Discretion 
Motivation 
Effort 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Appraisal Effect .082 .165 .012 .169 .380 .223 .205 .247 
TU Member -.123 .175 -.077 .180 .171 .249 .171 .282 
Full-time  .099 .401 .394 .409 .282 .496 .087 .558 
Age .055 .083 .001 .087 .096 .116 .044 .132 
Tenure  .059 .072 .069 .073 -.095 .109 -.057 .121 
Salary -.046 .099 -.067 .099 -.197 .142 -.269 .157 
Education .020 .043 .005 .044 .007 .064 -.059 .072 
Female  -.078 .163 -.112 .166 .033 .225 .090 .250 
Manager .210 .224 -.009 .224 .290 .323 .376 .364 
Intention to Leave -.121 .204 .007 .209 -.152 .232 .141 .255 
Note: PRP1 MotivationDiscretion (R2 = .025; Adjusted R2 = -.036) MotivationEffort (R2 = .016; Adjusted R2 = -.046);  
PRP2 MotivationDiscretion (R2 = .119; Adjusted R2 = -.011) MotivationEffort (R2 = .074; Adjusted R2 = -.059) 
It is also important to assess the incentive effect on the motivational effects of PRP to 
determine whether employees who receive a PRP award are more likely to believe in 
the motivational effects of PRP. A multilinear regression analysis was performed in 
the two organisations with PRP and the incentive effect was measured by asking 
employees how their performance was assessed in their most recent performance 
appraisal. Employees at PRP1 were asked to choose between excelled, highly 
effective, achieving well, meeting objectives, variable, underperforming, not proven. 
Employees in the first three categories would have received an award. Employees at 
PRP2 were asked the same question and had a choice of outstanding, highly effective, 
effective, developmental needs, significant shortfall, not proven, not assessed yet. 
Employees in the first three categories would have received an award. The responses 
were transformed into a dummy variable: Gets PRP Award (Table 6.15). 
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Table 6-15: Incentive Effect on the Motivational Effects of PRP 
 PRP1 (N = 247) PRP2 (N = 126) 
 Motivation 
Discretion 
Motivation 
Effort 
Motivation 
Discretion 
Motivation 
Effort 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Gets PRP Award .063 .216 -.112 .216 .524 .324 .444 .346 
TU Member -.169 .171 -.034 .178 .127 .238 .147 .261 
Full-time  .497 .376 .682 .384 -.059 .418 -.179 .454 
Age .080 .083 .032 .087 .048 .110 .019 .121 
Tenure  .080 .074 .058 .075 -.161 .122 -.160 .131 
Salary -.040 .099 -.050 .098 -.275* .128 -.250 .137 
Education .029 .042 .005 .043 .026 .062 -.052 .066 
Female  -.076 .162 -.109 .166 .248 .207 .159 .223 
Manager  .133 .220 -.128 .220 .408 .297 .369 .323 
Intention to Leave -.075 .193 .076 .198 -.092 .215 .106 .228 
Note:*p<.05;  PRP1 MotivationDiscretion (R2 = .041; Adjusted R2 = -.018) MotivationEffort (R2 = .035; Adjusted R2 = -.026) 
PRP2 MotivationDiscretion (R2 = .094; Adjusted R2 = -.007) MotivationEffort (R2 = .067; Adjusted R2 = -.034)  
The results in Table 6.15 show that there is no statistically significant association 
between employees getting a PRP award and believing in the motivational effects of 
PRP. It can be argued here that getting a pay award does not seem to motivate 
employees in PRP organisations to exert their discretion or increase their efforts any 
more than employees who do not get the award. 
Conclusion 
In an attempt to investigate whether PRP is an appropriate incentive scheme 
for nonprofit employees, it was deemed necessary to first determine whether the 
employees in all the organisations studied were observationally similar. PSM, 
affective commitment, job satisfaction and the reward preferences of the employees 
were the dimensions used here to demonstrate that the employees in all four 
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organisations are in fact motivationally similar and differ mainly in relation to the 
pay systems used. The motivational effects of PRP/PM were then investigated in the 
organisations. Despite the majority of employees in the PRP organisations agreeing 
with the principle of PRP, PRP had failed to motivate the employees any more than 
PM without any links to pay. In fact, in terms of the variable MotivationEffort, the 
motivational effects of PM were found to be stronger than those of PRP. This result 
was confirmed by the managers’ views of the motivational effects of PRP compared 
to PM. If the managers do not believe that PRP will increase the willingness of their 
employees to perform, it is unlikely that it will. It was found that the managers in the 
PM organisations have a higher positive opinion of the motivational effects of PM 
than the managers in the PRP organisations. 
The reasons for the failure of PRP to motivate employees any more than PM could 
be explained by the fundamental organisational differences between for-profit and 
nonprofit environments discussed earlier. Limited funding to invest in PRP and an 
organisational culture that emphasises wage equity, for instance, could be 
responsible for the results presented here. It is clear that the employees of the PRP 
organisations investigated here displayed higher feelings of unfairness in relation to 
their pay systems and also believed that quota systems were in operation at their 
organisations. Opinions of the quality of the appraisals were also found to be higher 
in the non-PRP organisations. These differences between the two groups of 
organisations (PRP and non-PRP) suggest that characteristics inherent in NPOs could 
make the successful implementation of PRP in the long run difficult. The regression 
results further demonstrated that goal setting was negatively associated with 
MotivationDiscretion in PRP1. In the same vein, perceived fairness was negatively 
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associated with MotivationEffort in PRP2. Employees in PRP2 with positive views 
of fairness in their organisation do not believe in the motivational effects of PRP to 
increase their effort. This could be explained by the fact that employees may not see 
PRP as a system that could bring fairness to the organisation. 
However, in PM organisations, the results appear to be quite different. Perceived 
fairness, goal setting and the quality of appraisals are all positively associated with 
the MotivationDiscretion effects of PM. MotivationEffort is positively associated 
with perceived fairness and goal setting. The only result that is difficult to explain is 
the fact that belief in a quota system is negatively associated with 
MotivationDiscretion in PM1 and negatively associated with MotivationEffort in 
PM2. No statistically significant association between the perception that there is a 
quota system and the motivation of the employees was found in the PRP 
organisations, despite the fact that the employees in the PRP organisations were more 
likely to believe that a quota system was being applied in their organisation. Quality 
of Appraisal was positively associated with MotivationDiscretion in the PRP 
organisations. 
Whether the PM organisations displayed higher pay satisfaction, and the incentive 
effect on the motivational effects of PRP, was also investigated in this chapter. It was 
observed that getting a pay award did not seem to have motivated the employees in 
the PRP organisations to have exerted discretion or effort in order to perform well. 
The link with pay does not appear to increase the motivation of employees to 
perform any more then PM does. PM without a link to pay seems to achieve similar 
motivational effects to PRP, and in some cases, better effects. The results presented 
here advocate that PRP might not be an appropriate incentive for nonprofit workers. 
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The next chapter continues the investigation of PRP in NPOs with a larger sample of 
nonprofits. Chapter 7 uses the WERS 2004 database, containing a random sample of 
over 100 NPOs, to further investigate whether PRP can have any effect on nonprofit 
employees’ attitudes.  
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Chapter 7  The Effect of Merit Pay on Worker Satisfaction and 
Commitment in the Nonprofit Sector – Evidence from 
the WERS 2004  
The empirical analysis undertaken in this chapter is a continuation of 
the investigation in Chapter 6 and takes advantage of the Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS). Here, only the 2004 cross-sectional survey is analysed, as 
it is the only one that includes a separate category for nonprofit employment, 
information that is rarely assessed in large-scale surveys. The WERS 2004 allows a 
representative picture to be built of the relationship between nonprofit work and 
attitudinal outcomes such as job satisfaction and organisational commitment. It also 
makes it possible to explore the determinants of such outcomes in detail, as it 
contains information on large sets of control variables. The WERS 2004 has a 
sample of 107 NPOs with 1,325 nonprofit employees and its main contribution to 
this thesis is to provide a broader view, beyond the case study analysis, of the use of 
PRP in NPOs and its effect on the attitudes of the employees. These NPOs may have 
different attributes from the cases discussed in Chapter 6 but since they are all 
defined as NPOs it is reasonable to expect that they will display more similarities 
than differences. Here, I look at a larger sample of similar organisations to 
investigate whether the results are consistent with the results presented in Chapter 6, 
that PRP may not be an appropriate incentive scheme for voluntary sector workers. 
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7.1 Contents of Survey Instruments – Variables Analysed 
Where possible, every effort has been made to use measures that are 
consistent with those used in Chapter 6. The dependent variables analysed in this 
chapter are organisational commitment, job satisfaction and pay satisfaction, also 
discussed in Chapter 6. With the WERS it is not possible to use the same motivation 
questions from the four cases in HAs, however, I can investigate whether patters of 
commitment and job satisfaction are similar in a wider sample of nonprofits and 
whether there is a relationship between PRP and the other variables used in the cases.  
Employees were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a series of 
statements, with response choices on a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly 
agree to strongly disagree (Table 7.1). The statements were compiled into a single 
variable for organisational commitment and another for job satisfaction. In WERS, 
managers are explicitly asked whether the employees in their organisation are paid 
by results or receive merit pay. Pay-by-results includes any method of payment 
where the pay is determined by the amount of work done or its value, rather than just 
the number of hours worked. When WERS asks managers about merit pay, they are 
shown a card defining it as ‘related to a subjective assessment of individual 
performance by a supervisor or manager’. Merit pay is the independent variable of 
interest in this study. It is worth noting, however, that out of the 6,017 employees in 
WERS with merit pay, only 47.68% have their pay linked to the outcome of a 
performance appraisal. Therefore, an independent variable ‘merit pay with appraisal’ 
was also included in the analysis. This variable is the closest to the definition of PRP 
used in the analysis of the case studies from the housing sector, and consequently the 
most relevant for use in this chapter. Dummy variables for sector, nonprofit, public 
203 
 
and private were also generated and are introduced into the analysis as independent 
variables.  
The control variables considered in the analyses are tenure, gender (male), age, 
education, manager, salary, trade union membership, size of workplace, amount of 
overtime and number of work-life balance policies on offer. Tenure, age, salary and 
size of workplace are measured in intervals, from which a scale is created. Gender 
and trade union membership are dummy variables. The work-life balance policies 
variable was generated by counting the number of schemes on offer in the work 
place. This ranged from none to seven. The offer of work-life balance policies in an 
organisation may well impact on the job satisfaction and commitment of employees 
(Benz 2005). Finally, education level was determined by consolidating all of the 
questions on education and training levels. The levels were equated to the National 
Qualification Framework (NQF) and assigned a number, with the highest number 
indicating the highest level of education. The WERS management and employee 
questionnaires were merged to give a full range of control variables and improve the 
validity of the results. 
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Table 7-1: List of Main Variables Used in WERS 2004 
 WERS 
Organisational Commitment       
(5-point Likert scale)  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements about working here?                                                                                               
I share many of the values of my organisation                      
I feel loyal to my organisation                                                     
I am proud to tell people who I work for                                
Job Satisfaction                              
(5-point Likert scale) 
How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your job?                                                                                            
The sense of achievement you get from your work                
The scope for using your own initiative                                       
The amount of influence you have over your job                            
The training you receive                                                                
The amount of pay you receive                                                    
Your job security                                                                                  
The work itself                                                                                    
Pay Satisfaction                              
(5-point Likert scale) 
The amount of pay you receive 
Merit Pay                                        
(dummy) 
Do any of the employees in this establishment get paid by 
results (PBR) or receive merit pay (MP)? Answer: PBR = 1, 
MP = 2 (fperf). Shown card: 'Merit pay is related to a 
subjective assessment of individual performance by a 
supervisor or manager'.                                                                          
Merit Pay with Appraisal                        
(dummy) 
Is individual employees’ pay linked to the outcome of their 
performance appraisal? (fapppay) 
7.2 A Comparison of Employees’ Attitudes in Nonprofit, Public and Private 
Organisations 
This thesis proposes that nonprofit workers differ from their public and 
private counterparts in terms of their values and their motives for working for their 
organisations (Rawls, Ullrich et al. 1975). Likewise, NPOs attract intrinsically 
motivated workers who are more likely to receive nonmonetary rewards for their 
work than for-profit employees (Hansmann 1980; Mirvis and Hackett 1983; Rose-
Ackerman 1996; Borzaga and Dependri 2005). These attributes are substantiated by 
studies showing that workers in NPOs display higher job satisfaction linked to the 
meaningfulness of their work when compared to for-profit employees. The studies 
show that workers in NPOs are indeed more motivated than for-profit workers, 
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despite the fact that they are faced with excessive workloads, staff shortages and low 
pay (Light 2002; Benz 2005). Further to these findings, Almond and Kendall (2000) 
reveal that nonprofit workers in the UK are much more likely to work unpaid 
overtime than public and private sector employees, suggesting that nonprofit 
employees have higher levels of commitment to their organisations. The first step in 
this chapter is to investigate whether nonprofit employees display higher job 
satisfaction and commitment than public and private sector employees, to confirm 
the propositions made earlier in this thesis. Private and public sector organisations 
make more use of pay-by-performance incentive schemes than NPOs. Therefore, pay 
satisfaction is also compared between sectors to investigate whether private and 
public sector employees have higher pay satisfaction than nonprofit sector 
employees. 
Using the WERS 2004 database, three separate linear multilevel regression analyses 
were performed with STATA using a random intercept model. Job satisfaction, pay 
satisfaction and organisational commitment were the dependent variables and 
dummies for private, public and nonprofit sectors the independent variables (Table 
7.2). The multilevel model is best suited to this dataset since it allows group-level 
averages to be estimated. Job satisfaction and organisational commitment are 
statistically significantly higher among nonprofit workers than private and public 
sector ones (Table 7.2). Age, manager, salary and the number of work-life balance 
(WLB) policies on offer have a statistically significant positive association with job 
satisfaction and commitment. Overtime has a positive statistically significant 
association with commitment, that is, the higher the number of overtime hours 
worked, the higher is the organisational commitment of the employees. There is no 
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statistically significant difference between pay satisfaction and sector. The results 
presented in Table 7.2 largely confirm the traditional view discussed in this thesis, 
that nonprofit employees are more satisfied and committed to their work than their 
counterparts in the private and public sectors. 
Table 7-2: Sector Effect on Attitudinal Outcomes: A Multilevel Regression Model 
 
Job Satisfaction Pay Satisfaction Organisational Commitment 
 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Private Sector -.143*** .033 -.041 .051 -.275*** .041 
Public Sector -.117** .035 -.087 .054 -.189*** .043 
Tenure -.030*** .003 -.054*** .006 -.047*** .005 
Gender (male) -.081*** .011 -.149*** .017 -.112*** .013 
Age .037*** .004 .018** .006 .058*** .004 
Education  -.024*** .002 -.022*** .004 -.008** .003 
Manager  .179*** .011 .084*** .018 .183*** .013 
Salary .021*** .002 .063*** .003 .023*** .002 
TU Member -.118*** .012 -.148*** .019 -.133*** .014 
Size of Workplace -.000*** -.000 -.000** .000 -.000*** .000 
N˚ of WLB 
Policies 
.085*** .003 .086*** .004 .068*** .003 
Overtime .0003 .0008 -.005*** .001 .004*** .000 
Sd(cons) .238 .007 0.356 .011 .302 .008 
Sd(res) .617 .003 1.04 .005 .742 .004 
ICC .129 .007 .106 .006 .142 .007 
Log. likelihood -19467.865 -31003.838 -23375.982 
N˚ of employees 19918 20805 20081 
N˚ of organisations 1721 1726 1722 
Note: Nonprofit Sector is the base line. ***p<.001, **p<.01 
  
7.3 Merit Pay and Appraisal Effect on the Attitudes of Employees in NPOs 
This section investigates whether NPOs that make use of merit pay or merit 
pay with appraisals find that the job satisfaction and commitment of their employees 
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is any higher than in organisations without merit pay. Table 7.3 shows the number of 
employees in the nonprofit sector with merit pay and merit pay with appraisals 
according to WERS 2004. 
Table 7-3: Number of Employees with Merit Pay and Merit Pay with Appraisals 
 Nonprofit Sector  
Merit Pay 225 
Merit Pay with Appraisals 99 
 Source: WERS 2004 
Three separate linear multilevel regression analyses were performed with STATA 
using a random intercept model for the nonprofit sector (Table 7.4). Job satisfaction, 
pay satisfaction and organisational commitment were the dependent variables and 
merit pay and merit pay with appraisals were the independent variables. The control 
variables were the same as those listed for the previous analysis. The results show 
that there is no statistically significant association between the use of merit pay and 
either job satisfaction, pay satisfaction or commitment in NPOs. The same is true for 
merit pay with appraisals. Neither merit pay nor the outcome of the performance 
appraisal is found to increase job satisfaction, pay satisfaction or the commitment of 
employees in the nonprofit sector. The number of WLB policies and salary both have 
a positive statistically significant association with all dependent variables. Age is 
positively associated with job satisfaction and organisational commitment and 
manager status is positively associated with job satisfaction. Education and amount 
of overtime worked are both negatively associated with pay satisfaction. 
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Table 7-4: Merit Pay and Appraisal Effect on Attitudes of Nonprofit Sector Employees: 
A Multilevel Regression Model 
  
Job Satisfaction Pay Satisfaction Organisational Commitment 
  
B SE B SE B SE 
MP -.072 .112 -.058 .211 -.083 .158 
MP with 
Appraisal .096 .147 -.021 .276 .182 .206 
N˚ of WLB 
Policies .088*** .009 .091*** .017 .090*** .012 
Tenure -.012 .014 -.028 .026 -.025 .018 
Amount of 
Overtime .001 .002 -.015** .005 .003 .003 
TU Membership -.060 .042 .010 .077 -.083 .054 
Gender -.059 .039 .010 .071 -.061 .049 
Age .059*** .013 .040 .024 .072*** .016 
Manager .127** .040 -.067 .073 .067 .050 
Salary .016* .007 .040** .012 .024** .008 
Education -.015 .008 -.038** .014 .006 .010 
SizeWorkplace -2.64e-05 3.12e-05 -6.21e-06 5.88e-05 -3.62e05 4.41e05 
Sd(cons) .205 .025 .392 .046 .302 .033 
Sd(res) .550 .011 1.01 .021 .686 .014 
ICC .122 .027 .129 .027 .162 .031 
Log. likelihood -995.21129 -1785.0254 -1284.2825 
N° of employees 1156 1208 1178 
N° of 
organisations 93 94 94 
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
The WERS also collects data on organisational performance using subjective 
measures of performance. These measures are financial performance, productivity 
and the quality of the product/service and they are framed in terms of the 
performance of the workplace relative to its competitors. I also investigated merit 
pay and the organisational performance of the employees of NPOs. However, due to 
a very small number of observations in the nonprofit sector, the results were 
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considered unreliable to be reported here. One explanation could be that managers in 
NPOs may not have data on these measures, or even make use of them, as it may be 
difficult to capture the performance of a NPO in the same way as for a for-profit 
organisation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides support for the results found in the study of housing 
associations presented in Chapter 6. There are 94 nonprofit organisations and over 
1,100 nonprofit workers included in the analysis, bringing a much larger number of 
cases into the discussion. Here, it has been confirmed that nonprofit workers display 
higher job satisfaction and organisational commitment than workers in the public and 
private sectors, suggesting that nonprofit employees may indeed have different 
values and motivations than their public and private counterparts. Moreover, and 
perhaps more importantly, neither merit pay nor merit pay with appraisals has any 
statistically significant association with either job satisfaction, pay satisfaction or 
organisational commitment in NPOs. The use of merit pay in nonprofits does not 
contribute to any increase in job satisfaction, pay satisfaction or organisational 
commitment above that found in organisations without merit pay. These results are 
consistent with the findings in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 8  Conclusion 
This thesis set out to explore the use of PRP in housing associations in 
England. First, it investigated whether PRP could contribute to increasing the 
nonprofit employee’s motivation to perform well at work. Second, given the 
system’s innefectives in motivating employees, it inquired why housing associations 
have introduced PRP for their workforce. Housing associations are defined as 
independent NPOs providing support for people in housing need as well as key 
community services to society. They have been central, along with others in the 
nonprofit sector, in government reforms to promote and reinforce the sector’s 
involvement in public service delivery. The long process of change, from having a 
secondary role in the provision of social housing to the extensive first-hand delivery 
of public services, means that housing associations have been subject to an 
increasingly demanding regime of performance management and inspection as a 
condition of providing services on behalf of the state. That is what makes them an 
interesting case to be studied. Performance management reforms, driven by the best 
value review, led to the explicit use of measures of performance that place greater 
emphasis on output controls. Now fully embedded in HAs, they encourage a 
business-like attitude to the management of their services.  
As seen earlier, increased state regulation influences the way NPOs operate their 
human resource management and, consequently, conformity with private sector 
managerial practices has been identified. This concluding chapter uses the case study 
findings to provide summarised answers to the research questions. It reflects the 
framework of the research approach by focusing on incentive and institutional theory 
perspectives in order to address the suitability of PRP to NPOs. After reviewing the 
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key findings of the results presented in the last three chapters, this chapter will then 
discuss the contributions of this thesis to the literature and to practice. Finally, the 
limitations of the thesis will be discussed, and directions for future research outlined.  
8.1 Summary of Key Findings 
8.1.1 Does PRP Increase the Motivation of Nonprofit Employees to Perform 
Well? 
It is never possible to be completely certain of how successful a pay scheme 
will be before it is in place; nevertheless, there are ways of assessing its chances of 
fitting and succeeding in an organisation. This was the initial step taken in this thesis. 
First, I looked at the incentive and nonprofit sector theories to try to establish a 
framework suitable for analysing PRP in NPOs. The compelling logic for linking pay 
to performance as a means of motivation is based on several assumptions: that 
organisations can accurately measure individual outputs, that individual outputs 
contribute to organisational performance, and that pay can be administered in a way 
that provides an incentive to the employees receiving it. These assumptions are 
difficult to satisfy in practice, particularly in relation to the nonprofit environment. 
There is considerable uncertainty associated with the translation of agent behaviour 
into outcomes, even more so in the case of NPOs where there is a multiplicity of 
potentially conflicting objectives generated by a diversity of stakeholders. The 
services provided by NPOs are often intangible, making measuring the fulfilment of 
organisational goals more difficult. Moreover, funding constraints, and difficulties 
attracting volunteers and donors, suggest that performance might not only be related 
to employees’ efforts. Additionally, the non-distribution component of nonprofits 
explains the unique characteristics of their employees and how NPOs are able to 
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produce socially desirable outcomes and attract an intrinsically motivated workforce 
willing to exchange extrinsic rewards for the opportunity to contribute to a social 
cause. In NPOs, workers are motivated by aspects of the job itself, as well as the 
opportunity to accomplish moral and ideological aspirations by doing work that is 
helpful to others. The behaviour of nonprofit workers can help to diminish the effort-
monitoring problem highlighted in the incentive literature, as they have different 
motivations that fit well with the characteristics of NPOs.  
Another way of assessing the chances that PRP will succeed in NPOs is to look at the 
success or failure of similar PRP schemes in other organisations. In this thesis, the 
public sector was used as a benchmark to evaluate how well PRP may fit and 
consequently succeed in NPOs. NPOs have some inherent features shared by public 
sector organisations, which are more likely to make PRP problematic. The 
multiplicity of stakeholders, the often-intangible objectives, as well as budget 
constraints, are some of the features of both nonprofit and public sector 
organisations. The empirical research on PRP in the public sector presented here 
signals the challenges involved in making PRP viable in NPOs. The results of the 
study of nonprofit housing associations in this thesis are consistent with the 
theoretical framework presented in Chapters 1 and 2. 
The main research question of this study is whether PRP can motivate nonprofit 
employees to perform well at work. In order to answer this question effectively, a 
series of measures were taken to attenuate possible biases. Organisations from the 
same geographical area were invited to participate in the study. Selecting all cases 
from London helped to minimise differences in labour characteristics and the level of 
pay of employees. All of the organisations chosen have a very similar client base and 
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compete for contracts to provide services in the same London boroughs. Two 
organisations without PRP agreed to take part in the study, and functioned as a 
control group, which allowed for a comparison of the motivational effects of PRP 
and the motivational effects of PM that is not linked to pay. The PM and PRP 
schemes in the organisations were also reviewed to determine whether they included 
structural features that would, on theoretical and empirical grounds, make PRP more 
likely to succeed. The interviews with managers and the documents gathered 
suggested that the schemes were indeed well implemented in the organisations, and 
followed many of ACAS’s advice regarding good practice. 
In the survey, PSM, affective commitment and job satisfaction were the measures 
used to determine whether employees in the four organisations were motivationally 
similar to one another and differed mainly with respect to the pay system used. The 
reward preferences of the employees was also examined and the results showed that 
employees in the four HAs were observationally equivalent, that there were no 
statistically significant differences in their PSM, commitment or job satisfaction, and 
that they also ranked intrinsic rewards in similar ways. These measures were 
paramount in attenuating possible biases in the examination of the motivational 
effects of PRP.  
The motivational effects of PRP/PM were then investigated in the organisations. 
Motivation refers here to a willingness or preparedness to do something, and the 
statements used to measure the motivational effects of PRP and PM were in line with 
what the managers in the organisations believed were the behaviours expected of 
employees as a result of the PRP and PM systems. The CFA of the measure of 
motivation confirmed the existence of two factors in the scale: MotivationDiscretion 
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and MotivationEffort. They are consistent with the different types of employee 
behaviour necessary to increase performance in the organisations. Specifically, they 
refer to a willingness to exert discretion or judgement when performing tasks, and a 
willingness to exert effort, such as working harder or increasing the quantity of work 
done (Katz 1964; Gagne and Deci 2005). 
The variables MotivationDiscretion and MotivationEffort were compared across the 
organisations and the results suggested that PRP did not increase the employees’ 
motivation any more than did PM without any links to pay. In fact, in terms of the 
variable MotivationEffort, the motivational effects of PM were found to be stronger 
than those of PRP. The managers in the PM organisations also reported a higher 
positive opinion of the motivational effects of PM on their employees than did the 
managers in the PRP organisations regarding PRP. Moreover, and perhaps most 
importantly, in the PRP organisations, the results showed that employees who 
received the PRP award were no more motivated to perform well than were 
employees who did not receive the PRP award. 
The results also demonstrated that employees in the PRP organisations had higher 
scores for perceived unfairness and believing that a quota system was in place, and 
significantly lower opinions regarding the quality of appraisals in their organisations, 
than those in the PM organisations. These results are consistent with the view that 
fundamental organisational differences between for-profit and nonprofit 
environments do exist. Budget constraints in NPOs are more likely to contribute to 
an imposed quota on the number of high appraisal grades issued to employees. In 
fact, the employees in the PRP organisations indicated suspicions of this in the open 
question at the end of the survey. The results showed that the organisations differed 
215 
 
significantly in terms of measures of perceived fairness, quota systems and the 
quality of appraisals, but goal setting was not found to be significantly different 
between organisations. Despite the results in the PRP organisations, only perceived 
fairness and goal setting had negative associations, with MotivationEffort and 
MotivationDiscretion, respectively. In the PM organisations, perceived fairness, goal 
setting, and the quality of appraisals were all positively associated with motivation. 
The quota system was the only odd result. Even though perceptions that a quota 
system was in operation were found to be much higher in the PRP organisations than 
in the PM organisations, the perceived existence of a quota system did not seem to 
impact negatively on the motivational effects of PRP for the nonprofit employees. 
However, it did show a negative association with MotivationDiscretion in PM1 and a 
negative association with MotivationEffort in PM2. Nonetheless, these results do not 
affect the conclusion of this thesis, that PRP had not motivated the nonprofit 
employees in the case organisations any more than PM had.  
The results presented in Chapter 6 lead to the natural question of whether one can 
generalise from the four cases studied in this thesis. Chapter 7 attempted to answer 
this question and continued the investigation of the use of PRP in NPOs in a larger 
sample of nonprofits. The WERS 2004 has a sample of 107 NPOs and provided a 
broader view, beyond the case study analysis, of the use of PRP in NPOs and its 
effect on the attitudes of the employees. Although it was not possible to use the same 
motivation questions used in the HAs, using the variables organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction and pay satisfaction, which were also used in the cases, 
allowed me to explore whether these attitudinal outcomes are similar in a wider 
sample of nonprofits, and whether there is a relationship between PRP and these 
variables, thus offering a comparison with the case results. 
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The results of the investigation using the WERS database were consistent with those 
in Chapter 6. First, a comparison of attitudinal outcomes in the private, public and 
nonprofit sectors confirmed that nonprofit workers display higher job satisfaction 
and organisational commitment than workers in the public and private sectors, 
suggesting that nonprofit employees may indeed have different values and 
motivations than their public and private counterparts. Second, the results showed 
that the use of PRP in nonprofits did not contribute to any increase in job 
satisfaction, pay satisfaction or organisational commitment, above that found in 
organisations without PRP. The results of the larger sample of nonprofits from the 
WERS thus supported the claims made in Chapter 6.  
8.1.2 Why Do HAs Use PRP? 
I embarked on an investigation of why housing associations have introduced 
PRP. In particular, what influenced their decision to implement PRP for their 
employees? These questions were posed in an attempt to challenge agency theory 
explanations for the use of PRP in NPOs. The analysis of the data from the 
interviews presented in Chapter 5 showed that the need to conform with market 
practice in order to gain legitimacy was one of the reasons why HAs had introduced 
PRP for their employees. Government reforms coupled with performance-based 
regimes have contributed to an environment of restricted funding and increased 
competition for contracts to provide public services, and consequently have altered 
the management of human resources in HAs. The results point to HAs conforming 
with best practice in pay decisions in order to cope with the uncertain climate.  
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Other reasons for choosing PRP were also discussed in the interviews. The need to 
change the culture of the organisation and cost control were raised by both senior 
management in the PRP organisations and reward consultants. However, these 
reasons are deeply rooted in the need to cope with the uncertain environment in 
which HAs now operate. The desire to change the organisation’s culture is 
influenced by tighter controls and performance standards being introduced for HAs 
by funding bodies. The choice of PRP is in line with the emergence of performance 
measures in the sector because PRP sends a strong message to employees about the 
importance that their employer places on performance. HAs have tried to change 
their culture in order to adopt, mimic and maintain organisational legitimacy through 
an alignment with political concerns and a shift in business focus (Hofstede 1997). 
Cost control could be interpreted in the same way. Two of the HAs studied here 
explained that they had moved away from the NJC scales due to finding them 
unaffordable. Funding restrictions, a result of government reforms, has meant that 
HAs cannot afford local authority pay increases, and implementing PRP was seen as 
a way of taking control of the pay bill. This is further evidenced by the small pay 
increments offered to employees in the PRP awards. The PM organisations had, on 
average, an annual incremental increase of 3% for all employees, while the PRP 
organisations had annual pay increases between 1.25% and 5%, with only a very 
small percentage of employees receiving the top amount of 5%. NPOs are known for 
their budget constraints, and small pay awards are a consequence of that. However, 
under PRP, they are not required to make any extra payments on top of the basic 
award, which covers the cost of living. In addition, the amount of money in the PRP 
fund will vary annually, depending on funding, fundraising etc. In this way, the PRP 
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organisations are not tied to pay increments they are unable to afford, and are more 
in control of their wage bills. 
Benchmarking mechanisms were also identified in the interviews. Senior 
management and reward consultants suggested that benchmarking was common 
practice in the sector, and a relevant tool used to aid reward decisions in housing 
associations. PRP was said to be implemented in housing associations because it fits 
the type of organisation they would like to become, and because it matches the best 
practice being implemented elsewhere, regardless of the different operational 
environments involved. The results presented in Chapter 5 pointed to the powerful 
influence of mimetic and normative pressures in the introduction of PRP in HAs, 
while the consideration of the alignment of principal and agents’ interests did not 
appear to be a factor influencing the reward decisions in the organisations. 
8.2 Contributions to the Literature and to Practice 
Research examining performance in NPOs has mainly been carried out at the 
organisational level and has concentrated on the healthcare system (Gray 1999; 
Brown 2002; Chou 2002; Ballou 2005). At the employee level, most studies focus 
their attention on executive pay (Baber, Daniel et al. 2002; Gray and Benson 2003; 
Bender 2004). This thesis advances the previous work on NPOs by addressing the 
issue of motivation and performance for the average nonprofit worker. Moreover, 
this research contributes to the incentive literature and sheds light on how far 
incentives can be applied more generally in different operating environments. 
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Expectancy theory (Vroom 1964) is a common justification for the use of PRP, 
whereby motivation is determined by the employee’s belief in his capabilities, his 
perception of instrumentality between behaviour and outcome, and the value of this 
outcome for him. These conditions are, perhaps, more easily implemented in 
situations where rewards can be closely linked to performance, and where financial 
incentives are abundant. The nonprofit sector presents a different operating 
environment, where financial rewards are less abundant, and multiple goals, other 
than profit making, make it difficult to closely link pay to performance. This thesis 
proposes that the characteristics of the nonprofit sector indicate that expectancy 
theory conditions cannot be fully implemented in these types of organisations.  
In addition, expectancy and agency theories advocate that the employee is not able to 
internalise the employer’s goals, and that linking the employee’s pay to his 
performance at work is the only way that the interests of the employee and the 
employer can be aligned. The theories assume that the worker is a rational maximiser 
of personal utility, and applying PRP in the nonprofit sector relies on the assumption 
that nonprofit employees will, invariably, focus their efforts on extrinsic rewards. 
The study of HAs has allowed me to investigate these assumptions more closely 
within the nonprofit environment. Nonprofit employees ranked their reward 
preferences similarly in all four case organisations, and intrinsic rewards were ranked 
among the highest. The investigation of the larger sample of nonprofits using WERS 
also shed light on how the motivations of nonprofit and for-profit employees differ 
and, furthermore, on how PRP does not appear to contribute to positive attitudinal 
outcomes in the nonprofit sector. 
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Another important contribution of this study is the adoption of institutional theory as 
an alternative to explain the use of PRP in housing associations. The results of this 
research add to the general body of evidence about why organisations use PRP. The 
uncertainty and turbulence that constitute the operating environment of the HAs 
make the introduction of PRP more symbolic than instrumental. It is used to 
accommodate institutional pressures and signal to funding bodies a more business-
like attitude. This study of PRP in HAs supports a number of findings in the 
literature with respect to the influence of institutional pressures on reward decisions 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Bender 2004; Fernandez-Alles 2006). This research work suggests 
that the consideration of reward decisions in NPOs goes beyond the monitoring and 
control conceptualised in agency theory.  
Eventhough managers in the PRP organisations said that they implemented the new 
system to motivate their employees to perform better in the workplace, much of the 
drive behind the changes in pay can be explained by institutional pressures faced by 
these organisations. The evidence suggests that the new pay arrangements were 
clearly seen by PRP1 and PRP2 as sending important messages about the type of 
company they wanted to be. Managers were less concerned with any concrete 
evidence that PRP had enhanced motivation, and more concerned with the legitimacy 
that the pay system could bring to their organisation. This view is reinforced by the 
ineffectiveness of PRP as a motivator for employees.  
Evidence of institutional isomorphism was found in the interviews with managers 
and reward consultants. Market competition, restricted funding, normative pressures 
from HR members and consultants have led to the implementation of PRP in housing 
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associations. This exploration of why HAs introduced PRP provides additional 
insight into the existent body of work on pay systems.  
This thesis advances the literature by offering an important dimension in the study of 
motivation and performance in NPOs. It argues that mimetic, normative and coercive 
pressures lead to the choice of PRP in this sector, rather than the expectancy and 
agency theory considerations that make PRP a suitable pay system for nonprofits. 
Moreover, the combination of theories, incentive and institutional, has led to a more 
complete understanding of institutionally driven behaviour in HAs, and the 
consequences of the use of PRP in NPOs. This work also makes an empirical 
contribution by providing evidence on the practices and responses of housing 
associations regarding how they react to government reforms and market-based 
competition. The strength of the case study approach, based on real events, gives a 
direct insight into how pay decisions work in practice. 
This thesis also presents some implications for practice. The results may prompt 
managers in organisations to reflect more carefully on what is influencing their 
reward decisions, and point out that they need to be assessing the risks rather than 
conforming passively to ‘best practices’. Not only reward decisions, but also human 
resource practices more generally, need to be investigated closely so as to try to 
provide a good fit to the characteristics of NPOs and their employees. The results 
may also provide funding bodies and government officials with a better 
understanding of the impact of reforms and regulatory intervention on the operating 
environments of NPOs and their implications for human resource management in 
these organisations. 
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8.3 Limitations of this Thesis and Future Research 
Despite the interesting findings and attempts to abbreviate possible 
weaknesses, a number of limitations of this study must be acknowledged. The main 
limitation arises from the sampling of the organisations. Several NPOs were 
contacted at the end of 2007. Initially, seven came forward for a first meeting to 
discuss the research aims and potential implications for the participating 
organisations. Three organisations, due to time constraints, and one that was going 
through a process of organisational change at the time, declined the invitation to 
participate in the study. The other four organisations agreed to take part in the study 
after the initial meeting. It is clear that this is not a random sample of organisations, 
and we should translate these findings to other nonprofits with care. However, I 
chose them because they provided a suitable context for the key investigation of this 
thesis, into how PRP functions in NPOs.  
Additionally, extending the investigation to a larger sample of nonprofits, provided 
by the WERS 2004 database, allowed me to explore whether the answers found in 
my cases were also consistent with the answers found in other NPOs. The results 
from the WERS made it possible to address, at least to a certain extent, the sampling 
issue and questions of generalisation. Another important point that deserves 
consideration is that, if PRP fails to motivate employees in housing associations, a 
type of organisation that has become more professionalised and performance-driven 
due to government reforms, it is unlikely that it will succeed in other types of 
nonprofits that are perhaps less performance-driven than HAs.  
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Another limitation of this quantitative research is the use of self-report 
questionnaires. Spector (1994) suggests that these can lead to contamination effects, 
as employees respond to items with potential biases, such as trying to portray a 
different image from the reality. To try to address the problem, this research 
promised complete anonymity in order to combat issues of social desirability. The 
second research question, the investigation of why NPOs use PRP for their 
employees, leads to another limitation of the study. Other authors (Miles and 
Huberman 1994) have suggested that, in qualitative research, one should try to 
increase the sample size in order to try to identify a greater variety of similarities 
and/or differences across the sample. In this thesis, four interviews with 
management, two in each PRP organisation, were carried out. In addition to those, 
four reward consultants with experience in the nonprofit sector were interviewed to 
provide a complementary perspective to the answers offered by the senior managers 
of the HAs. Other reward consultants were approached and invited to take part in the 
study but were not available for interview. The important fact here is that, although 
the choice of consultants was intended to be purposeful and provide a 
complementary perspective to the answers of the managers, there might be some 
element of bias in the findings due to the self-selecting nature of participation in the 
study. The question of whether or not these results can be replicated in other NPOs is 
an avenue for future research. 
The institutional change that is part of the new governance structure shows 
significant challenges, such as cuts to public funding and many NPOs struggling to 
keep services open. This new context provides a compelling argument for further 
research in NPOs, to deepen our understanding of how these organisations are 
establishing human resource practices to deal with this time of austerity. Further 
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studies including other types of NPOs may also help us to learn about how other 
nonprofits cope with market competition. Studies on how NPOs are able to balance 
their structure of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards could also further the literature on 
incentives, and to achieve that, a wider sample of nonprofits, and perhaps the 
inclusion of a comparative sample of for-profit organisations, may be necessary. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Survey Questionnaires 
Reward System at PRP1 
Thank you very much for your help answering this survey. The questionnaire should take no 
longer than 15 minutes to fill in. Please send the completed questionnaire as soon as 
possible.  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
1. I would like to start by asking you why did you take your current job? (Please 
choose all that apply).  
It pays well compared with similar jobs. 
It was an opportunity to contribute to an important cause. 
It was the first job that came along at that time. 
It was convenient for personal reasons. 
It was a career opportunity within the sector. 
Other 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
2. Which of the following statements best describes how you think of your current job 
at PRP1? (Please choose one).  
A long term job I would like to stay in.=1 
An opportunity for career advancement within PRP1.=2 
Part of a career or profession that will probably take me to different organisations.=3 
A job I will eventually leave because is not part of my career.=4 
I don't know.=5 
Other=6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
3. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
To me, before anything, good citizens should think of society. 
Serving the community interest is an important drive in my daily life. 
I voluntary contribute to my community. 
To me, helping people who are in trouble is very important. 
I rarely think about the welfare of other people whom I do not know personally. 
Without solidarity our society is certain to fall apart. 
Fighting poverty is an important duty of the homelessness sector. 
To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. 
Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. 
I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of society. 
I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it. 
Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. 
Everybody is entitled to a good service, even if it costs a lot of money to provide it. 
It is important that nonprofit organisations account for all the costs they make. 
Efficient management is essential for nonprofit organisations. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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4. People have different personal preferences about rewards that motivate them to do 
their best work. Please rank the following rewards from 1 to 9 in order of how 
important they are to you with "1" being the most important and "9" being the least 
important to you.  
Higher pay than you have now. 
Doing work that is helpful to other people. 
Recognition from your organisation (awards, praise etc). 
Job security. 
Career progression. 
A good feeling about yourself as a result of your work. 
Making decisions and exerting an important influence on your organisation. 
Training and development of your abilities and skills at work. 
Having autonomy at my job. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
5. Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following aspects of 
your own job at PRP1?  
What you earn. 
Doing work that helps other people. 
The recognition you get from PRP1 (awards, praise etc). 
Your job security. 
Your career prospects at PRP1. 
A good feeling about yourself as a result of your work. 
Making decisions and exerting an important influence on PRP1. 
Training and development of your abilities and skills at work. 
The autonomy you have at your job. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
6. I would now like to ask you some questions about the reward system at PRP1. 
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
I am paid adequately for my responsibilities and experience. 
In comparison with people in similar jobs in other charities, I feel my pay is reasonable. 
In comparison with people in similar positions at PRP1, I feel my pay is reasonable. 
The current pay system has a positive effect on employee productivity. 
I am satisfied with the benefits provided by PRP1. 
The benefits package that I receive is not as good as most available in the nonprofit sector. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
7. Do you intend to leave PRP1 in the next 12 months?  
Yes=1 
No=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
8. I would now like to ask you about the Performance-related Pay at PRP1. Please tell 
me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
The principle of relating employees' pay to performance in nonprofit organisations is a good 
one. 
The idea of Performance-related Pay is fundamentally unfair. 
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Communications between staff and management have been improved as a result of 
Performance-related Pay. 
The trouble with Performance-related Pay is that a good appraisal by the line manager is 
often overruled by someone higher up. 
People get a good appraisal mark not so much because of their performance but because 
managers want to reward their favorites. 
Staff are denied the appraisal mark they deserve because there is not enough money to pay 
a high award to everyone. 
Performance-related Pay has made managers set work targets more clearly. 
Performance-related Pay has meant that good work is at last recognized and rewarded. 
Performance-related Pay has helped to undermine staff morale. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
9. I would like to know how the existence of Performance-related Pay affects you 
personally. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:  
The existance of Performance-related Pay (PRP) gives me an incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of my job. 
PRP reduces my wish to cooperate with management. 
The system of PRP makes me want to show more initiative in my job. 
The existance of PRP encourages me to give sustained high performance at work. 
PRP gives me a greater incentive to get my work priorities right. 
The PRP system has no effect on the quality of my work because my work is already at the 
appropriate standard. 
PRP gives me an incentive to express myself at work with greater clarity. 
PRP gives me an incentive to be more effective in my dealings with clients (the homeless). 
PRP has made me willing to work harder. 
PRP has significantly raised my motivation at work. 
PRP has made me willing to improve the quality of my work. 
PRP has made me willing to increase the quantity of work I do. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
10. I would like to ask you about the link between pay and the Performance 
Development Review. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:  
Linking Pay with the Performance Development Review results in a fairer allocation of pay. 
The link undermines my confidence in the Performance Development Review. 
The link makes me take the Performance Development Review more seriously. 
The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work done in homeless norprofit 
organisations to individual performance. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
11. I would now like to ask you about your most recent Performance Development 
Review. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
The meeting with my line manager helped to establish specific objectives for the coming 
year. 
The objectives set were clear and measurable. 
The objectives focused on issues which I have direct control over. 
The meeting helped to relate my objectives to wider objectives at PRP1. 
The meeting provided a good opportunity to discuss my development needs. 
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I am in a position to achieve the objectives set to me. 
I understand how the objectives will be monitored and reviewed. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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12. I would now like to ask you about your most recent Performance Development 
Review related to your annual appraisal result. Please tell me whether you agree or 
disagree with the following statements:  
I am satisfied with my most recent appraisal result. 
My most recent Performance Review was a fair reflection of my performance. 
I understand why I was given my most recent appraisal result. 
Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt I will receive an Excelled (E). 
The amount of money an individual gets from a Performance-related Pay award should be 
substantially increased. 
My line manager knows enough about my work to assess my performance accurately. 
I have trust in the effectiveness of the Performance Development Review at PRP1. 
The Performance Review is only a matter of ticking boxes. 
The Performance Review helps to identify low performers and deals with the problem 
effectively. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
13. Are you an appraiser? (If you appraise staff).  
Yes=1 
No=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
14. I would now like to ask you about the impact of Performance-related Pay on your 
staff. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
The existance of Performance-related Pay has made many of the staff to work beyond the 
requirements of their job. 
PRP has contributed to many staff giving sustained high performance at work. 
PRP has contributed to increase the quality of work of many of the staff. 
PRP has contributed to increase the quantity of the work of many staff. 
PRP has contributed to staff to get their work priorities right. 
PRP has made many of the staff more committed to their work. 
PRP has reduced autonomy and participation of employees. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
15. I would like to ask you how was your performance assessed in your most recent 
Performance Development Review. Please choose one of the following options:  
Excelled (E) = 7 
Highly Effective (H)  =  6 
Achieving Well (A) = 5 
Meeting Objectives (M) = 4 
Variable (V) = 3 
Under Performing (U) = 2 
Not Proven (N) = 1 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
16. I would like to ask you what would you have given to yourself in your most recent 
Performance Review. Please choose one of the following options:  
Excelled (E) = 7 
Highly Effective (H) =6 
Achieving Well (A) =5 
Meeting Objectives (M) =4 
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Variable (V) =3 
Under Performing (U) =2 
Not Proven (N) =1 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
17. I would now like to ask you about the training and development at PRP1. Please 
tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I receive the training and development I need to perform my job well. 
I am satisfied with the training and development I receive at PRP1. 
I have the opportunity to discuss with my manager the training and development I need to 
improve my performance. 
I have the opportunity to discuss with my manager the training and development I need to 
progress on my career at PRP1. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
18. I would now like to ask you about your general feelings towards PRP1. Please tell 
me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I would be happy to spend the rest of my career at PRP1. 
I feel as if PRP1's problems are my own. 
I feel "part of the family" at PRP1. 
Being at PRP1 means a great deal to me. 
I feel as if my project's problems are my own. 
I feel "part of the family" at my Project. 
One of the major reasons I continue to work for PRP1 is that leaving now would require 
considerable personal sacrifice; another organisation may not match the overall rewards I 
have here. 
Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel it would be right to leave PRP1 now. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
19. Finally, I would like to ask you some personal information. I stress again that it will 
be treated as strictly confidential.  
 
Are you Male or Female?  
Male.=1 
Female.=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
20. Are you a manager?  
Yes.=1 
No.=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
21. Where do you work?  
Housing and care West. = 1 
Housing and care Central. = 2 
Housing and care East. = 3 
Homelessness and Tenancy Sustainment. = 4 
Central Support functions (including Maintenance, Business Development, HR, Strategy and 
Performance, Finance, IT, Office services). = 5 
Housing Management. = 6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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22. Are you:  
Full-time staff. =1 
Part-time staff. = 2 
Temporary staff. = 3 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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23. How old are you?  
Under 20 = 1 
20-29 =2  
30-39 =3  
40-49 =4  
50-59=5 
60 or more=6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
24. How long have you been working for PRP1?  
Less than 1 year. = 1 
1 to less than 2 years. =2 
2 to less than 5 years. =3 
5 to less than 10 years. =4 
10 years or more. =5 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
25. What is your current annual salary?  
£16,121 - £18,720  =1 
£18,721 - £22,360 =2 
£22,361 - £28,080=3 
£28,081 - £35,360=4 
£35,361 - £45,240=5 
£45,241 - or more=6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
26. What is your highest qualification?  
Certificate = 1 
BA/BSc = 2 
MA/MSc/MBA = 3 
PhD = 4 
No academic qualification = 5 
Other = 6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
27. Where was your previous job?  
Charity/Nonprofit sector. = 1 
Private sector. =2 
Public sector.=3 
Self-employed.=4 
This is my first job.=5 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
28. Are you a member of a trade union?  
Yes=1 
No=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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29. I f you have any additional comments about the reward system at PRP1, or any 
other issue you consider to be important to this survey, please add them here. Your 
comments are of great value for this study. Thank you.  
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Reward System at PRP2 
Thank you very much for your help answering this survey. The questionnaire should take no 
longer than 12 minutes to fill in. Please send the completed questionnaire as soon as 
possible.  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
1. I would like to start by asking you why did you take your current job? (Please 
choose all that apply).  
It pays well compared with similar jobs. 
It was an opportunity to contribute to an important cause. 
It was the first job that came along at that time. 
It was convenient for personal reasons. 
It was a career opportunity within the sector. 
Other 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
2. Which of the following statements best describes how you think of your current job 
at PRP2? (Please choose one).  
A long term job I would like to stay in. 
An opportunity for career advancement within PRP2. 
Part of a career or profession that will probably take me to different organisations. 
A job I will eventually leave because is not part of my career. 
I don't know. 
Other 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
3. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
To me, before anything, good citizens should think of society. 
Serving the community interest is an important drive in my daily life. 
I voluntary contribute to my community. 
To me, helping people who are in trouble is very important. 
I rarely think about the welfare of other people whom I do not know personally. 
Without solidarity our society is certain to fall apart. 
Fighting poverty is an important duty of the homelessness sector. 
To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. 
Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. 
I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of society. 
I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it. 
Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. 
Everybody is entitled to a good service, even if it costs a lot of money to provide it. 
It is important that nonprofit organisations account for all the money they receive. 
Efficient management is essential for nonprofit organisations. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
4. People have different personal preferences about rewards that motivate them to do 
their best work. Please rank the following rewards from 1 to 9 in order of how 
important they are to you with "1" being the most important and "9" being the least 
important to you. Please use all numbers between 1 and 9 only once each.  
Higher pay than you have now. 
Doing work that is helpful to other people. 
256 
 
 
Recognition from your organisation (awards, praise etc). 
Job security. 
Career progression. 
A good feeling about yourself as a result of your work. 
Making decisions and exerting an important influence on your organisation. 
Training and development of your abilities and skills at work. 
Having autonomy at my job. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
5. Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following aspects of 
your own job at PRP2?  
What you earn. 
Doing work that helps other people. 
The recognition you get from PRP2 (awards, praise etc). 
Your job security. 
Your career prospects at PRP2. 
A good feeling about yourself as a result of your work. 
Making decisions and exerting an important influence on PRP2. 
Training and development of your abilities and skills at work. 
The autonomy you have at your job. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
6. I would now like to ask you some questions about the reward system at PRP2. 
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
I am paid adequately for my responsibilities and experience. 
In comparison with people in similar jobs in other charities, I feel my pay is reasonable. 
In comparison with people in similar positions at PRP2, I feel my pay is reasonable. 
The current pay system has a positive effect on employee productivity. 
I am satisfied with the benefits provided by PRP2. 
The benefits package that I receive is not as good as most available in the nonprofit sector. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
7. Do you intend to leave PRP2 in the next 12 months?  
Yes 
No 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
8. I would now like to ask you about the Performance-related Pay system at PRP2. 
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
The principle of relating employees' pay to performance in nonprofit organisations is a good 
one. 
The idea of Performance-related Pay is fundamentally unfair. 
Communications between staff and management improved as a result of Performance-
related Pay. 
The trouble with Performance-related Pay is that a good appraisal by the line manager is 
often overruled by someone higher up. 
People get a good appraisal mark not so much because of their performance but because 
managers want to reward their favorites. 
Staff are denied the appraisal mark they deserve because there is not enough money to pay 
a high award to everyone. 
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Performance-related Pay makes managers set work targets more clearly. 
Performance-related Pay means that good work is at last recognized and rewarded. 
Performance-related Pay helps to undermine staff morale. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
9. I would like to know how the existence of Performance-related Pay affects you 
personally. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:  
The existance of Performance-related Pay (PRP) gives me an incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of my job. 
PRP reduces my wish to cooperate with management. 
The system of PRP makes me want to show more initiative in my job. 
The existance of PRP encourages me to give sustained high performance at work. 
PRP gives me a greater incentive to get my work priorities right. 
The PRP system has no effect on the quality of my work because my work is already at the 
appropriate standard. 
PRP gives me an incentive to express myself at work with greater clarity. 
PRP gives me an incentive to be more effective in my dealings with clients (the homeless). 
PRP makes me willing to work harder. 
PRP significantly raises my motivation at work. 
PRP makes me willing to improve the quality of my work. 
PRP makes me willing to increase the quantity of work I do. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
10. I would like to ask you about the link between pay and the Performance Appraisal. 
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
Linking Pay with the Performance Appraisal results is a fairer allocation of pay. 
The link undermines my confidence in the Performance Appraisal. 
The link makes me take the Performance Appraisal more seriously. 
The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work done in homeless norprofit 
organisations to individual performance. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
11. I would now like to ask you about your most recent Performance Appraisal 
meeting. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
The meeting with my line manager helped to establish specific objectives for the coming 
year. 
The objectives set were clear and measurable. 
The objectives focused on issues which I have direct control over. 
The meeting helped to relate my objectives to wider objectives at PRP2. 
The meeting provided a good opportunity to discuss my development needs. 
I am in a position to achieve the objectives set to me. 
I understand how the objectives will be monitored and reviewed. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
12. I would now like to ask you about your most recent Performance Appraisal result. 
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I am satisfied with my most recent Performance Appraisal result. 
My most recent Performance Appraisal grade was a fair reflection of my performance. 
I understand why I was given my most recent Performance Appraisal grade. 
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Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt I will receive an Outstanding (Grade 1) or 
Highly Effective (Grade 2). 
The amount of money an individual gets from a Performance-related Pay award should be 
substantially increased. 
My line manager knows enough about my work to assess my performance accurately. 
I have trust in the effectiveness of the Performance Appraisal System at PRP2. 
The Performance Appraisal is only a matter of ticking boxes. 
The Performance Appraisal at PRP2 helps to identify low performers and deals with the 
problem effectively. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
13. Are you an appraiser? (If you appraise staff).  
Yes 
No 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
14. I would now like to ask you about the impact of Performance-related Pay on your 
staff. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
The existance of Performance-related Pay (PRP) makes many of the staff to work beyond 
the requirements of their job. 
PRP contributes to many staff giving sustained high performance at work. 
PRP contributes to increase the quality of work of many of the staff. 
PRP contributes to increase the quantity of the work of many staff. 
PRP contributes to staff to get their work priorities right. 
PRP makes many of the staff more committed to their work. 
PRP reduces autonomy and participation of employees. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
15. I would like to ask you how was your performance assessed in your most recent 
Performance Appraisal. Please choose one of the following options:  
Outstanding (1) 
Highly Effective (2) 
Effective (3) 
Development Needs (4) 
Significant Shortfall (5) 
Not Proven (6) 
I have not been assessed yet. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
16. I would like to ask you what would you have given to yourself in your most recent 
Performance Appraisal. Please choose one of the following options:  
Outstanding (1) 
Highly Effective (2) 
Effective (3) 
Development Needs (4) 
Significant Shortfall (5) 
Not Proven (6) 
I have not been assessed yet. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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17. I would now like to ask you about the training and development at PRP2. Please 
tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I receive the training and development I need to perform my job well. 
I am satisfied with the training and development I receive at PRP2. 
I have the opportunity to discuss with my manager the training and development I need to 
improve my performance. 
I have the opportunity to discuss with my manager the training and development I need to 
progress on my career at PRP2. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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18. I would now like to ask you about your general feelings towards PRP2. Please tell 
me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I would be happy to spend the rest of my career at PRP2. 
I feel as if PRP2's problems are my own. 
I feel "part of the family" at PRP2. 
Being at PRP2 means a great deal to me. 
I feel as if my project's problems are my own. 
I feel "part of the family" at my Project. 
One of the major reasons I continue to work for PRP2 is that leaving now would require 
considerable personal sacrifice; another organisation may not match the overall rewards I 
have here. 
Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel it would be right to leave PRP2 now. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
19. Finally, I would like to ask you some personal information. I stress again that it will 
be treated as strictly confidential.  
 
Are you Male or Female?  
Male. 
Female. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
20. Are you a manager?  
Yes. 
No. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
21. Where do you work?  
Central House 
CP Partnering 
Services 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
22. Are you:  
Full-time staff. 
Part-time staff. 
Temporary staff. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
23. How old are you?  
Under 20 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60 or more 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
24. How long have you been working for PRP2?  
Less than 1 year. 
1 to less than 2 years. 
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2 to less than 5 years. 
5 to less than 10 years. 
10 years or more. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
25. What is your current annual salary?  
£16,121 - £18,720 
£18,721 - £22,360 
£22,361 - £28,080 
£28,081 - £35,360 
£35,361 - £45,240 
£45,241 - or more 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
26. What is your highest qualification?  
Certificate 
BA/BSc 
MA/MSc/MBA 
PhD 
No academic qualification 
Other 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
27. Where was your previous job?  
Charity/Nonprofit sector. 
Private sector. 
Public sector. 
Self-employed. 
This is my first job. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
28. Are you a member of a trade union?  
Yes 
No 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
29. I f you have any additional comments about the reward system at PRP2, or any 
other issue you consider to be important to this survey, please add them here. Your 
comments are of great value for this study. Thank you.  
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Reward System at PM1 
Thank you for your help answering this survey. The questionnaire should take no longer than 
15 minutes to fill in. Please send the completed questionnaire as soon as possible.  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
1. I would like to start by asking you why did you take your current job? (Please 
choose all that apply).  
a) It pays well compared with similar jobs. 
b) It was an opportunity to contribute to an important cause. 
c) It was the first job that came along at that time. 
d) It was convenient for personal reasons. 
e) It was a career opportunity within the sector. 
f) Other 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
2. Which of the following statements best describes how you think of your current job 
at PM1? (Please choose one).  
A long term job I would like to stay in. 
An opportunity for career advancement within PM1. 
Part of a career or profession that will probably take me to different organisations. 
A job I will eventually leave because is not part of my career. 
I don't know. 
Other 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
3. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
a) To me, before anything, good citizens should think of society. 
b) Serving the community interest is an important drive in my daily life. 
c) I voluntary contribute to my community. 
d) To me, helping people who are in trouble is very important. 
e) I rarely think about the welfare of other people whom I do not know personally. 
f) Without solidarity our society is certain to fall apart. 
g) Fighting poverty is an important duty of the homelessness sector. 
h) To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. 
i) Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. 
j) I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of society. 
k) I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it. 
l) Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. 
m) Everybody is entitled to a good service, even if it costs a lot of money to provide it. 
n) It is important that charities account for all the costs they make. 
o) Efficient management is essential for charitable organisations. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
4. People have different personal preferences about rewards that motivate them to do 
their best work. Please rank the following rewards from 1 to 9 in order of how 
important they are to you with "1" being the most important and "9" being the least 
important to you.  
a) Higher pay than you have now. 
b) Doing work that is helpful to other people. 
c) Recognition from your organisation (awards, praise etc). 
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d) Job security. 
e) Career progression. 
f) A good feeling about yourself as a result of your work. 
g) Making decisions and exerting an important influence on your organisation. 
h) Training and development of your abilities and skills at work. 
i) Having autonomy at my job. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
5. Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following aspects of 
your own job at PM1?  
What you earn. 
Doing work that helps other people. 
The recognition you get from PM1 (awards, praise etc). 
Your job security. 
Your career prospects at PM1. 
A good feeling about yourself as a result of your work. 
Making decisions and exerting an important influence on PM1. 
Training and development of your abilities and skills at work. 
The autonomy you have at your job. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
6. I would now like to ask you some questions about the reward system at PM1. 
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
I am paid adequately for my responsibilities and experience. 
In comparison with people in similar jobs in other charities, I feel my pay is reasonable. 
In comparison with people in similar positions at PM1, I feel my pay is reasonable. 
The current pay system has a positive effect on employee productivity. 
I am satisfied with the benefits provided by PM1. 
The benefits package that I receive is not as good as most available in the charity sector. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
7. Are you already on the top of your pay scale? (if you do not receive anymore 
annual incremental increases).  
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
8. Do you intend to leave PM1 in the next 12 months?  
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
9. I would like to know how the existence of Performance Management (annual 
appraisal, supervision etc) affects you personally. Please tell me whether you agree or 
disagree with the following statements:  
The existance of Performance Management gives me an incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of my job. 
Performance Management reduces my wish to cooperate with management. 
The system of Performance Management makes me want to show more initiative in my job. 
The existance of Performance Management encourages me to give sustained high 
performance at work. 
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Performance Management gives me a greater incentive to get my work priorities right. 
The Performance Management system has no effect on the quality of my work because my 
work is already at the appropriate standard. 
Performance Management gives me an incentive to express myself at work with greater 
clarity. 
Performance Management gives me an incentive to be more effective in my dealings with 
clients (the homeless). 
Performance Management makes me willing to work harder. 
Performance Management at PM1 is only a matter of ticking boxes. 
Performance Management reduces my autonomy and participation in my work environment. 
Performance Management contributes to increase my motivation at work. 
Performance Management makes me willing to improve the quality of my work. 
Performance Management makes me willing to increase the quantity of work I do. 
Performance Management at PM1 identifies low performers and deals with the problem 
effectively. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
10. I would like to ask you about your most recent Annual Appraisal at PM1. Please 
tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
The meeting with my line manager helped to establish specific objectives for the coming 
year. 
The objectives set were clear and measurable. 
The objectives focused on issues which I have direct control over. 
The meeting helped to relate my objectives to wider objectives at PM1. 
The meeting provided a good opportunity to discuss my development needs. 
I am in a position to achieve the objectives set to me. 
I understand how the objectives will be monitored and reviewed. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
11. I would now like to ask you about your most recent annual appraisal results. 
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I am satisfied with my last appraisal result. 
My most recent annual appraisal was a fair reflection of my performance. 
I understand why I was given my most recent appraisal result. 
Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt I will receive a 4 or 5 (Exceeds 
expectations/Outstanding). 
My line manager knows enough about my work to assess my performance accurately. 
I have trust in the effectiveness of the annual appraisal system. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
12. Are you an appraiser? (If you appraise staff).  
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
13. I would now like to ask you about the impact of Performance Management (annual 
appraisal, supervision etc) on your staff. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
The existance of Performance Management (PM) causes many of the staff to work beyond 
the requirements of their job. 
PM contributes to many staff giving sustained high performance at work. 
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PM contributes to increase the quality of work of many of the staff. 
PM contributes to an increase in the quantity of work many staff do. 
PM contributes to staff to get their work priorities right. 
PM makes many of the staff more committed to their work. 
PM reduces autonomy and participation of employees. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
14. I would now like to ask you about the training and development at PM1. Please tell 
me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I receive the training and development I need to perform my job well. 
I am satisfied with the training and development I receive at PM1. 
I have the opportunity to discuss with my manager the training and development I need to 
improve my performance. 
I have the opportunity to discuss with my manager the training and development I need to 
progress on my career at PM1. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
15. I would now like to ask you about your general feelings towards PM1. Please tell 
me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I would be happy to spend the rest of my career at PM1. 
I feel as if PM1's problems are my own. 
I feel "part of the family" at PM1. 
Being at PM1 means a great deal to me. 
I feel as if my project's problems are my own. 
I feel "part of the family" at my Project. 
One of the major reasons I continue to work for PM1 is that leaving now would require 
considerable personal sacrifice; another organisation may not match the overall rewards I 
have here. 
Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel it would be right to leave PM1 now. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
16. Finally, I would like to ask you some personal information. I stress again that it will 
be treated as strictly confidential.  
 
Are you Male or Female?  
Male. = 1 
Female. = 0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
17. Are you a manager?  
Yes. = 1 
No. = 0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
18. Where do you work?  
Central services.=1 
Services delivery.=2 
Matrix services.=3 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
19. Are you:  
Full-time staff.=1 
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Part-time staff.=2 
Temporary staff.=3 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
20. How old are you?  
Under 20=1 
20-29=2 
30-39=3 
40-49=4 
50-59=5 
60 or more=6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
21. How long have you been working for PM1?  
Less than 1 year.=1 
1 to less than 2 years.=2 
2 to less than 5 years.=3 
5 to less than 10 years.=4 
10 years or more.=5 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
22. What is your current annual salary?  
£16,121 - £18,720=1 
£18,721 - £22,360=2 
£22,361 - £28,080=3 
£28,081 - £35,360=4 
£35,361 - £45,240=5 
£45,241 - or more=6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
23. What is your highest qualification?  
Certificate=1 
BA/BSc=2 
MA/MSc/MBA=3 
PhD=4 
No academic qualification=5 
Other=6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
24. Where was your previous job?  
Charity/Nonprofit sector.=1 
Private sector.=2 
Public sector.=3 
Self-employed.=4 
This is my first job.=5 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
25. Are you a member of a trade union?  
Yes=1 
No=0 
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
26. I f you have any additional comments about the reward system at PM1, or any 
other issue you consider to be important to this survey, please add them here. Your 
comments are of great value for this study. Thank you.  
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Reward System at PM2 
Thank you for your help answering this survey. The questionnaire should take no longer than 
12 minutes to fill in. Please send the completed questionnaire as soon as possible.  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
1. I would like to start by asking you why did you take your current job? (Please 
choose all that apply).  
It pays well compared with similar jobs. 
It was an opportunity to contribute to an important cause. 
It was the first job that came along at that time. 
It was convenient for personal reasons. 
It was a career opportunity within the sector. 
Other 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
2. Which of the following statements best describes how you think of your current job 
at PM2? (Please choose one).  
A long term job I would like to stay in.=1 
An opportunity for career advancement within PM2=2 
Part of a career or profession that will probably take me to different organisations.=3 
A job I will eventually leave because is not part of my career.=4 
I don't know.=5 
Other=6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
3. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
To me, before anything, good citizens should think of society. 
Serving the community interest is an important drive in my daily life. 
I voluntary contribute to my community. 
To me, helping people who are in trouble is very important. 
I rarely think about the welfare of other people whom I do not know personally. 
Without solidarity our society is certain to fall apart. 
Fighting poverty is an important duty of the homelessness sector. 
To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. 
Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. 
I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of society. 
I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it. 
Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. 
Everybody is entitled to a good service, even if it costs a lot of money to provide it. 
It is important that charities account for all the money they receive. 
Efficient management is essential for charitable organisations. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
4. People have different personal preferences about rewards that motivate them to do 
their best work. Please rank the following rewards from 1 to 9 in order of how 
important they are to you with "1" being the most important and "9" being the least 
important to you. Please use all numbers from 1 to 9 only once each.  
Higher pay than you have now. 
Doing work that is helpful to other people. 
Recognition from your organisation (awards, praise etc). 
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Job security. 
Career progression. 
A good feeling about yourself as a result of your work. 
Making decisions and exerting an important influence on your organisation. 
Training and development of your abilities and skills at work. 
Having autonomy at my job. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
5. Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the following aspects of 
your own job at PM2?  
What you earn. 
Doing work that helps other people. 
The recognition you get from PM2 (awards, praise etc). 
Your job security. 
Your career prospects at PM2. 
A good feeling about yourself as a result of your work. 
Making decisions and exerting an important influence on PM2. 
Training and development of your abilities and skills at work. 
The autonomy you have at your job. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
6. I would now like to ask you some questions about the reward system at PM2. 
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
I am paid adequately for my responsibilities and experience. 
In comparison with people in similar jobs in other charities, I feel my pay is reasonable. 
In comparison with people in similar positions at PM2, I feel my pay is reasonable. 
The current pay system has a positive effect on employee productivity. 
I am satisfied with the benefits provided by PM2. 
The benefits package that I receive is not as good as most available in the charity sector. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
7. Are you already on the top of your pay scale? (if you do not receive anymore 
annual incremental increases).  
Yes=1 
No=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
8. Do you intend to leave PM2 in the next 12 months?  
Yes=1 
No=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
9. I would like to know how the existence of Performance Management (annual 
appraisal, supervision, monthly managerial meetings etc) affects you personally. 
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
The existance of Performance Management gives me an incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of my job. 
Performance Management reduces my wish to cooperate with management. 
The system of Performance Management makes me want to show more initiative in my job. 
The existance of Performance Management encourages me to give sustained high 
performance at work. 
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Performance Management gives me a greater incentive to get my work priorities right. 
The Performance Management system has no effect on the quality of my work because my 
work is already at the appropriate standard. 
Performance Management gives me an incentive to express myself at work with greater 
clarity. 
Performance Management gives me an incentive to be more effective in my dealings with 
clients (the homeless). 
Performance Management makes me willing to work harder. 
Performance Management at PM2 is only a matter of ticking boxes. 
Performance Management reduces my autonomy and participation in my work environment. 
Performance Management contributes to increase my motivation at work. 
Performance Management makes me willing to improve the quality of my work. 
Performance Management makes me willing to increase the quantity of work I do. 
Performance Management at PM2 identifies low performers and deals with the problem 
effectively. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
10. I would like to ask you about your most recent Annual Appraisal at PM2. Please 
tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
The meeting with my line manager helped to establish specific objectives for the coming 
year. 
The objectives set were clear and measurable. 
The objectives focused on issues which I have direct control over. 
The meeting helped to relate my objectives to wider objectives at PM2. 
The meeting provided a good opportunity to discuss my development needs. 
I am in a position to achieve the objectives set to me. 
I understand how the objectives will be monitored and reviewed. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
11. I would now like to ask you about your most recent annual appraisal results. 
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I am satisfied with my last appraisal result. 
My most recent annual appraisal was a fair reflection of my performance. 
I understand why I was given my most recent appraisal result. 
Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt I will receive a 1 or 2 (Exceeded or 
achieved). 
My line manager knows enough about my work to assess my performance accurately. 
I have trust in the effectiveness of the annual appraisal system. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
12. I would like to ask you how was your performance assessed in your most recent 
Annual Appraisal. Please choose one:  
Exceeded=4 
Achieved=3 
Below=2 
Not acceptable=1 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
13. I would now like to ask you what would you have given to yourself in your most 
recent Annual Appraisal. Please choose one:  
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Exceeded=4 
Achieved=3 
Below=2 
Not acceptable=1 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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14. Are you an appraiser? (If you appraise staff).  
Yes=1 
No=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
15. I would now like to ask you about the impact of Performance Management (annual 
appraisal, supervision, monthly managerial meetings etc) on your staff. Please tell me 
whether you agree or disagree with the following statements (respond only if you 
appraise staff):  
The existance of Performance Management (PM) causes many of the staff to work beyond 
the requirements of their job. 
PM contributes to many staff giving sustained high performance at work. 
PM contributes to increase the quality of work of many of the staff. 
PM contributes to an increase in the quantity of work many staff do. 
PM contributes to staff to get their work priorities right. 
PM makes many of the staff more committed to their work. 
PM reduces autonomy and participation of employees. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
16. I would now like to ask you about the training and development at PM2. Please tell 
me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I receive the training and development I need to perform my job well. 
I am satisfied with the training and development I receive at PM2. 
I have the opportunity to discuss with my manager the training and development I need to 
improve my performance. 
I have the opportunity to discuss with my manager the training and development I need to 
progress on my career at PM2. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
17. I would now like to ask you about your general feelings towards PM2. Please tell 
me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
I would be happy to spend the rest of my career at PM2. 
I feel as if PM2's problems are my own. 
I feel "part of the family" at PM2. 
Being at PM2 means a great deal to me. 
I feel as if my project's problems are my own. 
I feel "part of the family" at my Project. 
One of the major reasons I continue to work for PM2 is that leaving now would require 
considerable personal sacrifice; another organisation may not match the overall rewards I 
have here. 
Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel it would be right to leave PM2 now. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
18. Finally, I would like to ask you some personal information. I stress again that it will 
be treated as strictly confidential.  
 
Are you Male or Female?  
Male.=1 
Female.=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
19. Are you a manager?  
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Yes.=1 
No.=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
20. Where do you work?  
Central services.=1 
Operational services.=2 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
21. Are you:  
Full-time staff.=1 
Part-time staff.=2 
Temporary staff.=3 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
22. How old are you?  
Under 20=1 
20-29=2 
30-39=3 
40-49=4 
50-59=5 
60 or more=6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
23. How long have you been working for PM2?  
Less than 1 year.=1 
1 to less than 2 years.=2 
2 to less than 5 years.=3 
5 to less than 10 years.=4 
10 years or more.=5 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
24. What is your current annual salary?  
£16,121 - £18,720=1 
£18,721 - £22,360=2 
£22,361 - £28,080=3 
£28,081 - £35,360=4 
£35,361 - £45,240=5 
£45,241 - or more=6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
25. What is your highest qualification?  
Certificate=1 
BA/BSc=2 
MA/MSc/MBA=3 
PhD=4 
No academic qualification=5 
Other=6 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
26. Where was your previous job?  
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Charity/Nonprofit sector.=1 
Private sector.=2 
Public sector.=3 
Self-employed.=4 
This is my first job.=5 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
27. Are you a member of a trade union?  
Yes=1 
No=0 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
28. I f you have any additional comments about the reward system at PM2, or any 
other issue you consider to be important to this survey, please add them here. Your 
comments are of great value for this study. Thank you.  
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Cover Letter to Managers 
Date, Year 
Dear  (name of manager), 
I am doing a PhD at the LSE and I am writing to ask your help in a study of reward systems 
in charities in the UK. I have contacted four organisations in the homeless sector, (names of 
organisations), to take part in the study. Your organisation has been very kind in supporting 
my research work and (name of HR Director) has provided me with your contact details. 
This research gives an opportunity to charity employees to discuss reward/payment systems 
in the sector and will influence future research in this field. 
Within the next few days all employees at (Organisation name) will receive an email with a 
link to an online survey which they can complete and send it to me at the LSE.  I would like 
to ask for your help in distributing the cover letters in this pack to all your employees and to 
encourage them to complete the online survey. I kindly ask you to distribute the letters 
before the end of this week, as the survey will be running from the week commencing 17 
September. The cover letter explains the aims of this research and asks for their 
contributions. All questionnaire responses will be treated as strictly confidential and all the 
responses will be directed to me. A report with the findings of the research will be available 
and all employees can have a copy of the report if they wish to. 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you in advance for your help during the process 
of data collection and If you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me 
on mendesde@lse.ac.uk. Your support is very much appreciated and of paramount 
importance for the success of this study. 
Thank you very much for your time and I look forward to receiving your responses. 
Best wishes, 
Bethania Mendes de B. Antunes 
Employment Relations and Organisational Behaviour Group 
London School of Economics and Political Sciences/LSE 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE 
 
 
276 
 
 
Cover Letter to Employees 
Date, year 
Dear (Organisation name) Employee, 
I am doing a PhD at the LSE and I am writing to ask your help in a study of reward/payment 
systems in charities in the UK. The research work I am developing at the LSE aims to 
contribute to a better understanding of the process of formulation and implementation of 
reward systems in nonprofit organisations and whether they motivate staff to achieve 
organisational goals. The Charity sector is very much in evidence in the UK and increases in 
size, scope, roles and responsibilities. Therefore it is of paramount relevance to study what 
directions are taken by the sector in terms of payment systems. 
Four organisations in the homeless sector are taking part in the research. (names of 
organisations taking part). They have been chosen for their importance and contributions 
made to the homeless sector. Your organisation has been very kind in supporting my 
research work and I would like to ask for your help in completing the online survey. This 
research gives an opportunity to charity employees to discuss reward/payment systems in the 
sector and will influence future research in this field. 
Within the next few days you will receive an email subject ‘Reward Systems at 
(Organisation name)’ with a short introduction of the study and a link to the survey which 
you can complete it online. I will be sending the online survey to all organisations taking 
part in the study and I hope very much that you will find the questions relevant and 
interesting. All questionnaire responses will be treated as strictly confidential and managers 
at (Organisation name) will not have access to the data collected. All the responses will be 
directed to me at the LSE. 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you in advance for your contribution and 
emphasize how important your answers are for the success of this study. If you have any 
further questions please do not hesitate to contact me on mendesde@lse.ac.uk. A report with 
the findings of the research will be available and if you are interested in a copy please do 
email me.  
I hope that you will all wish to complete the survey questionnaire. Thank you very much for 
your time. 
Best wishes, 
Bethania Mendes de B. Antunes 
Employment Relations and Organisational Behaviour Group 
London School of Economics and Political Sciences/LSE 
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Houghton Street 
WC2A 2A  
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Survey Email to Employees 
Dear (name of organisation) Employee, 
I would like to ask for your help in a study of reward systems in charities in the UK. This 
study aims to contribute to a better understanding of the process of formulation and 
implementation of reward systems in charities and whether they motivate staff to achieve 
organisational goals.   
Four organisations in the homeless sector are taking part in this research. (name of 
organisations taking part). You have been chosen for your importance and contributions 
made to the homeless sector.  This research gives an opportunity to nonprofit employees to 
discuss reward/payment systems in the sector and will influence future research in this field. 
Below is a link to the survey which you can complete online. Once you click on the link it 
should take you no longer than 12 minutes to complete it. All questionnaire responses will be 
treated as strictly confidential and managers at (organization name) will not have access to 
the data collected. All the responses will be directed to me at the LSE. 
 [S] 
I hope very much that you will find the questions relevant and interesting and I would like to 
take this opportunity to thank you in advance for your contribution and emphasize how 
important your answers are for the success of this study. 
Thank you very much for your time, 
Bethania Mendes de B. Antunes 
Employment Relations and Organisational Behaviour Group 
London School of Economics and Political Sciences/LSE 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE 
This link is unique to you. Please do not forward it. 
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Letter to Participating Charities 
 (Name of HR Director)  
HR Director 
(Address) 
Re: Bethania Mendes de Brito Antunes (200524663) 
Date, year   
Dear Ms (name of HR Director), 
I am writing to confirm that Ms Bethania Mendes de Brito Antunes is currently registered as 
a PhD Student in the Employment Relations and Organisational Behaviour Group, 
Department of Management at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Ms 
Antunes supervisor is David Marsden.  
The purpose of Bethania’s research is to analyse the reward systems adopted in charities in 
the United Kingdom and its relevance in retaining and motivating employees to achieve 
organisational goals.  The research will involve interviews and a survey questionnaire for 
members of staff in the charities wishing to take part.  Any material distributed to staff in the 
charities will be agreed previously with the HR managers. 
The research conducted will be for academic purposes only.  Any information disclosed by 
organisations participating in the case studies will be treated as confidential and documents 
provided by the organisations will not be shared with the other charities taking part.  The 
results of the research will be shared with the organisations and a final report will be 
provided to the charities. 
The research work to be undertaken will not involve any costs for the charities. 
Should you require any additional information please do not hesitate to contact me 020 7955 
7791. 
Yours Faithfully, 
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Emma Anderson 
Programme Administrator 
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APPENDIX 3 
Interview Questions (General Guidance) – HR Directors and HR Managers 
1. Background: title, role, responsibilities 
 
2. Organisation: Business, services offered 
 
3. What is the reward system you have in place at the moment?  
 
4. Why have you chosen this pay system? 
 
5. What drives the choice of a pay system and who is responsible for making the 
decision?  
 
6. Do you make use of benchmarking to access what other organisations in the sector 
are having in terms of pay system? Does that influence your decision? 
 
7. Has the pay system been developed in consultation with key stakeholders 
(management, staff, unions)? 
 
8. Is it linked to the organisation’s current needs and goals? 
 
9. In your opinion is the reward system congruent with the organisation’s culture? 
 
10. In your opinion is the reward system effective? Why? How? 
About Performance Management 
11. How long have you had Performance Management for? Why have you decided to 
implement PM?  
 
12. What are the identifiable performance measures for the organisation? 
 
13. Who assesses and manages performance? 
 
14. Are they close enough to employees (especially those out in the field) to be able to 
judge performance effectively? 
 
15. Is there sufficient management capability to manage performance and motivation 
well? 
 
16. Do you think there is trust in the current performance management process? 
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17. PM could be a way to have tighter/strict control over employees. Do you think 
employees would have less autonomy or participation in the organisation once you 
have performance management? 
 
18. How often do you have appraisals or performance reviews? What is the coverage? 
What is the appraisal method (competences/targets/360 degree etc)? 
 
19. Do you have meetings between line managers/supervisors and all the workers for 
whom they are responsible? If yes, how frequent are these meetings? Which issues 
are discussed? 
 
20. Do you believe there is good communication between hostels/projects and head 
office? 
 
21. Do employees have any involvement in the process of decision making of issues 
related to their work? 
 
22. Are employees given the training and development needed to help improve 
performance? 
 
23. Do you believe employees have the right skills for the demands of the work? 
 
24. Would you say that employees here are satisfied with their: remuneration system, 
training opportunities, working conditions?  
 
25. In your opinion, why do you think people come to work for charities?  
 
26. Where was your previous job? (charity, public, private sector) 
 
27. Would you say that the values of charity workers are different from private sector 
employees? How?  
 
28. From your experience in recruiting, where do employees come from? (charity, 
public, private sector). 
 
29. Do you take measures to attract and contract people with charity work experience? 
 
30. Are employees led to expect long-term employment at Broadway? 
 
31. What is the annual staff turnover? 
 
32. In your opinion, what are the reasons for staff turnover? (e.g. Pay, lack of career 
opportunities, poor working conditions, poor training)  
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33. Would you believe that pay responses are the only way to keep people? 
 
34. Have other strategies, such as improved training and development, and improved 
working conditions been tried? 
 
 
Interview Questions (General Guidance) – Line Managers 
1. How long have you been working for this organisation? Same position? Was a 
career decision to work for a charity? 
 
2. Do you enjoy working here? 
 
3. In your opinion, why do you think people come to work for charities? (Apart from 
mission attachment what else?) Why do they come to work for this organisation? 
 
4. Would you say that the values of charity workers are different from private sector 
employees? How?  
 
5. Where was your previous job? (charity, public, private sector) 
 
6. Do you think employees here are led to expect long-term employment? 
 
About Rewards/Performance Management 
7. In your opinion is the reward system used here effective? Why? How? 
 
8. Would you say that employees here are satisfied with the remuneration system?  
 
9. About Performance Management? Who assesses and manages performance? 
 
10. Are they close enough to employees (especially those out in the field) to be able to 
judge performance effectively? 
 
11. Do you think managers are capable of managing performance well? 
 
12. What are the identifiable performance measures for the organisation? 
 
13. Do you think there is trust in the current performance management process? 
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14. Do you think Performance Management could be a way to have tighter/strict control 
over employees? Do you think employees would have less autonomy or 
participation in the organisation once you have performance management here? 
 
15. Are there meetings between line managers/supervisors and all the workers for whom 
they are responsible? If yes, how frequent are these meetings? Which issues are 
discussed? 
 
16. Do you believe there is good communication between hostels/projects and head 
office? 
 
17. Do employees have any involvement in the process of decision making of issues 
related to their work? 
 
18. Are employees given the training and development needed to help improve 
performance? 
 
19. Do you believe employees have the right skills for the demands of the work? 
 
20. Would you say that employees here are satisfied with their training opportunities, 
working conditions?  
 
21. Do you think staff turnover here is high? 
 
22. In your opinion, what are the reasons for staff turnover? (e.g. Pay, lack of career 
opportunities, poor working conditions, poor training) 
 
23. Would you believe that pay responses are the only way to keep people? What other 
strategies could be used to keep and motivate people? 
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APPENDIX 4 
Interview Questions – Reward Consultants 
Role and background 
What is your approach to reward strategy? 
Who is responsible for reward decisions in the organisation? (Board, CEO, Senior 
Management) 
What factors do nonprofit organisations take into account in determining their pay system? 
(More specifically PRP) 
Why do you think those factors are important to the organisations? 
What do you think it leads organisations to change their pay system? Examples of your own 
clients? 
Any other factors we have not discussed here that could influence the choice of PRP system? 
